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For it was the voice of one 
 who had never been dirty or hungry, 
 and had not guessed successfully 
 what dirt and hunger are. 
 
 



































If John Donne were correct, and no one is an island, than 
this is doubly true for a PhD student.  
My thanks to my advisor, Liz Faue, and to my committee members,  
Tracy Neumann, Janine Lanza, and John Pat Leary. 
My thanks to the many faculty members in the WSU Department of History 
and many outside of it, who helped me along the way. 
My thanks to my peers in the Departments of History and English, 
and the many more in and from places across North America, Europe, and West Africa, 
who helped me think through this project via presentations 
and conversations. 
 
I could not have finished this journey without the support of my family, 
who always show me anew what love means. 
I could not have done it without my friends, who enrich my life 
in ways I could never express in words. 
I never would have begun it except for those who showed me 
the fascination of history in high school and as an undergraduate. 
 
My final thanks and gratitude are to those  
who call Detroit home, past and present. 

































Chapter 1 Introduction___________________________________________________________1 
 
Chapter 2 “Ghost Towns in the Very Near Future”: Industrial Decentralization and Working- 
 
Class Organization in Suburban Detroit in the 1950s__________________________________39 
 
Chapter 3 “This Potent, Though Invisible, Barrier”: Housing Segregation and Civil Rights in 
 
Suburban Detroit, 1943-973 _____________________________________________________81 
 




Chapter 5 From Detroit to Washington: The Federal Response to the Urban Crisis and the Fight 
 
for Model Cities, 1966-1970____________________________________________________163 
 
Chapter 6 The Urban Imaginary of the Great Society, 1967-1968________________________213 
 






















CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The crisis of Fordism rapidly or simultaneously became the crisis of the Fordist city. 
W.F. Fever1 
 
There have been many Detroits over the past one hundred years. There has been the city of 
Henry Ford, of the assembly line, and of five dollar days. There was the Motor City, the world 
capital of automobiles, suburbanization, highways, and a working class with middle class 
remuneration. Or there was Motown, where glamor, music, and fame ruled supreme, regardless of 
the color of one’s skin. There was, too, the model city of race relations in the United States. With 
1967 came the Detroit of civil unrest that may be, depending on the beholder, a riot, an uprising, 
or a rebellion. Then there is the city of industrial ruins, the way paved by decades of 
deindustrialization and disinvestment, followed by the murder capital of crisis, crime, and 
violence. Finally, there is the empty city, an urban space perceived to be devoid of residents. A 
place of fear, of abandonment, which all-to-easily elides with the revitalization fantasies which 
paint the city as a blank slate, free for the taking. 
During World War II, Detroit, the Motor City, claimed the mantle of the “Arsenal of 
Democracy,” even as it began to encounter the costs of rapid growth and mass industrial 
production. By 1950, with the Second World War receding into memory, many began to image 
the future of Detroit in different ways. Some had visions of broad and stable homeownership and 
employment; others styled futuristic renderings of driverless cars and manufacturing facilities 
contained within mountains. Very few people in 1950, however, imagined Detroit as an urban 
space riven by racial and class divisions, plagued by unemployment poverty, and housing crises. 
By and large, Detroiters all wished and imagined a better future, although what they understood to 
                                                          





constitute a better future was wide-ranging and occasionally conflicting. Central to the varying 
visions of the future of Detroit were different conceptions of what contemporary problems in urban 
spaces were and what future shape Detroit might take. 
At the end of the 1940s and into the early 1950s, some automobile workers and their local 
governments railed against industrial decentralization, warning of “ghost towns” if industrial 
employment moved away. At the River Rouge industrial complex, in Dearborn, workers brought 
their concerns to the attention of the Ford Motor Company. Union officials and automobile 
companies disagreed with this prognosis, as did a federal judge. Across town in Grosse Pointe, a 
suburban community just over the city lines practiced a systematic and codified form of housing 
segregation, later subject to a state investigation. Defenders of the segregation system acted as they 
did out of a fear of the future might bring otherwise for their community. They saw themselves as 
guardians and protectors. But not all of members of their community agreed with this vision of a 
lily-white future. Instead, the dissenters organized to bring integration to their community. 
By the late 1960s, local elites foresaw the need to plan for infrastructure needs up to the 
end of the millennium. An internationally prominent urban planner and theorist was engaged to 
plan the future of the Detroit region in the year 2000. Brilliant, imaginative, comprehensive yet 
human-centered, the planner and his team nonetheless argued that class and racial divisions were 
outside the project’s purview. The city they imagined called upon technology and a planned 
physical environment to create a different future for Detroit. 
Around the same time, the Lyndon Johnson administration, prompted by Walter Reuther, 
moved to address the urban crisis across the country. Legislators responded with criticism and then 
a defense of what came to be known as the Model Cities program, revealing a spectrum of views 




and internal communications of the LBJ administration on Model Cities revealed that, while the 
intention was good, an understanding of the class and racial divisions in urban America, as will be 
shown in the first two chapters, and the experiences of working-class and non-white city residents, 
was missing from these high-level conversations and plans. 
The urban crisis is the conceptual heart of this study. Here, urban crisis is used as it was in 
the 1950s. That is to say, as a structural interpretation of the existence and causes of low-quality 
housing, industrial decentralization, the decreasing capacity of cities to provide services to their 
residents, and segregation.2 It asks questions about whether residents in Detroit imagined these 
changes and how they attempted to get beyond them. In addition, this study draws form the work 
of Manuel Castells, Henri Lefebvre, and David Harvey.3 It does not concern itself with the “culture 
of poverty” or underclass interpretations of urban concerns, which blame cultural conditions rather 
than material ones for poverty and segregation in urban spaces.4 Instead, this study focuses on the 
on-the-ground effort to assess Detroit’s problems and imagine a way out of them, toward a 
different urban future. For local residents, the future included stable, unionized, employment and, 
while opinions were split on the merits of integration, the role of racial inclusion or exclusion was 
a large part of the conversation. The further from local communities one goes, the less 
understanding there is of the importance of industrial employment, and racial questions are more 
likely to be avoided than met head-on. 
 
                                                          
2 Timothy Weaver, "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept," Urban Studies 54, no. 9 (2017); Thomas Sugrue, 
The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005; originally 1996). 
3 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); David Harvey, Social 
Justice and the City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); David Harvey, "The Right to the City," 
New Left Review, no. 53 (2008); Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
4 For an overview of these arguments, see Weaver, "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept."; and Mitchell 





The beginning, but certainly not the end, of the puzzle of Detroit and its fate is the 
intersection of class with race in the United States. Scholars have argued that white supremacy in 
the colonies, and then in the States, was rooted in the control of labor, and thus the control of the 
working class.5 Given the divisions among workers by gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and other 
identities, we should speak of different working classes, which together comprise the overarching 
working class. By the 20th century, and the spread of mas industrial production, further refined into 
Fordist production, exploiting racial and gendered divisions among laborers continued to be a key 
strategy among managers and the owners of capital.6 This is not to argue that discrimination based 
on race or gender are by-products of class relations, but rather that they are intertwined tightly and 
intimately with class structure. Thus, even as white Detroit auto workers staged wildcat strikes to 
protest integrated work spaces, key union wins – such as the unionization of Ford – only occurred 
when class solidarity held against racial divisions.7 
Similarly, racial segregation has formed an integral component of US urban history. Just 
as DuBois wrote that the problem of the United States in the 20th century was the problem of the 
color line, cities in the 20th century United States were marked with the history and legacy of racial 
and ethnic inequalities. Detroit was and is no exception. A number of scholars already have tilled 
                                                          
5 Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: the Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2003); Theodore Allen, The Invention of the White Race, Volume 1: Racial Oppression and Social 
Control (2012); Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race, Volume 2: The Origin of Racial Oppression in 
Anglo-America (London: Verso, 2012); David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the 
American Working Class (London: Verso, 2007); W. E. B.  Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, orginally 1935). 
6 Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York: New Press, 2001); 
Stephen Meyer, Manhood on the Line: Working-Class Masculinities in the American Heartland (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2016); Elizabeth Faue, Rethinking the American Labor Movement (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
7 Beth Tompkins Bates, The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the 




this soil. Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin’s Detroit: I Do Mind Dying (1975), covering Detroit 
in the late 60s through the early 70s, is one vital example.8 Another contemporaneous account, by 
radical geographer William Bunge, who taught at Wayne State University, studied one square mile 
in Detroit before, during, and after the events of the summer of 1967.9 Slightly earlier, in 1972, B. 
J. Widick, who came out of the union movement and the United Auto Workers (UAW) to teach 
economics at Wayne State University and then Columbia University, wrote Detroit: City of Race 
and Class Violence.10 More recently, historian Beth Bates addressed the racial politics of the city 
in The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford, which ended with the unionization of 
Ford in 1941.11 All of these works are attentive to the interplay of race and class in the Motor City 
in the 20th century. 
The two works of history that correspond the closest to this study are Thomas Sugrue’s 
The Origins of the Urban Crisis and Heather Ann Thompson’s Whose Detroit?, both of which 
examine the dynamics of race and class in Detroit in the decades following the Second World 
War.12 Set in the 60s and 70s, Thompson’s Whose Detroit? locates the labor movement in the 
context of 1960s social movements, including, most importantly civil rights. She demonstrates 
how interwoven the experiences of racism and classism were in the city. In tune with Thompson’s 
interest in the carceral state, Whose Detroit? addresses issues of policing and law enforcement in 
an urban space, showing the power of courts, jails, and police as realms of racial oppression and 
class exploitation.13 Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis is the launching point for study. My first 
                                                          
8 Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2012; originally 1975). 
9 William Bunge, Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution (University of Georgia, 2011). 
10 B.J. Widick, Detroit: City of Race and Class Violence, revised ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989). 
11 Bates, Making of Black Detroit. 
12 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis; Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a 
Modern American City (Cornell University Press, 2004). 
13 Heather Ann Thompson, "Rethinking Working-Class Struggle through the Lens of the Carceral State: Toward a 




two chapters, on Local 600 and on segregation in Grosse Pointe, came from much more 
abbreviated discussions in Sugrue’s study. As his title indicates, Sugrue examines the cause of the 
urban crisis in Detroit and identifies it as the interaction of housing segregation, job discrimination, 
and deindustrialization. This dissertation builds on Thompson’s and Sugrue’s work, asking how 
Detroiters understood these processes at the time and what their responses were. Thus, while 
Sugrue asks what happened in postwar Detroit to bring about its urban crisis, this study asks what 
Detroiters thought would or could happen as the city confronted challenges in the changing 
economic environment and encountered the political opportunities and limitations of the emerging 
liberal state. 
Defining Deindustrialization 
As the process of deindustrialization creates the background of much of this history, a brief 
discussion of the scholarly literature provides a useful background for the rest of this study. As 
Barry Bluestone has explained in his foreword to the collected volume Beyond the Ruins: The 
Meanings of Deindustrialization, industrial productivity has risen in the United States even as 
industrial employment has gone down. Despite the dominant narrative of deindustrializing cities 
in the US, the amount of manufacturing has gone up. In 1959, 16.7 million American workers 
were in the manufacturing sector, comprising a little over a third of all US workers outside of the 
agricultural sector (31.3%). In 1979 the actual number of workers had risen to 21 million even as 
the percentage dropped to 23.4%. By 1999, the actual number began to decline, to 18.6 million, 
and the percentage dropped as well, to 14.4%. After 2001, the number was down to 16.5 million, 
lower than in 1959, and the percentage was 12.6%, or around an eighth of all workers who were 
                                                          
"Rethinking Urban America through the Lens of the Carceral State," Journal of Urban History 41, no. 5 (2015); 
Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy (New York: 




employed outside of agriculture. “Millions of workers are losing their jobs,” Bluestone concludes, 
“in industries in which productivity  is growing faster than sales. This cannot be termed 
‘deindustrialization,’ but for the workers affected it feels the same.”14 While perhaps this does not 
describe the deindustrialization of the United States, it does describe the deindustrialization of the 
American workforce. 
Additionally, Bluestone highlights a key aspect of attention to deindustrialization in the 
United States: that it is chronologically situated in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, Bluestone 
pinpoints the 1973 oil embargo as the beginning of the economic woes that would come to be 
associated with deindustrialization. It set the stage for Bluestone’s own influential analysis, with 
co-author Bennett Harrison, published in 1982.15 Beginning with a 1980 Business Insider editorial 
calling for “the reindustrialization of America,” Bluestone and Harrison trace the “trouble” back 
to the early 1970s. In this telling, the 1960s were a time of growth and prosperity, a decade during 
which economic growth averaged 4.1% a year and the GNP grew by 50% over ten years. The 
United States was, as Kenneth Galbraith described it, “the affluent society” (with, as Bluestone 
and Harrison put it, “the notable exception of millions of black, brown, and teenaged workers.”).16 
By the 1980s the tide had seemed to turn, as domestic economic concerns joined together with 
“America’s apparent inability to compete in the global marketplace.”17 In Detroit, the tendency to 
                                                          
14 Barry Bluestone, “Foreword,” in Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of 
Deindustrialization (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003), xii-xiii. 
15 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community 
Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York City: Basic Books, 1982). Jefferson Cowie and 
Joseph Heathcott credit this book with introducing the term to “the popular and scholarly lexicon.” However, they 
also state that the first public use of the term deindustrialization was to describe the Allied policy towards Germany 
following World War II. The Oxford English Dictionary gives that honor to the Economist in 1940, describing the 
Third Reich’s policy towards Vichy France. This quibble does not alter Heathcott and Cowie’s main point, although 
it is worth noting that the first use of the verb to deindustrialize occurred nearly six decades earlier, in 1882. 
16 Bluestone and Harrison, Deindustrialization of America, 4; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2009).  
17 This timeline is used elsewhere, including in W.F. Lever’s entry on “The Post-Fordist City” and that of Douglas 




blame non-Americans, or those seen as non-American, for the downturn in the metropolis’s 
industrial employment has a troubling and chilling history. At the most benign, it involves defiant 
gestures like the UAW refusing to allow foreign-made automobiles to park in the lot at their 
headquarters, Solidarity House, on Jefferson Avenue or bumper stickers that read “Out of a job 
yet? Keep buying foreign.” At its worst, opposition to foreign goods and workers fueled racial and 
ethnic hatred that led to brutal incidents such as the race-based murder of Vincent Chen in 1982.18 
Putting temporal matters to the side, Bluestone and Harrison usefully delineate the different 
forms deindustrialization took. In one form, called “milking,” a profitable plant could  see its 
profits redirected elsewhere in the operation, leading to financial difficulties and problems with 
the physical plant. In a more aggressive form, management makes a conscious decision to allow 
the factory to deteriorate, with profits directed elsewhere and physical assets not maintained, 
leading to inevitably to inefficiencies and breakdowns. A third form involves shifting physical 
assets, like machinery or other equipment, to other locations. While the plant stays open, 
productivity declines. In a fourth form of deindustrialization, the one most closely associated with 
the process in the popular imagination, the plant – and possibly even the business – is closed. In a 
variant, operations are relocated elsewhere, a process which became known as the “runaway shop” 
in the 1930s and again in the 1950s. In the latter case, Bluestone and Harrison refer to the use of 
the term in “industries such as shoes, textiles, and apparel [which] left New England for the lower-
wage, non-unionized South,” but autoworkers in Detroit also used the term, “runaway shop,” at 
the beginning of the 1950s, as the first chapter details.19 
                                                          
18 Bluestone and Harrison, Deindustrialization of America, 5; Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of 
Economic Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); Frances Kai-Hwa Wang, "Vincent Chin: A Catalyst for the 
Asian-American Civil Rights Movement," Michigan History Magazine, 2017 March-April 2017. 




While pushing back against this popular narrative, Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott 
repeat the common misconceptions about the chronology in their introduction to Meanings of 
Deindustrialization. They write that while the late 1970s and early 1980s was the time during 
which deindustrialization became part of the political lexicon, its roots were longer than supposed. 
In 2003, the scholarly literature continued to have to argue against the dominant narrative that tied 
the period of deindustrialization to the late 1970s and the 1980s. Similarly, scholars have often 
argued that deindustrialization itself is not the most useful term, as the total number of 
manufacturing employment in the US did not change much, let alone shrink – from 18 million in 
1965 to 18.5 million in 2000. Instead, what changed was the quality of jobs available and their 
compensation, the unionization rate (down 40% from 1985 to 2000), power relations in the 
workplace, and the location of manufacturing.20 
For these reasons, together with growing concerns about globalization and uneven 
development, many scholars have chosen to refer to industrial restructuring rather than 
deindustrialization.21 This is an important aspect to keep in mind in discussing a site of production 
such as Detroit, where the city proper lost manufacturing while production merely left the city for 
the suburbs or nearby locations like Toledo.22 Regardless, whether shops moved to the suburbs, 
neighboring states, or to the Sunbelt, manufacturing continued in the Detroit metropolitan area. 
The question is where it was located and what the quality of employment in the manufacturing 
sector was, as well as the broader context of local employment. Further, as sociologist Ruth 
                                                          
20 “Introduction,” in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins, 14. 
21 See, for instance, Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005); W. F. Lever, "The Post-Fordist City" and Douglas V. Shaw, "The Post-Industrial 
City," in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies. 
22 Some, including Constantinos Doxiadis, who is the subject of the third chapter, would include Toledo as part of 




Milkman has written, examinations of job loss and industrial decline should not devolve into rosy 
nostalgia for what were harsh and often dehumanizing work conditions and jobs.23 
What is useful about the term industrial restructuring is how it conveys how 
deindustrialization was part of a larger process, “one episode in a long series of transformations 
within capitalism,” and that industrial production itself does not end. As Cowie and Heathcott 
phrased it, “deindustrialization and industrialization are merely two ongoing aspects of the history 
of capitalism that describe continual and complicated patterns of investment and disinvestment.”24 
They are the two sides of a single coin. Moreover, it helps to convey that deindustrialization is a 
process embedded in geography, in the sense that the location of manufacturing has always been 
place-based, uneven, and changing. 
Cowie and Heathcott argue that the point of departure for any discussion of 
deindustrialization “must be respect for the despair and betrayal felt by workers,” the “defeat and 
subjugation” of “workers who banked on good-paying industrial jobs for the livelihoods of their 
families and their communities.”25 Yes, but how necessary was it that these jobs were industrial? 
Did workers mourn factories as factories, in and of themselves, or for the good-paying and 
seemingly stable jobs ensured by unionization, with a relative ease of entrance? What was lost 
when workers no longer had the ability to plan ahead and to count on employment with which one 
could support one’s family and sustain one’s community? We should ask to what degree industrial 
employment was necessary for these conditions of labor. Other fields of work, such as teaching 
and nursing, if they are unionized, meet many of these criteria, although with major exceptions. 
                                                          
23 Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 12. 
24 Cowie and Heathcott, "Introduction: The Meanings of Deindustrialization," in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond 
the Ruins, 15. 
25 Cowie and Heathcott, "Introduction: The Meanings of Deindustrialization," in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond 
the Ruins, 1. See also Sherry Lee Linkon and John Russo, Steeltown USA: Work & Memory in Youngstown 




The first is the mass employment required by mass production, and the second is the requirement 
in these latter occupations for higher education. 
Deindustrialization was devastating to workers, workers’ families, and working-class 
neighborhood and communities. Most important was the loss of the conditions of labor favorable 
to workers, not industrial production in and of itself, with its ear-shattering noise, its inhuman 
rhythms, and its back-breaking work. We should ask how stable were these conditions of labor 
under an industrial regime. Do we remember as permanent what was really a fleeting historical 
moment contingent on the Second World War, followed by the Cold War and proxy wars, such as 
that in Korea? Did manufacturers, amiable during time of national security and federal contracts, 
merely revert to the status quo as soon as it was expedient? As labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein 
has argued, “the very idea of such a postwar accord is a suspect construct,” that whatever industrial 
peace that did exist “came flying apart when management in highly competitive industries went 
on the postwar offensive.”26 
Nonetheless, it is that concept of the postwar accord that provides the foundation for the 
American (and Canadian) framework for Steven High and David W. Lewis’s in 2007 work, 
Corporate Wasteland, in which they contextualized “the deindustrial sublime.”27 The American 
(and Canadian) dream, as it was conceived in the post-World War II era, found fulfillment in the 
blue-collar middle class, by which “the higher wages won by unionized workers offered millions 
                                                          
26 Nelson Lichtenstein, "Class Politics and the State during World War Two," International Labor and Working-
Class History, no. 58 (2000): 270. 
27 What High and Lewis call the deindustrial sublime overlaps with what others have critiqued as ruin porn. See, for 
instance, John Patrick Leary, “Detroitism,” Guernica, January 15, 2011, 
https://www.guernicamag.com/leary_1_15_11/, accessed August 27, 2018. High and Lewis are not uncritical of the 
preservation of closed sites of industrial production, however, noting that “the factory-scape might be retained, but 
the jobs were gone, as were the workplace cultures on which industrial workers depended for status and solidarity.” 
See Steven C. High and David W. Lewis, Corporate Wasteland: The Landscape and Memory of Deindustrialization 




of families a home in the suburbs and a broad range of consumer goods.”28 The unsettling impact 
of industrial restructuring undermined this dream of economic uplift and underscored the 
fundamental economic precarity and vulnerability of working-class people and communities. By 
contrasting deindustrialization in the US and in Canada, the authors of Corporate Wasteland show 
how economic transformations do not occur in vacuums and how their consequences are shaped 
by public policies and laws. High and Lewis argue that deindustrialization in both countries is 
often framed as inevitable, “a natural by-product of corporate capitalism.”29 Instead, the authors 
pinpoint two major factors in plant closings: relocation and obsolescence. Both are entirely under 
the control of companies, although their decisions are guided by cost-saving and profit margins, 
not the negative impact on the labor force or local communities. The result is uneven development, 
a plant closing in one place with another opening somewhere else, in which “people and places 
have become disposable” under the guise of what Schumpeter called creative destruction.30 
Jefferson Cowie traced how this played out with RCA Victor in his 1999 study, Capital 
Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor, which chronicled how a Camden, New 
Jersey, plant’s workforce was slashed in the late 1940s following unionization in 1937. The jobs 
moved first to Bloomington, Indiana, a city attractive to RCA due to “the population’s desperation 
for work.” When unionization came to Bloomington, and a strike wave in the mid-to-late 1960s, 
RCA moved production first to Memphis for a few years before crossing the border to Ciudad 
Juarez. From the 1960s through the 1990s, the Bloomington plant continued to decline until it shut 
                                                          
28 High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 3. See also Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass 
Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Knopf, 2003). 
29 High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 7. 
30 High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 8; Joseph A. Schumpteter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 




down completely in 1998 as production was siphoned down south, where labor was cheaper and 
non-unionized.31 
Industrial Production and Detroit’s History 
From the late 19th century through the Second World War, Detroit was a boomtown 
propelled by industrialization, even as its early days of industrialization were outpaced by the 
behemoth of Fordist production. In 1870, the city’s population was 80,000, and it grew to 465,000 
within forty years. Between 1910 and 1920, with the advent of mass automobile production, the 
population more than doubled that number, to 994,000. By 1930, the population was 1.5 million, 
and the city reached its population peak at 1.8 million in 1950.32 By the postwar era, automobile 
production and its secondary industries were what kept Detroit moving as a center of mass 
industry. The working-class communities of postwar Detroit were predicated on mass industrial 
employment. This employment, or at the very least its enduring potential and possibility, was the 
sine qua non of Detroit as a city of a relatively prosperous working class.33 
The beginning of the 20th century saw a diverse economy in Detroit, with regional 
manufacturing and retail of stoves, carriages, railroad cars and equipment, drugs, and boots. By 
1920, however, the automobile industry dominated the economy of Detroit.34 There was a hiatus, 
during the Second World War, in 1943 and 1944, when the auto industry produced no cars but 
instead focused on defense production – tanks, armored vehicles, planes, and munitions. When 
peacetime production resumed, the demand was all the greater for the moratorium. The record year 
for automobile production was 1929, when 5.4 million automobiles were made. In 1948, 5.3 
                                                          
31 Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor. The quote is from p. 43 
32 Douglas V. Shaw, “The Post-Industrial City,” in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies, 285, 290. 
33 On early industrialism in Detroit, and the social concerns it raised, see Joseph Stanhope Cialdella, "Landscape of 
Ruin and Repair: Parks, Potatoes, and Detroit's Environmental Past, 1879-1900," Michigan Historical Review 40, 
no. 1 (2014). For a discussion Fordism, see Fever, “The Post-Fordist City,” in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban 
Studies, 273-283. 




million were produced, just slightly under the record, and the next year the number was 6.6 million. 
By 1950, it was 8.8 million. This growth bespoke a number of changes, both nationally and 
globally. Before the Second World War, the auto industry was largely subject to consumer demand 
– and automobiles were, relatively speaking, luxury goods. While that luxury was extended to the 
middle class and even better paid working-class consumers, via used vehicles, they were not 
crucial for transport or most employment. Consequently, consumer demand often went down 
during times of economic hardship, and the entire auto industry, and employment in related 
industries such as steel and rubber, went down with it. The advent of the military-industrial 
complex during the Second World War meant that defense contracts and the post-war rebuilding 
effort could give an impetus to American industry that was independent of consumer demands, 
even as war-time savings fueled consumer demand in cars in the 1950s.35 
From 1947 through 1967, the number of industrial workers employed in manufacturing in 
Detroit proper fell from 281,500 to 149,600, a decrease of 47%.36 In the same years, the workforce 
grew in the surrounding communities in the tri-county area (Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne) from 
186,700 to 244,700, or an increase of 31%.37 The worst job losses occurred in the 1950s, due to a 
combination of four postwar recessions, the loss of small manufacturing plants and defense jobs, 
the rise of automation and other technological changes, and decentralization of production to 
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communities outside the city proper.38 For example, at Chrysler, employment dropped from 
100,000 to 35,000, most of which occurred at its major factories in Detroit.39 
Even in good years for the automobile industry, such as 1955, unemployed auto workers 
in the city were did not benefit, as the auto companies built new factories incorporating new 
technologies of automation in surrounding communities – such as Trenton, Warren, and Utica – 
to replace the aging industrial infrastructure in Detroit proper. As auto production increased to new 
heights, up to 10,000,000 annually, employment in auto factories stayed the same across the United 
States. The result was, in B. J. Widick’s phrasing, “severe dislocations” of Detroit industrial 
workers in the 1950s.40 Nor was Detroit alone. Nineteen fifty-six was, after all, the year pinpointed 
by sociologist Daniel Bell, writing in 1973, as the year when the United States shifted to being a 
post-industrial society, as evidenced by, “for the first time in the history of industrial civilization,” 
the number of white-collar workers was greater than the number of blue-collar workers.41 
Detroit may not have been a center for high-tech manufacturing, but it was the site of booming 
production that went hand-in-hand with a increased consumer demand following the war, which 
in turn mean a new demand for labor. In addition to recent migration to the city, the increased 
demand for labor deepened the continuing housing shortage. Further, 75% of new housing in the 
metropolitan area was happening outside Detroit proper, in Macomb and Oakland counties. 
Developers found that it was more cost-effective to build new housing and factories in 
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undeveloped areas outside the city rather than rebuilding or renovating existing buildings in the 
city.42 
That the 1950s were such turbulent years for auto workers in Detroit serves as a reminder that 
the Motor City went through several generations of automobile production. The first generation 
was the early factories located in the city proper with heavy demand for labor, which gave way to 
a second generation of increasingly automated plants located in metropolitan areas. This, in turn, 
gave way to a subsequent generations of plant relocation, automation, and worker displacement 
and relocation. Indeed, the movement of production from the city proper into the suburbs correlates 
to the suburban boom in metropolitan Detroit. In the 1950s, 500,000 people moved out of Detroit, 
with a net loss of 270,000. On the other side of the city border, Warren, a suburb just to the north 
of Detroit and one of the suburban communities that saw the construction of new auto plants, grew 
to a city of over 100,000 as Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors built facilities there, joined by 
smaller auto parts suppliers. Nor did these changes occur in a social or political vacuum: Warren 
remained an all-white community until the 1970s.43 
Journalist Scott Martelle has argued that Detroit’s current fortunes would have been 
fundamentally different if the city’s economy had continued to be as closely tied to defense 
spending after the Second World War as it had been during the war. Martelle’s argument suggests 
the difficulties that arise from equating deindustrialization with a decline in industrial 
manufacturing overall, rather than a decrease in manufacturing’s share of the economy and, vitally, 
the number and quality of jobs manufacturing provides.44 It is not industrial production per se so 
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much as the conditions of production that matter. But neither are industries outside of automobile 
production, including defense, immune from the forces that weakened the economies of cities like 
Detroit – decentralization of production, automation, outsourcing – that might call for smaller 
workforces in dispersed locations, rather than large workforces in centralized locations.45 
Moreover, decentralization was often a condition for defense contracts. It is not far-fetched, 
given Detroit’s role as the Arsenal of Democracy during the war, that industrial decentralization 
was related to, if not direct defense contracts, than at least the possibility of future defense 
production on a different model. Regardless, the defense spending that did come Detroit’s way 
was on a far smaller scale than that directed towards the Sun Belt, which saw high-tech, computer, 
and electronic manufacturing develop in ways they never did in Detroit. The defense jobs that did 
exist in metropolitan Detroit were far outside the city’s limits, such as at the Warren tank plant, 
and therefore increasingly outside the reach of city residents. The economy of the region might 
have evolved differently in Martelle’s hypothetical situation, but it would not done much to change 
the situation of Detroit’s central city.46 
At the Ford River Rouge complex, workers noted both small scale and more expansive forms 
of deindustrialization in the years following the Second World War. Union leadership struggled to 
find a language to describe their situation, which they had not witnessed prior to the postwar 
period. Layoffs, speedups, automation, and runaway jobs were all decried. As early as 1948, the 
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term decentralization was used to identify the loss of employment at Ford and automobile 
companies in metropolitan Detroit, even as new factories continued to be opened elsewhere.47 
Like other large manufacturing concerns, Detroit auto companies conducted large-scale 
decentralization during the 1950s, building factories closer to other regional bases and reducing 
the cost of labor.48 In the decade following the Second World War, General Motors build factories 
in Atlanta, Kansas City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Wilmington, Delaware; Framingham, 
Massachusetts; Linden, New Jersey; South Gate, California; and Parma, Ohio. All of the 
company’s new or expanded factories were outside of Detroit.49 Moves to integrate production 
meant that local small-part suppliers lost significant business.50 While the large automakers were 
changing their operations, the auto industry in Detroit was undergoing other changes, too. Large 
job loss (77,000 jobs) occurred when Kaiser-Frazer, Midland Steel, Hudson, and Packard went out 
of business. In 1940, 625,456 Detroit city residents were wage-laborers, and that number grew to 
757,772 in 1950. By 1960, however, it has shrunk to 612,295, below the 1940 figure. In 1970, the 
number was 561,184. The decline in the number of production workers mirrored this pattern. In 
1939, before wartime production kicked off, the number was 181,935. It rose to 281,515 in 1947, 
and then declined to 232,348 in 1954. It further dropped to 145,177 in 1958 – again, below the 
prewar number. Employment in the auto industry, which was sensitive to consumer demand, was 
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constantly in flux and tumultuous. The winter of 1949-1950, for instance, saw sudden layoffs that 
raised the number of unemployed in Detroit to 127,000.51 
These changes had a profound impact for the economic well-being of city residents. The 
median family income for white Detroiters in 1959 was $7,050, while it was $4,370 for black 
Detroiters. In the next decade, the median income rose 71% for white Detroiters, but only 40% for 
black families. Seventy-three percent of black households lived on less than $6,000 a year, whereas 
only 41% of white households did so.  Combine this racial disparity with the demographic shift 
occurring as white Detroiters began leaving the city proper for the surrounding suburbs, as the 
proportion of city residents who were black began its upward trajectory. As Detroit became more 
African American in population, it also became relatively more poor, with a corresponding impact 
on neighborhoods, small businesses, local shops, and housing stocks. By 1969, the median family 
income in Detroit was $10,045, but the median family income for black families, just under half 
of the city’s population, was $8,645. “Detroit,” Scott Martelle noted, “was two cities defined by 
one boundary.”52 
The deindustrialization of Detroit was part of a global economic restructuring. This 
restructuring has been variously called post-Fordism, post-industrialism, postmodern, or 
neoliberalism, with each term containing differing connotations and critiques.53 Common 
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characteristics among them include a shift to knowledge and service industries, the spread of 
consumerism to all areas of life, global interconnectedness and networks (including multi- and 
transnational corporations), and flexibility of employment, also called precarity.54 
Deindustrialization could, theoretically, occur without loss of industrial employment. If the 
relative share of a city’s economy taken up by manufacturing decreased, eclipsed by new engines 
of economic growth, such as services ranging from medical, educational, and governmental to 
consumer services, then one could describe that city as post-industrial – that is, no longer 
economically dominated or defined by industrial production. In practice, due to technological 
advances such as automation, job loss tends to go hand-in-hand with the decreasing importance of 
industrial production.55 
Wartime Detroit and the Postwar City 
For Detroit, the Second World War began before the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. A year earlier, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called on the United States to 
provide aid to Great Britain against the Axis. “The people of Europe who are defending themselves 
do not ask us to do their fighting,” the president soberly told those listening, “They ask us for the 
implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight 
for their liberty and for our security.” Roosevelt’s address announced that “business as usual” 
could no longer continue. As production must move away from the market and towards defense, 
so workers and management had to work together for the greater good. “We must be the great 
arsenal of democracy,” the president exhorted.56 
                                                          
54 List based off that of Fever, “The Post-Fordist City,” in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies. But see also 
Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; Sassen, The Global City. 
55 Shaw, “Post-Industrial City,” in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies, 285-286. 
56 Fireside Chat December 29, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15917, 
accessed July 30, 2016. See Josh Zeitz, “The Speech That Set Off the Debate About America’s Role in the World,” 
December 29, 2015, Politico, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/12/roosevelt-arsenal-of-democracy-




Detroit industry responded to Roosevelt’s call, and the transition was profound. Of the 
city’s existing industrial machinery for automobiles, only 12% could be used for the creation of 
tanks, trucks, boat and submarine engines, machine guns, anti-craft weapons, and airplanes. 
Consequently, as the auto industry retooled, the tool-and-die industry underwent a profound 
change. In an often cited example of wartime conversion, Ford built a new facility in Ypsilanti, 
Michigan, roughly 18 miles from Detroit, in 1943. The Willow Run Bomber plant, where Ford 
applied the structure of the assembly line to the production of war planes, was the largest war plant 
in the world when it opened in September, 1941. In August, 1944, the Albert Kahn-designed 
factory could claim to finish a new B-24 every hour.57 
The change in production brought a change in labor demands. Through a combination of 
industrial recruiters and word-of-mouth, Detroit received around 500,000 migrants – many African 
American – between June 1940 and June 1943. This influx led to a severe housing shortage, which, 
due to racial segregation, affected black Detroiters the most.58 The growing struggles over access 
to decent housing and jobs created a perceptible climate of racial tension. One Catholic unionist 
newspaper put it bluntly, stating in June 1943 that “to tell the truth, there is a growing, subterranean 
race war going on in the city of Detroit which can have no other ultimate result than an explosion 
of violence.”59 Similarly, Walter White, the national director of the NAACP, warned a Detroit 
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audience, “Let us drag out in the open what has been whispered through Detroit for months – that 
a race riot may break out here at any time.”60 
Break out it did. Fighting between white and black Detroiters began on June 20, 1943, on 
Belle Isle, a 900-acre Frederick Law Olmsted-designed park located on an island in the Detroit 
River, between the US and Canada, that had been open to city residents since 1845. By nightfall, 
the fighting involved several hundred people and had migrated from the island onto the mainland. 
The violence escalated over the next several days. In the end, thirty-four people were killed and 
433 injured. Houses, stores, and factories sustained property damage of $2 million, and the US 
Army was required to restore order in the city. Who was killed during the violence, however, 
points to an underlying truth. Of the thirty-four killed, twenty-five were black, and seventeen of 
those were killed by police. None of the white Detroiters were killed by police.61 
Accounts from June 1943 demonstrated that white and black Detroiters behaved very 
differently during the tumult. While hundreds of black Detroiters looted white-owned businesses 
in black neighborhoods, thousands of white Detroiters concentrated on meting out violence to 
black men and women who crossed their path in the city. In other words, a larger number of white 
Detroiters were intent on doing harm to people while a smaller number of black Detroiters attacked 
property. This dynamic led journalist Scott Martelle to write that “where the whites acted out of a 
desire to maintain the Jim Crow-like status quo, the blacks acted out of a frustrated drive to break 
down barriers.” He cited a contemporary analyst who noted that “the main difference was that the 
blacks acted out of hope and the whites acted out of fear.”62 
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This pattern of behavior, of two different forms of rioting, reveals two different forms of 
policing in the city. Black looters received the full force of armed agents of the state while white 
rioters received indifference, and sometimes a helping hand. As economist B.J. Widick recounted, 
“The country got some idea of how Detroit was behaving when newspapers printed a photograph 
of a Negro World War I veteran being held by police while a white man hit him.”63 The NAACP, 
civic and religious organizations, and community leaders protested the police’s use of force against 
black Detroiters and police indifference to the white rioters’ violence. The Detroit Chapter of the 
NAACP, then the largest chapter in the country, stated, “There is overwhelming evidence that the 
riot could have been stopped at its inception Sunday night had the police wanted to stop it. So 
inefficient is the police force, so many of its members are from the deep south, with all their anti-
Negro prejudices and Klan sympathies, that trouble may break out again as soon as the troops 
leave.”64 
Protests against the behavior of Detroit police were not solely from the leaders and 
institutions of black Detroit. Brigadier General William E. Guthner, former police chief of Denver 
and the officer in charge of the federal troops during the 1943 riot, was far from impressed with 
the behavior exhibited by the city police during the turmoil. “They [Detroit police] have been very 
handy with their guns and clubs and have been very harsh and brutal,” according to Guthner, “They 
had treated the Negroes terrible up here, and I think they have gone altogether too far. […] If they 
want everybody to get back to normal, the police will have to get back to normal themselves.”65 
Most important, none of the underlying issues behind the riot were addressed, let alone resolved 
after the disturbance ended. Far from resolution, the official post-riot reports and analyses placed 
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on the blame for the riot centrally on the black community. County Prosecutor William E. Dowling 
pointed to the black press and the NAACP as the major culprits, arguing that the latter had “been 
fomenting trouble with their crusades in the Negro neighborhoods from the start. If they want to 
do something constructive they might try to control the Negro Press.” The committee on the riot, 
convened by Michigan’s governor Harry Kelly, piled on, stating that the racial tensions came from 
“the positive exhortation of many Negro leaders to be militant in the struggle for racial equality.”66 
Unsurprisingly, Detroit’s black community was outraged with analyses that placed the blame 
squarely and only on black Detroiters. A Michigan Chronicle editorial rued the consequences, 
writing, “The race riot and all that has gone before have made my people more nationalistic and 
more chauvinistic and anti-white than ever before. Even those of us who were half liberal and were 
willing to believe in the possibilities of improving race relations have begun to have doubts – and 
worse they have given up hope.”67 Frustrations over racial discrimination in the Motor City were 
deeper than narratives of Detroit as the model city on race relations completely taken by surprise 
in 1967 allow or acknowledge. 
June, 1943, witnessed the brief boiling over of what simmered away beneath the surface of 
Detroit during the war years. Perhaps it was the context of the war that open the gates to physical 
violence, or perhaps the tension had simply brought city residents to a breaking point. Whatever 
were the exact variables that led to the riot, the broader climate was clear. It was tensions revolving 
around overcrowded housing, the influx of migrants to the city, and the growing African American 
community coupled with widespread white racism and tensions over job discrimination and 
security. As blame was placed on civil rights organizations like the NAACP, the city continued to 
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be the site of unresolved conflict over who belonged where, who could go where, and what the 
consequences of violating these informal rules would be. As the riot proved, violence in the streets 
of the city was not an improbable response. 
The tensions in the city might have gone back under cover, but they by no means 
disappeared. Once the war ended, leaders in Detroit shifted their attention to the need for urban 
development, which included highway construction and slum clearance. In 1945, then-city 
treasurer Albert Cobo wrote a letter regarding urban development to the city council advocating 
highway construction as an integral part of maintaining real estate values in downtown Detroit.68 
The city’s Detroit Plan of 1947, released under Mayor Jeffries, addressed these concerns. It showed 
how race, poverty, housing, and the use of space intersected in the immediate postwar moment. In 
November of 1946, the mayor announced a plan to raze a hundred acres of “blight” northeast of 
downtown Detroit but south of Gratiot Avenue.69 The land would be sold to private developers to 
build new, private, housing. Part of the plan was to generate income via property taxes, so the 
construction of public housing was out of the question. The upfront cost to the city would be $2 
million, taking into account the resale of the land to developers, the mayor reasoned, but the plan 
would pay for itself over fifteen years. The plan explicitly moved low-income Detroiters out of 
their homes to make way for better, private, housing stock that would generate higher tax returns 
for the city. 
When the condemnation of housing began in 1947, the area proposed by the city had grown 
from a hundred acres to 129. A legal challenge to the city’s right to condemn private property to 
sell the land for private development was overcome, and demolition was allowed to begin in 1950. 
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The land then sat vacant for five years. The city’s housing department did not successfully relocate 
most of the seven thousand black families displaced by the scheme. As black Detroiters were 
severely limited as to the neighborhoods into which they could move, many of those displaced 
moved into nearby neighborhoods, further worsening overcrowding. “Rather than ending blight,” 
journalist Scott Martelle noted, “the Gratiot redevelopment project simply redistributed it.”70 
Globally, the era of the Bretton Woods Agreement was beginning. The United States was the 
foremost industrial and military power in the world following the Second World War, although its 
close rivalry with the Soviet Union meant that the American military and defense communities 
actively planned for further conflicts. Part of Cold War planning was an emphasis on geographic 
decentralization of strategic locations that could be targets of Soviet weapons. Detroit’s role as an 
industrial center, including as a producer of military machinery, meant that new government 
contracts came with stipulations requiring production facilities and factories be moved away from 
central urban areas.71 The postwar boom in production and resulting demand for labor combined 
with earlier migration to the city, placing even more stress on housing in Detroit. The result was 
that seventy-five percent of new housing was built outside of the city proper, in adjacent Macomb 
and Oakland counties. While existing buildings in Detroit became outdated, cheap land outside the 
city required no razing or renovating of existing structures in order to build.72 
Detroit’s 1949 Mayoral Race 
By the end of the 1940s Detroit was already a city of industrial might, union strength, racial 
tension, and a housing crisis. All of these dynamics came to the front during the 1949 race for the 
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office of city mayor. The mayoral election saw record voter turn-out in what was then the fourth-
largest city in the United States, and demonstrated that these issues were not far from the minds of 
most Detroiters following the war. The Chicago Tribune, reporting on the election, called it “one 
of the most bitterly challenged in the history of the city.”73 The two main contenders – George 
Edwards, Jr., and Albert E. Cobo – represented competing visions of the city. Where Edwards ran 
on a campaign of social justice associated with fair housing, employment, and labor, Cobo ran a 
campaign premised on “pragmatic” financial common sense. Edwards’ vision entailed a city 
government that included the marginalized and the least well-off, while Cobo’s vision was oriented 
towards the interests of the professional and business classes of the city. 
Edwards was a Democrat, and he came out of the progressive, New Deal liberal, wing of 
the United Auto Workers. He graduated from Harvard with a master’s in sociology by the age of 
20, and he worked for two years as a researcher in the Student League for Industrial Democracy 
under Norman Thomas.74 In 1936, Edwards moved to Detroit to join the industrial union 
movement. By 1938, he was the head of the UAW’s Welfare Department. In 1940, Republican 
Mayor Jeffries asked Edwards, only 25 years old, to serve as the director of the Detroit Housing 
Commission. In 1941 he won his first of four two-year terms on the Detroit city council, the 
youngest council member to be elected at that time, and served as Detroit’s air raid warden while 
working shifts at the Timken-Detroit Axle Company. Two of his terms on city council Edwards 
served while stationed in the Philippines with the US Army. While overseas, he was elected the 
                                                          
73 “Detroit Voters Again Say ‘No’ to Labor Choice,” Chicago Tribune, November 9, 1949, 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1949/11/09/page/2/article/detroit-voters-again-say-no-to-labor-choice, accessed 
March 31, 2017 
74 SLID was the precursor to Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which became the largest New Left 
organization of the Sixties, and who wrote their 1962 Port Huron Statement as a UAW campground north of 
Detroit. See Andrew Hnatow, “Visions of the New Left: Organized Labor, the Port Huron Statement, and the 
Making of SDS,” in Jon K. Lauck et al., eds., Mapping Midwestern Minds: Essays on the Intellectual History of the 




council president, a position he won twice. He earned a law degree from the Detroit College of 
Law in 1944. In 1949, Edwards turned his attention away from the city council and towards the 
mayoralty.75 
By contrast, Cobo, a Republican, was a trained accountant who had left the private sector 
to temporarily work for the city during the Depression under New Deal Democrat mayor Frank 
Murphy. Cobo wound up being appointed to the vacant City Treasurer position in 1935, and then 
won the position in the next election. Cobo wove together fiscal conservatism, which aligned him 
with the business and real estate interests in the city, and the sensibilities of “an old-ward-style 
politician.” As journalist Scott Martelle characterized him, Cobo “maintained close personal ties 
with the leaders of ethnic clubs and service organizations – the life blood of Detroit’s Democratic-
heavy politics.” While Edwards was back by the industrial UAW and CIO, Cobo was endorsed by 
the craft-oriented AFL.76 
Housing and race became central questions during the race. Edwards, who had long 
defended public housing and voted several times to locate publish housing outside of the inner 
city, ran on a platform of public works (such as cleaning streets and building more playgrounds 
and public housing) and civic reform (specifically police reform).77 Edwards received substantial 
union support during his campaign, including $30,000. The labor movement also produced over 
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1.3 million pamphlets, supporting his election, printed in English, Polish, and Hungarian, as well 
as door-to-door canvassers, and sound trucks.78 
True to his stated fiscal conservatism, Cobo ran on a platform focused on fixing the city’s 
budget and implementing better management. In contrast to Edwards’ calls for increased public 
housing, Cobo advocated slum clearance, with the cleared land then being sold to private 
developers. He also called for better city services, such as fixing sewer problems, but he used 
rhetoric that emphasized tax-paying. He told an interviewer that “the people who pay taxes want 
better services for their money.” An innocuous-sounding statement, but it had clear implications 
in a city where most property-owners were white and many blacks were renters.79 Not all of Cobo’s 
positions were racially coded. He was quite clear in his meaning when he warned about the threat 
of “Negro invasions” of all-white neighborhoods.80 
The voter turn-out for the September 13th primary to determine who would run in the 
November election was record-breaking. Cobo came out ahead, with 170,000 to Edward’s 
113,000. In the aftermath, Edwards lost no time in painting Cobo as working for well-off 
suburbanites and real estate developers in Grosse Pointe, Birmingham, and Bloomfield Hills rather 
than being motivated by the interests of city residents.81 The argument was helped by Cobo’s plans 
to clear out slums and sell the land to private developers, with no accommodation given to city 
residents who lost their homes. Cobo, however, deflected Edwards’ characterization by countering 
that such development would result in more tax revenue without a corresponding raise in the tax 
rate, thus raising more funds for schools, parks, and other city services. Cobo contended that those 
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displaced could be housed in apartments built first on the cleared land for purpose, although where 
they would live between the time of condemnation, demolition, sale, and the development of new 
housing was unclear.82 “Sure there have been some inconveniences in building our expressways 
and in our slum clearance programs,” Cobo later commented when criticized for demolishing 
African-American neighborhoods in order to build highway, “but in the long run more people 
benefit. That’s the price of progress.”83 
Just as the rhetoric and reality of tax-paying had racial implications, so did that of slum 
clearance. The majority of those targeted for slum clearance were black Detroiters. The more 
Edwards, however, defended public housing and sought endorsements from black Detroit 
community leaders – such as Dr. James J. McClendon, the president of the Detroit chapter of the 
NAACP – the more radical he appeared to moderate white Detroiters. The election results in 
November made this crystal-clear. Cobo won with 313,136 votes to Edwards’ 206,134. Cobo won 
every city precinct except for those in black neighborhoods.84 He was true to his campaign 
promises and in the first weeks of his mayoralty he vetoed eight of twelve proposed public housing 
projects. The ones that escaped his axe were all in black inner-city neighborhoods. The eight he 
cancelled were all located in white, outlying, parts of the city. Later, Cobo moved to quash the 
city’s public housing program altogether, replacing its director, who had served under the two 
previous mayors, with a private developer. Detroit only built 8,155 units of public housing between 
1937 and 1955, putting the nation’s fourth largest city behind Boston, Newark, Norfolk, St. Louis, 
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and New Orleans in the construction of public housing.85 This would have long-term consequence 
for the city’s development and for race relations within the city. 
The election showed that Edwards’ UAW backing did not go far, despite his candidacy in 
a heavily unionized town. Being a Democrat did not ensure him victory in a heavily Democratic 
city. In an UAW campaign debriefing, one organizer related, “They told me that the union is OK 
in the shop but when they buy a home, they forget about it […] as long as they think their property 
is going down, it is different.” A labor campaign coordinator working on Detroit’s west side 
reported that he thought “in these municipal elections we are dealing with people who have a 
middle class mentality. Even in our own UAW, the member is either buying a home, owns a home, 
or is going to buy one. I don’t know whether we can ever make up for this difficulty.”86 The 
UAW’s political endorsement was strangely limited in the UAW’s city. The UAW’s first foray 
into the city’s mayoralty race, in 1937, had resulted in a two-to-one defeat, beginning a pattern 
that repeated for the next three decades.87 Since Edwards became a Wayne county judge by 
appointment in 1954, won reelection in 1955, and won election to Michigan Supreme Court in 
1956, it is clear that he did not have trouble winning public office as such. But he did lose the 
mayoralty of Detroit, reinforcing the sense that city politics were more closely tied to racial 
dynamics within the city than other public offices.88 
The 1949 mayoral race focused on themes that arose time and time again in 20th century 
Detroit. There was the interweaving of class and race, sometimes intersecting, and other times 
competing against one another. There was the importance of housing and housing policy, and who 
lived where, and who had the right to which parts of the city. There was the policing and 
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criminalization of certain Detroiters and certain parts of the city. There was the red scare and the 
threat of communism. These were pressing issues in the immediate postwar United States, and 
they were essential questions in Detroit’s city politics. They shaped the decisions made by voters 
and elected officials, as well as those of bureaucrats and functionaries. 
Thomas Sugrue has argued that white Detroiters’ politics were due to an investment by the 
white working-class, previously a collection of various ethnicities, in protecting their recently 
earned “whiteness.” Going further, Sugrue argued that the Reagan Democrat phenomenon should 
be placed in the historical context of “Cobo Democrats.”89 In a 1950 study of the union voting 
patterns in the 1949 Detroit mayoral election, Harold Sheppard used the anti-Semitism scale 
developed in Theodor Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality to correlate ethnic prejudice to 
voting preference. The study found that union members were not statistically different from non-
union members in terms of prejudices, but that generation and ethnic affiliation made a difference. 
Sheppard hypothesized that younger workers, who tended to have lesser attachment to ethnic 
identity and who tended to be better educated, also tended to have fewer ethnic prejudices such as 
anti-Semitism. Younger workers also tended, however, to have less involvement in the union. 
Thus, older, less-educated, ethnic-identifying union members were more likely to vote Republican 
than younger, more educated, non-ethnic-identifying union members.90 
Consider the issue of housing, which is, fundamentally, about where an individual or a 
family is and is not allowed in a city. In a city with high homeownership, and where working 
people, due to union wages, increasingly could afford their own homes, contestations over housing 
was tied to the fact that houses were assets. Houses become imbued with the meanings and feelings 
that their inhabitants give them (as the location of family life or personal refuge, or as 
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manifestations of one’s social standing or respectability, to give but two examples), but they are 
also sources of profit and significant investments that were expected, at the very least, to maintain 
their value. In this context, people went to extremes to prevent the devaluing of their property, and 
fears of racial integration lowering property values further exacerbated feelings, either hidden or 
explicit, on race and class. 
Chapter Outline 
By the time High and Lewis wrote Corporate Wasteland, they could identify a forty-year 
decline in North American manufacturing. Using the framework of uneven development and 
industrial restructuring, however, one could address deindustrialization outside the framework of 
a decline in manufacturing overall. That is to say, a metropolitan area such as Detroit could be the 
site of deindustrialization, even as industrial production stayed roughly stable throughout the 
country. This is what the workers at Ford’s River Rouge complex confronted in the a few years 
after the end of World War II. The first chapter of this dissertation sets the stage for the following 
chapters by examining an early case of what would become known as deindustrialization, at the 
time called decentralization, in metropolitan Detroit. The case study specifically looks at a Ford 
industrial center, the River Rouge facility, that began to decentralize only a few years after World 
War II. The UAW local representing the facility brought a lawsuit against Ford for breach of 
contract, which was thrown out of court for various reasons, including the red scare during the 
Korean War, the lack of support on the part of the UAW leadership, and the primacy of business 
prerogatives over community well-being. A vital dimension of the local union’s fight against the 
movement of jobs and production away from their communities was the enlisting of those local 




municipalities supported the local union, arguing that the future of their communities depended on 
the continuing presence of automobile production and employment. 
The second chapter moves across town, and examines ethnic and racial segregation in 
metropolitan Detroit. The suburb of Grosse Pointe, immediately adjacent to the city, codified 
segregation into a methodical and orderly system, in which real estate agents agreed to a point-
based system of client evaluation. Those who failed to receive the necessary number of points, the 
number of which varied according to one’s ancestry, were refused housing in the suburb, 
regardless of ability to pay. This system was the subject of a state investigation in 1960. The 
architects and defenders of the arrangement took the stand to explain and justify their reasoning. 
In response to these revelations and in the context of the Civil Rights Movement broadly, some 
residents of Grosse Pointe joined together in order to promote integration and inclusion in their 
community. Thus, two separate visions of the future were at play in Grosse Pointe, one based on 
racialized fear and the other on racial acceptance. 
These first two chapters lay the groundwork to understanding how class and race played 
into divisions in the metropolitan Detroit area. The third chapter switches viewpoints, and 
examines the findings of a prominent urban planner engaged by the local electric utility to project 
the future of greater Detroit in the year 2000. The planner, Constantinos Doxiadis, operated within 
the framework of ekistics, the scientific study of human settlements that he founded. Doxiadis’ 
treatment of racism was ambivalent, wavering between arguing that it was a social problem, not 
an urban one, yet he also acknowledged that it deeply involved cities. While ambivalent on racial 




this view with a belief that industrial production would continue apace, perhaps even expand, in 
the Detroit region.91 
The fourth chapter continues that examination of responses to the urban crisis, this time at 
the federal level. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, in its desire to create a society of 
shared prosperity and well-being, targeted the urban crisis via the Model Cities program. This 
chapter focuses on the legislative battle prior to the passing of the bill, originally proposed by 
UAW-president and Detroiter Walter Reuther. It looks at the reasoning behind objections to the 
legislation and arguments for it. Racial and class difference came to the fore, such as objections to 
school integration as exposing one’s child, coded white and middle-class, to the “slum child.” 
While the fourth chapter focuses on the Model Cities program before its passage into law, the fifth 
chapter looks at the legislation itself and how members of the Johnson administration justified it 
and defended it. Just as the ways that members of Congress had attacked the legislation before its 
passage was indicative of the various ways Americans thought of and understood race and class in 
urban spaces, the ways that the administration thought and understood the same came across in 
their speeches, white papers, and internal memos. These revealed that members of the Johnson 
administration understood the best future for American cities like Detroit to be middle-class. They 
were wary of black political power even as they disavowed racial discrimination and segregation. 
For some, the future of urban areas was not even urban. Rather, suburbanization was the future 
and the ideal. 
The first two chapters on racial and class divisions in metropolitan Detroit provide the 
foundation for the later chapters – the concrete lived experiences of city residents in the decades 
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following World War II. It is in that context that we must understand the attempts by planners and 
experts to address what they see as urban problems and ills. The fundamental and overarching 
focus of the study are the reality of class and race divisions in the metropolitan areas, and how 
these divisions are ignored or inadequately addressed by responses to the urban crisis. I seek to 
understand why people thought the way they did, and how they defended their thoughts on 
segregation, on integration, on work, on industrial decentralization, on urban planning, and on 
federal urban policy to others.92 
Taken all together, the study argues that the solutions proposed by Doxiadis and the LBJ 
administration, while understanding that racial segregation, discrimination, and unemployment 
were parts of the urban crisis, could not quite understand what they were. The flipside of this is 
that, in the case of Detroit, local city residents often had a much better sense of what was going 
on, although they did not have enough power to challenge the forces of industrial restructuring and 
systemic racism. Nonetheless, some residents imagined futures in which employment was assured, 
or in which a community could be integrated.93 Despite their expansive and ambitious future 
imaginings, the Doxiadis project and the Model Cities team did not dream this big. 
This study uses Detroit as a case study, but the themes it explores are not only applicable 
to Detroit, or even to cities in the United States. One can see them in the banlieus of Paris, rather 
notoriously in urbanist circles. Much academic work focuses on Paris, but it emerges in fictional 
work as well, such as the novel Arab Jazz. The same themes are present in cities such as 
Amsterdam and Stockholm, as demonstrated in Ian Buruma’s Murder in Amsterdam or Ruben 
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Östlund’s 2017 film The Square.94 While the dynamics change when demographic differences 
include religion and language, the impact of residential segregation and discrimination in 
employment remain similar. While the language of colonialism has been used to critique this 
dimension in the United States – by the Black Panthers and others influenced by revolutionary 
movements around the world in the 1960s and 1970s – the colonial aspect is clear cut in the cases 
of previous colonial powers in Europe and those they previously colonized, as Carl Nightingale’s 
Segregation details.95 
Furthermore, other scholars have detailed the moment where this study ends. Historian 
Tracy Neumann, in Remaking the Rust Belt, details how postindustrial urban policy foresaw cities 
designed to cater to financial and commercial service sectors, “scrubbed free of evidence of 
manufacturing,” and as the sites of “culture and leisure activities that would appeal to tourists and 
suburbanites.”96 These ideas did not come out of nowhere. They were the result of international 
networks of urban planners and policy creators, as described by Christopher Klemek and Daniel 
T. Rodgers.97 This study adds to these works, tracing the responses to industrial restructuring in 
the United States during a slightly earlier timeframe. A significant difference is that while 
postindustrial ideas in the 1980s were, as Neumann describes it, “closely linked to the ethos of 
privatization and devolution that permeated urban developments in North Atlantic nations in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century,” the individuals and organizations examined in this study are 
by far liberal in orientation. This is the case, certainly, with the Johnson administration and those 
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who worked on the Great Society, which was explicitly seen as a descendant of FDR’s New Deal. 
Even someone with strong ties to the business community such as Constantinos Doxiadis, was 
generally liberal in approach, as well. They accepted the positive role of states in private housing 
markets and public sector services. While Doxiadis actively encouraged the involvement of 
business and private sector community members in finding solutions to urban problems, he did not 
have any qualms about enlisting the aid of government and public funds as well. Yet, as the last 
chapter of this study chronicles, one of the main architects of the Model Cities program envisioned 

















CHAPTER 2 “GHOST TOWNS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE”: INDUSTRIAL 
DECENTRALIZATION AND WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZATIONS IN SUBURBAN 
DETROIT IN THE 1950S 
We shall solve the problem of cities by leaving the city. 
Henry Ford98 
 
A dominating physical presence up to the present day, the Ford River Rouge complex at 
its peak was a sight to behold. The expansive complex located in Dearborn, a suburb adjacent to 
Detroit, was, according to a Vanity Fair cover story in February, 1928, “the most significant public 
monument in America.” The Rouge plant “[threw] its shadow across the land more widely and 
more intimately than the United States Senate, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Statue of 
Liberty . . . .” The fashion and popular culture publication dubbed the industrial mammoth 
“America’s Mecca,” given that it embodied the “cardinal virtues” of size, quantity, and speed.99 
Historian and Walter Reuther biographer Nelson Lichtenstein described the Ford River Rouge 
plant as the realization of Henry Ford’s “dream of continuous, integrated manufacture” and an 
“industrial marvel, the largest concentration of machinery and labor anywhere in the world.”100 
Even today, the complex is clearly visible from the sky and in aerial photographs of metropolitan 
Detroit, rivaling the scale of the downtown business district. 
From its beginning, the Rouge plant was a monument to American industry. Designed to 
be able to construct an entire automobile on site from raw materials, the complex was made up of 
over twenty-three buildings packed into a square mile. These ranged from a power station to mills 
and foundries to assembly plants. In a fictionalized account of a new worker approaching the 
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complex for the first time, novelist and native Detroiter Jeffrey Eugenides described, “the main 
building, a fortress of dark brick, [which] was seven stories high, the smokestacks seventeen . . . . 
It was like a grove of trees, as if the Rouge’s eight main smokestacks had sown seeds to the wind, 
and now ten or twenty or fifty smaller trees were sprouting up in the infertile soil around the 
plant.”101 The Rouge plant was so complex that it was and is often compared to the city in its own 
right. Allan Nevins, a biographer of Henry Ford, once wrote that the Rouge “was an industrial city, 
immense, concentrated, packed with power.”102 In a telling turn of phrase, The Henry Ford’s 
website on the history of the complex describes the Rouge in the 1930s as “a city without 
residents.” Its workforce in 1929 was around 100,000.103  
It was that workforce, the disregarded residents of an immense industrial city, that 
contributed to the Rouge’s uniqueness and importance. The industrial complex could not run if not 
for its workforce, but the significance of the Rouge workforce went beyond that fundamental fact. 
Labor relations in the automobile industry were inherently national, if not global, in scope. This 
was not because the union locals involved were engaged necessarily in large-scale battles, but 
because of the degree and scope of industrial power located in Detroit. When the president of 
General Motors, Charles Wilson, stated during his 1953 Senate confirmation hearings to become 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense that “what was good for the country was good for GM and vice 
versa,” he was not indulging in overblown rhetoric. During World War II, GM accounted for a full 
10% of all war materials manufactured from metal in the United States. The course of the auto 
industry was of national importance, and consequently so were the labor relations within the auto 
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industry. Strikes and contract negotiations were national news. Even the most parochial union 
grievance could, under the right circumstances, become a fight with far extending consequences.104  
 Of the industrial might located in Detroit, the Ford River Rouge complex made up a 
significant component. Consequently, the UAW local representing the Rouge workforce, Local 
600, was a titan among UAW locals. It was the largest local union in the world. In the late 1940s, 
it had more members than twenty-five of the thirty-six national unions in the CIO.105 A good deal 
of the local’s strength came from the nature of the River Rouge complex itself: Local 600 
represented a large number of auto workers. In Detroit, workers at the Rouge made up 3.7% of the 
city’s total workforce, with an estimated 6.5% of Detroit families with employment ties to the 
complex.106 Due to the local’s large membership, and the diverse manufacturing process present 
at the River Rouge complex, Local 600 wielded an immense influence. Combined with that size 
and influence was a clear left-leaning bent in the Local’s political orientation. Local 600 was “a 
rank-and-file kind of local,” Ernest Goodman, the labor lawyer who represented the local, 
remembered, “None like it anywhere in the country I don’t think.” “It was pretty anarchic in their 
thinking at least,” he said of the local’s politics, “It was wonderful democracy-in-action in a local 
union.”107 
But that anarchic, democracy-in-action spirit confronted a changing power dynamic in the 
postwar economy. In 1950 American industry was changing rapidly, with companies investing in 
automation, speeding up production rates, and moving their factories away from centralized 
industrial cities. In terms of bottom-lines, these changes were beneficial. For workers in centralized 
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industrial cities, however, these changes had profoundly negative effects on their employment as 
well as for the communities they inhabited. The residents of metropolitan Detroit were aware of 
the potential consequences of these policies and choices, including offering organized resistance 
to them. In the immediate post-WWII period, the local UAW union at the Rouge began raising the 
alarm about what they called decentralization, a deliberate corporate policy of moving jobs and 
production away from the company’s manufacturing center.  
 Between 1950 and 1953, the leadership of Local 600 ran a campaign against 
decentralization after they recorded significant job loss at the Rouge complex.108 Ford’s leadership 
reassured the local’s leadership that decentralization of production was not an issue. 
Unsurprisingly, local members felt angry and betrayed when they discovered the company moving 
machinery out of the complex in the middle of the night. Their fears were confirmed. Jobs 
originally held at the Rouge were going to contractors, or to Ford plants outside of Detroit, such 
as in Buffalo and Cleveland.109  
Moving to stop the flow of jobs away from the Rouge complex, Local 600 filed an 
injunction against Ford in early 1952. It argued that Ford was committing a breach of contract, as 
the company and the UAW had recently signed a historic five-year contract. The union, Local 600 
argued, would never had signed the contract if they had known their jobs would be relocated. 
Dramatically, at the same time as their claim against Ford was being heard in court, testimony 
regarding Communist penetration and influence of Local 600 was being heard by the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities in a courtroom down the hall.110 A mix of reasons, 
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including different strategic positions between the UAW local and its parent organization, as well 
as Cold War anti-communism, led a decision against the local’s lawsuit. The HUAC hearings 
proved to be embarrassing, and Walter Reuther and the International UAW stripped the local’s 
leadership from office and placed the local under receivership.  
While Local 600 was unsuccessful in court, they were successful at a campaign aimed at 
raising support within local communities and municipalities surrounding the Ford River Rouge 
complex. Industrial decentralization, the union leaders argued, would take away the employment 
that supported working-class Detroit, which in turn threatened the foundation of the entire 
community. Their campaign relied on a fundamental fact for working-class communities: Without 
employment, communities disappear. The rhetoric that emerged from Local 600’s campaign often 
evoked the image of ghost towns. But while the original ghost towns were mining towns whose 
existence dwindled with the resources they extracted, communities predicated on production 
operated under a different economic logic.111  
Industrial ghost towns entailed the loss of production. Such a loss could be caused by a 
variety of factors: company strategy, lack of materials, or a loss of consumer demand, for instance. 
That local politicians supported this argument suggests that these arguments resonated beyond the 
union, and that Local 600 was not merely a voice in the wilderness. This was not merely a case 
involving industrial workers concerned with their individual jobs and incomes. Community 
members outside the factory gates also saw their futures and communities bound together with the 
continuing presence of industrial work, and publicly asked for the Ford Motor Company to 
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consider the well-being of the communities surrounding their factories when making corporate 
decisions.112  
In response, the Ford company at first argued that decentralization was due to matters of 
national security. Production was down due to wartime demands on steel and, further, was in 
compliance to the national defense plan in place at the beginning of the Korean War in late June, 
1950. The local union came to the conclusion, however, that decentralization was a deliberate 
policy choice by the company, independent of external concerns.113 The Korean War provided a 
convenient, if puzzling, cover for industrial restructuring. The outbreak of war created another 
boom in demand for labor, and Detroit saw a full-employment economy again.114 There was not 
only federal spending at play. Americans bought eight million cars before cutbacks in the winter 
of 1951, stemming from the cyclical nature of automotive employment, saw unemployment in 
Detroit rise once more to 127,000. Defense spending flowed into Detroit the following year, adding 
221,000 more jobs. The spoils of war were short-lived. By the end of 1958, there were only 30,000 
defense-related jobs in the state of Michigan.115 In a sense, the moment of well-paying blue-collar 
industrial jobs in Detroit was supported by the Second World War and sustained by the Korean 
War, a forty-to-fifty year period between the unionization of the auto industry in the late 1930s 
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and the significant decline of industrial employment in the 1970s and 1980s. This relationship with 
national defense was not unremarked in the 1950s, such as when UAW lobbyist Paul Sifton warned 
in 1951 that “under the imperatives of the world conflict, we drift into a military-industrial 
receivership.”116 
The economic stress on Detroit’s working classes were not solely within their places of 
employment. As the next chapter will explore in further detail, the dynamics of segregation existed 
throughout Detroit and its suburbs, and affected industry. As decentralization (or what we have 
come to call deindustrialization) progressed, the economic pressures of racism increased. Further, 
as white Detroiters were able to follow industrial jobs out of Detroit while black Detroiters were 
geographically constrained, due to segregation in housing, so did the brunt of deindustrialization 
come to rest on the African American community. This burden grew and contributed to tensions 
undergirding the 1967 riot and beyond.117  
In fact, Dearborn, the site of the Ford River Rouge complex, was openly segregationist. In 
1950, its population was 94, 994.118 Its mayor from 1941 until his retirement in 1978, Orville 
Hubbard, won eighteen elections. He had declared himself “for segregation 100 percent” in a 1956 
interview.119 In 1944, he opposed a Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) proposal for public 
housing for black workers near the Rouge complex. The draft resolution Hubbard gave to the 
Dearborn City Council against the proposal called for the protection of property values and called 
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the proposed housing “an invasion.”120 Although UAW Local 600 and the NAACP campaigned 
for the housing project, Hubbard insisted that housing black workers was “Detroit’s problem.” 
“When you remove garbage from your backyard,” he explained, “you don’t dump it in your 
neighbor’s.”121 When the FPHA moved the project to neighboring Ecorse Township, Hubbard 
called it a “sneak move” on the part of the “goddamned nigger-loving guys” of the agency. The 
Ford Motor Company joined with the Dearborn City Council and the board of Ecorse Township 
to sue the FPHA to prevent construction.122  
In 1948, the John Hancock Life Insurance Company attempted to build private rental 
housing on the Ford Motor Company’s property. Orville Hubbard attacked the project as an 
opening for black Detroiters, who were confined to segregated and overcrowded Detroit 
neighborhoods like Black Bottom and Paradise Valley, to move to Dearborn. He accused the 
insurance and automobile company of conspiring against Dearborn. City employees handed out 
leaflets reading, “Keep Negroes Out of Dearborn! Protect Your Home and Mine! . . . With none 
of the 15,000 Ford Rouge Negro workers living in Dearborn, don’t be ‘lulled into a false sense of 
security’.”123 
Nor were black Americans the only ones targeted. In the 1950s, Dearborn’s Arab 
community was beginning to grow in a neighborhood east of the Rouge complex called the South 
End. Calling them “white niggers,” Mayor Hubbard sought to deny permits to homeowners in the 
area. He leaned on the Federal Housing Administration to restrict mortgage insurance for the 
neighborhood.124 The city then bought up properties with the stated goal of converting the area 
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into industrial use. The case dragged year upon year through the court system, with no resolution 
until decades after the fact: a class-action lawsuit by the South End Community Council was 
awarded in their favor in 1973. Only then was the destruction of the community ceased, and the 
350 displaced homeowners allowed the sue the city of Dearborn. Nonetheless, Mayor Hubbard 
had achieved his goal. In 1970, Dearborn had remained all-white.125 
This dynamic is all the more striking because the River Rouge plant had the largest African 
American labor force in any Detroit auto factory. As a consequence, Local 600 had the largest 
African American membership of any UAW local. While one cannot argue that Local 600 voiced 
the views of Detroit’s black working class, its history contains the possibility of speaking to more 
than just the experience of the city’s white working class. Indeed, historian Beth Bates calls Henry 
Ford’s policy of hiring African American workers his third revolutionary practice in automobile 
production, following the assembly line and the five-dollar day.126 Ford’s policy was not 
disinterested, as he hoped that black workers loyal to him would form a bulwark against 
unionization. Ford’s plan backfired, however, during the 1941 UAW drive, during which he hired 
black workers en masse, driving the number of black Ford workers to an all-time high of 14,000-
16,000 by the end of March. As Bates argues, the turning of black workers away from allegiance 
to Ford and to the UAW was not due to the union in and of itself. One African American union 
organizer, David Moore, recalled that the UAW leadership acted “as though they just did not care 
about black workers at the Rouge.” Black workers’ embrace of unionization was rather a decision 
to work for a better future by building on the opportunities of working for Ford.127 
                                                          
125 Galster, Driving Detroit, 178. 
126 Bates, Making of Black Detroit, 50. 




But, as segregation in Dearborn shows, in the words of labor journalist B. J. Widick, 
writing in 1972, “the sad fact is that union solidarity never went beyond the plant in Dearborn.”128 
This analysis holds true for housing, but belies a more nuanced, if ambivalent, history of cross-
racial working-class solidarity. One such example involves the American pastime of baseball, and 
its close cousin, softball. In late April, 1943, the Local 600 newsletter, Ford Facts, ran an article 
– “CIO Demands City Stops Racial Discrimination in Use of Ball Fields” – in which the 
anonymous author related how the Greater Detroit and Wayne Country Industrial Union Council 
officially sent a protest to Mayor Jeffries over the “barring of Detroit’s Negro citizens from most 
of the public baseball diamonds” in the city. The Detroit Baseball Federation, the article noted, 
“actively practices racial discrimination,” and affirmed the CIO position that “no citizens shall be 
discriminated against because of color or creed.” Right above the article, with big black letters 
inviting the reader to “PLAY BALL!,” Local 600 announced that they “had started forming its 
own ball league.”  
In the same issue, to drive their point home, Ford Facts ran picture of the Briggs Local 212 
UAW-CIO softball champions of the 1939 Inter-Union UAW Softball League. In 1940, the photo 
caption related, Briggs Local 212’s hardball team had refused to play in the Detroit Baseball 
Federation due to its discriminatory policy against black players. The Briggs Local was “actively 
working . . . to promote equal athletic opportunities for all Negro and white workers.” The CIO, 
the caption asserted, “is opposed not only to segregation in the shop but also to segregation in all 
other activities and pursuits engaged in by Negro and white workers.”129 
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 Photo captions are one thing, but creating popular, integrated, ball leagues in a matter of 
weeks is another. On May 10, Ford Facts ran a picture of Michael F. Widman, the director of the 
Ford CIO drive, throwing the first pitch of the Local 600 softball league (“of Negro and white 
players”), and a nearby photo caption of a game noted “the fast action on the field Sunday.” A few 
pages later, a headline announced, “Negro Players Star in Ford Local Baseball League,” recounting 
how, on the previous Sunday (May 4th), the Local 600 baseball series had opened, with “many 
Negro lads” who were “active as players and managers.” “All teams,” the article defiantly 
explained, “are open to players regardless of race, creed, or color.” Further, the article added that 
“most teams are mixed, Negro and white.”130 
 Crucially, union members did not seem to mind. “The competition became keen and hot,” 
players were in “flashy outfits,” but the lack of racial discrimination did not dampen the mood. In 
fact, the opposite occurred: despite originally planning for twenty-five teams, over a hundred had 
been formed since Local 600 had announced the league, “with more applications coming in every 
day,” and more equipment already needing to be ordered. Nor could Local 600 pass by an 
opportunity to take a dig at major league baseball, which would remain segregated until opening 
day, April 15, 1947, when Jackie Robinson debuted with the Brooklyn Dodgers. “Big league 
moguls,” the newsletters scoffed, “have for some time stated that the fans are not in sympathy with 
Negro and White playing on the same team. But some Ford Local teams, not only have Negro and 
White on the same team, but have a Negro Manager.” These included Frank Milliams, from the 
heat treatment department (and “the former manager of the famous West Side Black Hawks”) , 
and Henry “Skippy” Bulkey, from the Rolling Mills. The league was so popular that the union was 
                                                          




in negotiations to secure playing fields at night, in addition to already having games going 
mornings, evenings, and on Sundays.131  
 The next week, Ford Facts boasted of the continuing popularity of the integrated league, 
describing how “Baseball Draws Huge Crowds To Play and Watch.” Even more teams had been 
formed, reaching 125, and forcing the creation of multiple leagues to accommodate them all. Ford 
Facts ran the scores of the games, with team names listed like the Motor Building Tomcats, the 
Local Boys 751, the Foundry Cardinals, the Foundry Champs, and the Motor Building Heart 
Breakers. Nor were players encouraged to keep it on the field: Ford Facts encouraged members 
to wear their uniforms to a labor demonstration featuring Philip Murray in Cadillac Square, in 
downtown Detroit, the following Monday.132 
 This brief history of working-class recreation contains much: how working-class culture 
existed outside the world of work, despite being dependent on it. How racial discrimination could 
be palpable in one arena, such as housing, and irrelevant in another, such as a baseball game. How 
something as mundane as an amateur sports game could carry large political weight on its 
shoulders. How public spaces, such as baseball diamonds, were not open to all Detroiters equally. 
How class, just as much as race, was visibly inscribed in the geography of metropolitan Detroit.133 
 The neighborhoods encircling the Rouge and other factories were the homes of the workers 
whose labor filled spaces of production.134 The loss of large-scale industrial production, and the 
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economic and social system of Fordism curtailed communities, physically and socially.135 In 
addition to the geography of socioeconomic class, there is the geography of deindustrialization: 
where jobs were, where they went, and which parts of the city were affected. City residents 
organized against decentralization at the Rouge, recognizing a threat to their homes, families, 
communities, and ways of living, and that threat eventually resulted in diminishing and damaging 
the surrounding communities.  
Local 600’s Campaign Against Decentralization 
 By 1950, the internal politics of UAW Local 600 were, as historian Nelson Lichtenstein 
phrased it, “an entire world of ethnic and ideological complexity.”136 A sample of the diversity of 
positions present in the local union came across during the 1950 election for the local’s presidency, 
won by thirty-four year old Carl Stellato. He had started out working as a machine-setter in the 
River Rouge complex when he was eighteen years old and with a eighth-grade formal education, 
followed by a few years of working on the International UAW’s staff before winning the local’s 
presidency. Stellato and his slate were seen as being pro-Reuther, which was not necessarily a 
positive comment in the Rouge plant.  
One candidate, Fred Soretti, boasted that he “has never been a supporter of Walter Reuther” 
and “has not made a deal with Reuther” as the top two reasons to vote for him, before assuring 
voters that “the fight will continue for Democracy and against Dictatorship from the top in 
UAW.”137 The Stellato slate released a flier defending themselves against another faction in the 
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plant, “the Thompson Group,” that accused them of being “stooges for the International Union, 
[and] that the UAW-CIO, to which we all belong, is a sinister organization which is trying to 
destroy our Local Union.” Stellato and his group, the flier continued, would “fight any individual 
or group” that tried to separate Local 600 from the UAW, before finishing with a call against 
company unionism, speed-ups, job movement, and “to restore militant union leadership in Local 
600.”138 The campaign manager for the Progressive Unity Slate, Ed Lock, attacked candidate Paul 
Kay for following “the Reuther role of confusing, dividing and disrupting,” reminding voters that 
“you all know that the undemocratic actions of the Administrators HAVE NOT brought greater 
benefits for Ford workers.”139 Separate from the election, the officers and committee members of 
the Gear and Axle Building in Local 600 sent Walter Reuther an letter asking him if “the walls of 
Solidarity House [are] so sound proof, or are you so far removed from actual conditions in the 
shop that you do not hear the angry resentment of Ford workers?”140 
Thus, it is unsurprising that Stellato and his team responded, following their successful 
campaign, that “We are independents. We are independent of Reuther. We are independent of the 
Communist Party.” Rather, they identified as “free Americans and militant Unionists.”141 Stellato 
began his presidency by removing left-wing and anti-Reuther union officials from office, via a 
UAW constitutional clause prohibiting members of the Communist Party from holding office, a 
difficult process given Local 600’s history and culture. Throughout the 1940s, the local union had 
consistently elected left-leaning leaders with a preference for direct action on the shop floor. In 
                                                          
138 “Unionism or Company-Unionism? – Who Are the Real Stooges?” Box 249, Folder 18, Series VI, Subseries B, 
WPR. 
139 “Measure Them Up: Facts About the Coming Plastics Building Elections by Ed. Lock campaign manager 
Progressive Unity Slate - - Geo. Pluhar for President,” Box 249, Folder 18, Series VI, Subseries B, WPR. 
140 Walter Reuther to Officers and Committeemen of Gear and Axle Building Local 600, Box 249, Folder 18, Series 
VI, Subseries B, WPR. 
141 Carl Stellato, Pat Rice, William R. Hood, W.G. Grant, “We Are Independents,” Box 249, Folder 18, Series VI, 




May of 1949, for one example, the Rouge workers shut down the entire complex for twenty-four 
days to protest the increased speed of production. Nor did Stellato’s attempt to change the local 
union’s direction endure. Local 600 demonstrated its stubbornly independent streak by reelecting 
the purged leadership in that fall’s elections. 
A complicating factor to the politics of Local 600, especially in relation to the left-wing, 
was its large African American membership, which overlapped with but was not directly tied to 
the significant Communist Party presence in the local. The Communist Party had been a fixture of 
politics at River Rouge since at least the 1920s, thanks to antifascist workers of Polish, German, 
and Italian backgrounds. The black and Communist Party membership had a synergistic 
relationship, as the Communist Party was known as one of the few white-majority organizations 
that openly supported racial equality as well as economic equality. In particular, some parts of the 
black community grew more receptive to the Communist Party following the 1931 defense of the 
Scottsboro Boys, nine young men falsely accused of and convicted for raping two white women 
on a train between Chattanooga and Scottsboro, AZ, by the International Labor Defense (ILD – 
the legal branch of the Communist Party) while the NAACP avoided the case. To be sure, not all 
black workers were members of the Communist Party or fellow travelers, but many of the 
Communist Party members at River Rouge were black. By the middle of the 1940s, half of the 
Communist Party members at the plant were African American.142 
 In the 1940s, the UAW’s African American membership had become a stronghold of union 
activism. Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein noted that the Rouge in the 1940s 
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“overshadowed all other Detroit area production facilities as a center of black political power.”143 
Black unionists took aim at racism and discrimination in the workplace, the union, and in society 
and politics. Local 600 became a center of this anti-racist activism. Well-known activists, like 
Horace Sheffield and Shelton Tappes, who had backed Reuther since the organization of the Rouge 
in 1941, attained high positions within the UAW.  They, along with other members, like 
Willoughby Abner, formed the Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC), a black caucus within 
the UAW, to open a position on the union’s International Executive Board (IEB) to an African 
American member. At the 1955 UAW Convention, delegates from Local 600 called for a 
nomination of an African American member to serve as a vice-president, but the resolution was 
not carried.144 
 Yet, while a significant number of rank-and-file Local 600 members supported the CP, 
purges of the left-wing leadership that had led the local through the 1940s and into the 1950s 
followed wider trends in the United States and coincided with other purges in the UAW. Eleven 
unions, with a combined membership of around 900,000 – about a fifth of the CIO’s membership 
– were forced out of the CIO in 1949 because of their ties to the Communist Party.145 
Contemporary events contributed to the deteriorating political climate in the United States. In 
1949, the victory of Communist forces in China, the successful testing of atomic weapons by the 
USSR, and the revelation of allegedly Soviet spy rings in the United States fed fears of Communist 
expansion and led to great anticommunist sentiments and politics. Then, in 1950, North Korea 
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invaded South. The environment was ripe for the rise of Senator Joe McCarthy, whose inquisitions 
in the nation’s capital, and the hysteria is fueled, led prominent political columnist Joe Alsop to 
remember later that “The nation had simply taken leave of all sense of proportion.”146  
As far as Carl Stellato was concerned, despite working with the left-leaning union officers 
after their reelection, communism entailed “disloyalty and unpatriotism to the Government [and] 
Constitution of the United States,” and he deemed it a danger to legitimate unionism.147 However, 
as Stellato moved away from the pro-Reuther orbit, and accepted a working relationship with the 
left-leaning forces within the local, he also would be swept up in the anti-communist hysteria 
spreading across the country.148 
 In the summer of 1950, a few weeks before the Korean War began, UAW president Walter 
Reuther successfully negotiated a five-year contract with General Motors that was shortly 
emulated by Ford and Chrysler as well. The five-year contract, nicknamed by Fortune the “Treaty 
of Detroit,” stipulated a cost of living allowance, a company-funded pension plan, and wage 
increases tied to increased production.149 While such a contract provided stability and the means 
to plan further into the future for both the UAW and Ford, Local 600 was more concerned with 
the increased laying off of workers and the speeding up of the assembly line at the Rouge complex. 
In response to widespread work shortage at the Rouge, Stellato and other Local 600 leaders argued 
that workers should not be called to work overtime as long as others were laid off. In addition, 
Local 600 noted that these were not issues that only affected automobile workers at the Rouge. 
Their proposed solution was a thirty-hour work week for forty hours pay, a challenge to Ford 
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management as well as to the UAW and Reuther’s recent negotiating victory.150 On a deeper level, 
Local 600 radically suggested disconnecting worker pay from the amount of labor he or she 
performed. Nonetheless, the actions open to Local 600 were constricted by the contract, including 
the ability of workers to respond directly to conditions on the shop floor. Stellato thus described 
the five-year contact as amounting to “entrapment.”151 
 Rank and file campaigns, furthermore, ran counter to Walter Reuther’s vision for the 
direction of the UAW. Reuther had been raised in a Socialist household and maintained a belief in 
the need for a democratically-controlled economy.152 He saw the UAW as more than a trade union. 
Instead, Reuther imagined the union as an organization that provided the means to affect broad 
social and economic change. To achieve these strategic ends, Reuther set about centralizing the 
UAW and consolidating a hierarchical, top-down, flow of power in the union once he was elected 
president in 1946. There were benefits to the union in doing so. The UAW’s history had included 
divisions and antagonism between skilled and unskilled workers, native-born Americans, old 
Northwestern European immigrants, and new Southern and Eastern European immigrants, white 
workers and black workers, and rural migrants and the city-bred. There were political divisions 
between communists, socialists, Trotskyists, Catholic unionists, and radical trade-unionists.153 
Reuther believed centralization of power would limit such conflicts and allow the UAW to pursue 
his broader ends.  
 The political environment in the postwar United States, with its burgeoning “byzantine 
world of federal regulations,” favored centralized union bureaucracy over rank-and-file campaigns 
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and shop floor militancy.154 While president, Reuther moved to further consolidate his power. 
Capitalizing on the pervasive anti-communism of the post-war period, he purged the UAW of 
communist officials, clearing the way for the union to comply with 1947’s Taft-Hartley Act while 
removing the main critics of Reuther and supporters of shop-floor democracy.155 The left-leaning 
leadership of Local 600 was a fly in his ointment, and Local 600 leaders often spoke out against 
Reuther’s desire to pursue a “militant unionism pursued though a centralized union 
management.”156 The basis of the long-term contract was the promise of stability. For the 
employer, this entailed the ability of the UAW to provide a stable labor force. The trade-off for 
Reuther and the UAW for stability for their membership was that the union essentially promised 
to provide labor management.157 But it was economic stability, nonetheless, and it was probably 
even more important to Reuther and the UAW given that they had gone full strength for an 
economic bill in 1949 that would provide for “publicly planned economic abundance” under the 
guidance of a tripartite government-management-labor board only to see it roundly defeating after 
President Truman, facing considerably pressure form the business community, ordered White 
House officials to oppose the bill.158  
This context explains why, when Local 600’s executive board began their campaign against 
decentralization in 1950, they were met with a chilly response by Reuther and his team.  “Local 
600 goes on record,” the local resolved on February 10 of that year, “requesting the International 
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Union to continue to make a thorough investigation” of reports of a company policy of 
decentralization. The resolution ended by confirming the union’s right to strike if such a policy 
existed. The summer of that year, the local union created a committee on decentralization, which 
pressed to meet with Henry Ford II to discuss the realities and consequences of a policy of 
decentralization.159  
When Carl Stellato wrote letters to Reuther asking him to arrange a meeting with Henry Ford 
II, then president of the Ford Motor Company, Ford himself consistently redirected Stellato’s 
requests to the company’s Director of Personnel, John Bugas, as well as “numerous lesser 
officials”.160 Stellato was stymied as neither the Ford Company nor the UAW seemed to recognize 
that “the decentralization problem” was, in fact, a problem. As he wrote Reuther, Stellato 
considered it a vital question, as it “indicates that thousands of our members may be displaced by 
this new Ford Motor Company plan.” Nor was he only concerned with union members. Stellator 
wrote to Henry Ford II, “You, I am sure, are thoroughly aware of the possible effect on our 
members – your employees – and the communities surrounding the Rouge Plant of removing 
twenty or thirty thousand jobs from this area.” “Certainly,” Stellato added, “you must agree with 
me that there is no issue more important to the worker and the community than jobs.”161 
 In response to Stellato’s questions, Bugas responded only with vague assurances and guarded 
comments. On May 29, Stellato ran through a litany of questions, including how many jobs would 
be moved out of the Rouge, how many workers would be affected, and in which buildings and in 
which positions. On June 7, Bugas responded that “plans for the future will be determined first of 
all by the over-all economic situation” but that the company needed “to remain competitive in a 
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highly competitive industry” and that decisions would be made “in direct relation to our ability to 
operate efficiently.” Ford would react as management thought appropriate in response to market 
forces. “It is true,” Bugas conceded, “that several plants are under construction and that we will 
begin work on other in the very near future.” Nonetheless, he concluded, “I believe it is fair to say, 
however, that the transition will be a gradual one and that in most instances where work will be 
moved out of the Rouge Plant, it will be replaced by operations currently being done elsewhere or 
by outside suppliers.” Bugas’s indicated that job loss would not occur due to decentralization, even 
as he avoided addressing other means by which the company was eliminating, reducing, or 
relocating production work.162 
Bugas’ reassurances did not prevent Rouge workers from noticing that, between July 1950 and 
July 1951, the hourly workers in the complex dropped from 67,000 to 54,000. The Press Steel 
Building alone saw the decrease of 4,069 workers, from 10,905 to 6,836.163 For the members of 
Local 600, these losses seemed to contradict what the company told them. Consequently, the 
Executive Board passed a resolution at the end of July, 1951, stating that “speed up, layoffs, run-
away shops, wage freeze and the high cost of living” were all problems that affected the entire 
automotive industry and not just Local 600 or Ford workers. Nonetheless, Walter Reuther assured 
Local 600 that the layoffs were a result of a shortage of steel, a consequence of the Korean War.164
  So it was that on July 7, 1950, Stellato wrote a letter to Henry Ford II. He insisted that “the 
decentralization problem raises questions which go beyond the realm of pure industrial relations. 
The moral and economic issues . . . are such as I feel warrant your personal attention.”165 The head 
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of Ford Motor Company disagreed, despite Stellato’s continuing and persistent attempts to attain 
a meeting with him. Regardless, that Stellato framed the issue of decentralization as a moral and 
economic quandary that went beyond “pure industrial relations” was an indicator of how Local 
600 understood decentralization and the stakes involved. It was just not a matter of wages and 
work conditions, but of the livelihood of entire working-class communities, an argument that 
would be brought to the forefront in a matter of weeks and which surfaced again in massive plant 
closings two decades later.  
Given the response Local 600 had received from John Bugas, they were surprised to learn that 
the company was moving machinery out of the Rouge, to be sent other production facilities, in the 
dead of the night. It was, as one Ford worker wrote in a letter to Local 600’s newsletter, Ford 
Facts, “thievery in the night.”166 Paul Boatin, a member of the local’s executive committee, 
reported on August 7 that he had received a phone call early in the morning that machinery was 
being moved out of the Motor Plant. Boatin investigated the matter. He was told by management 
that the machinery was being moved to the Ford Dearborn Engine Plant, but other union members 
reported that the machines to be shipped out were addressed to different plants. “There was no 
question,” Paul Boatin told his colleagues on the executive committee, “. . . that very soon now 
the workers would be out of jobs, and the company is taking the jobs out without giving the union 
a guarantee of other jobs coming in.”167 In addition to machinery being relocated, other jobs were 
being outsourced to outside contractors. A part of the six-cylinder engine that was made on 
premise, for example, was moved to an independent shop in Brighton. In other cases, the jobs were 
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moved to Ford plants in other locations. Jobs in the Press Steel department of the River Rouge 
plant were moved to Buffalo, and gear and transmission work was moved to Cleveland.168 
Following a summer of uncertainty, and being given a run-around by the company, the 
executive board of Local 600 passed a lengthy resolution regarding decentralization on August 
21.169 Restating their belief that this was not a parochial concern relevant only to their local union, 
the resolution immediately framed the issue as one that affected “workers in the Detroit 
Metropolitan Area” who worked at “Ford and other plants.” Local 600 was unambiguous in their 
assertion that larger issues were at play than ones that just affected their membership, their 
workplace, or even their company.  
In addition to alerting UAW members to scope of the problem, the resolution confirmed two 
more premises that are crucial to Local 600’s argument. The second premise placed automobile 
workers in the context of their entire lives: “Workers,” the resolution declared, “are citizens of 
long standing in their communities, home owners, taxpayers, and their complete plans for the 
future,” which included the raising of families and the pursuit of social lives, “are geared to their 
living in the Metropolitan Detroit Area.” This was not a claim about labor relations, but a claim 
about citizen rights and the ways local communities were constituted by those whose livelihoods 
depended on the continuing presence and health of the auto industry.  
The union’s third premise expanded the idea of community presented in the preceding premise. 
“Community groups,” Local 600 explained, “such as the City Councils, Civil Organizations, 
Churches, etc., have a responsibility towards the Citizenry in their immediate community.” Again, 
the claim regarding the rights of workers as citizens is striking. Workers are citizens, and local 
communities, including local government and religious institutions, have a responsibility to 
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support their peers. Thus, Local 600 called upon local organizations and institutions to support 
workers facing job loss due to decentralization. The reasons for doing so were starkly clear. “If 
decentralization of industry continues and workers are continually laid off,” Local 600’s resolution 
continued, this would “entail greater financial spending on the part of the community, and these 
communities will become partial ghost towns.” The loss of jobs on the part of industrial workers 
at the River Rouge and other plants, Local 600 argued, would constitute a severe loss for the 
community as a whole. Their futures were intertwined. 
Following from these premises, Local 600 suggested immediate steps in opposition to job loss 
due to decentralization. First, “all Mayors, City Councils, Civic Organizations, Church Groups, 
Fraternal Organizations, Veteran Groups,” should become involved in the campaign against 
decentralization, revealing Local 600’s understanding of how far the impact of decentralization 
would be felt. If veterans and fraternal organizations gave the list a masculine tilt, it should be 
noted that church groups, civic organizations, and even city councils meant that women in the 
community were included in this call to arms. Second, Local 600 called for those concerned to 
contact all relevant politicians and government employees, beginning with President, in order to 
share concerns of how decentralization would “destroy the ‘Arsenal of Democracy.’”170 Once 
again, Local 600 moved from local threats and local solutions to factors of national and 
international relevance, and emphasized that decentralization was more than just a labor dispute. 
Invoking Detroit’s identity as the Arsenal of Democracy, so soon after the Second World War and 
in the midst of the Korean conflict, positioned decentralization as a threat to national security.  
Whether at the level of national defense or at the local level of the neighborhoods near the 
Rouge, the language of the resolution poses job loss as a danger to the community. Unemployment 
                                                          




from corporate decentralization of production did not solely affect abstract workers, but the 
foundations of communities that would also, in turn, suffer because of decentralization. Workers 
were much more than a supply of labor; they were community members, homeowners, taxpayers, 
and people who planned on raising his or her family in the local community. Consequently, 
according to Local 600, it was the duty of local governments, community organizations, churches, 
as well as the union to resist industrial decentralization. In a time of war in Korea and the Cold 
War globally, Local 600 called on communities to defend their jobs in the name of national 
defense, the rights of citizenship, and economic self-preservation. The local union repeated their 
right to conduct a strike as one means to resist the threat of decentralization. 
The members of Local 600 did not rest following this resolution. Rather, they took their 
campaign to the local communities they had exhorted to rally to the union’s cause. The local union 
asked municipalities with significant employment at the River Rouge complex to pass resolutions 
against decentralization. The city councils of Dearborn, Melvindale, Garden City, and Ecorse all 
answered Local 600’s call, and formally condemned the policy of industrial decentralization. A 
notable exception was the city of Detroit, whose conservative mayor, Albert Cobo, refused to 
support the city council resolution supporting the Local’s campaign.171 The local did not just stop 
at city councils. Local 600 also contacted senators from Michigan, Republican Homer Ferguson 
and Democrat Blair Moody, to enlist their support. Both Ferguson and Moody agreed to publicly 
state their opposition the policy of decentralization. When Local 600 contacted Michigan 
Representative John Lesinki, Jr., a Democrat, about joining their campaign, he originally 
demurred. A local business owner in addition to being a politician, Lesinki argued that 
decentralization was part of the war effort in Korea. Percy Llewellyn, of Local 600, responded that 
                                                          




the policy of decentralization at begun at the Rouge plant before the war had, and Lesinki agreed 
to investigate the matter in greater depth. He later added his voice, along with the two senators, to 
those who were, as the union phrased it, “concerned with the possibilities of ghost towns in the 
very near future.”172  
The resolutions from local city councils were passed in the fall of 1951. Garden City sent 
the local union their official statement in October, in which they wrote that they were “going on 
record in opposition to decentralization of the Ford Motor Company and calling upon the President 
of the United States, Governor Williams, and the Congressmen of the State of Michigan to 
investigate the decentralization program of the Ford Motor Company and effect a program of 
bringing jobs into the Rouge Plant.”173 The Dearborn City Council voted unanimously to support 
Local 600’s position after Percy Llewellyn requested their support. He spoke movingly at a city 
council meeting of “pensioners [who] are forced to give up their ties and move along.”174 He also 
noted the amount of taxes Ford paid to Dearborn, and “pointed out that city taxes would go ‘sky 
high’ if Ford continued to move out.” The city council president, Marguerite Johnson, reportedly 
replied, “Why, in ten years this city would be a ghost town.”175 
Statements in support of Local 600’s campaign did not always entail support for their 
reasoning or, indeed, the same reasoning at all. The Dearborn City Council, while agreeing to 
condemn decentralization, disagree over why it should be condemned. One member, Martin 
Griffith, argued that decentralization was the result of Dearborn not respecting Ford Motor 
Company enough. Mayor Orville Hubbard, Griffith reminded the rest of the council, “ridiculed 
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and threatened officials of the Company as well as saying he would punch John Bugas, vice-
president, in the nose.” And now Ford was building factories elsewhere. Another council member, 
Joseph Ford, disagreed with Griffith, arguing that he did not see how the mayor’s attitude had any 
bearing on Ford’s policies. “We must do something before Dearborn is a ghost town,” council 
president Marguerite Johnson reiterated, before declaring that she was not interested in jobs 
anywhere but in Dearborn.176 
As Local 600 was rallying community members and organizations to its cause, the 
competing claims between the local union and the international UAW came to a head. The 
Committee on Decentralization finally arranged a meeting with the Ford Motor Company and with 
the international union in September. Walter Reuther informed Local 600 that the UAW would 
take the meeting over, including determining who would and would not be allowed to participate 
in the meeting. Only Local 600 President Carl Stellato was granted permission to attend the 
meeting. He walked out of in protest, insisting that he would never presume to represent all of 
Local 600 by himself. At the same time, Stellato refuted accusations that the campaign was merely 
a ploy against Reuther. The anti-decentralization campaign, he maintained, was not an attempt to 
needle Reuther or seek personal glory at his expense. Nonetheless, the conflict between the local 
and the international undermined the attempt to bring the local’s concerns to Ford.177  
At the end of September, a month after the union began discussing the authorization for a 
strike, the local’s language became more militant. The executive board accused the Ford Motor 
Company of deliberately misrepresenting decentralization as a matter of government policy 
undertaken for security reasons. Further, the leadership of the local urged all possible means of 
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disseminating information regarding decentralization, including the use of Ford Facts (Local 
600’s newsletter), leaflets, daily newspapers, and meetings at the plant gates. Even more striking 
is their demand that 
. . . . efforts [to] be physically instituted to stop the job movement out of the plant by having 
the workers form a human snake across the gates. In other words, the local would have to 
resort to tactics of 1936 and 1937 in order to keep the jobs in the plant.178 
 
The sit-down strikes of 1936 and 1937 were used in the Flint strikes when the United Auto Workers 
gained recognition at General Motors and, subsequently, at Chrysler and Ford. Such an allusion 
suggested that the local union saw the struggle against decentralization as just as important as the 
original struggle for union recognition fourteen years prior. If one accepts that the scale of 
significance was similar, then one could argue that those struggling against decentralization could 
reasonably respond with tactics such as the occupation of factories in the tradition of the sit-down 
strikes.  
 The environment of the late 30s and the early 60s were not similar. Sit-down strikes had 
been declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 1939, and, besides, all the major auto companies 
had accepted collective bargaining. At Ford, the stringently anti-union ethos of management that 
had spurred the lively leftist worker culture had faded away following the 1945 retirement of Henry 
Bennett, the head of the notorious Ford Service Department, and Henry Ford’s death in 1947, after 
which the reins were taken by his grandson, Henry Ford II.179 “Class war,” as B.J. Widick 
characterized it, “had been turned into a truce through negotiation.”180 
In the case Local 600 did call a strike, they declared that the International UAW had an 
obligation to support them and that all  Ford plants should be struck. Even as Local 600 moved 
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deeper into their campaign against decentralization, Stellato took care to caution the rest of the 
local union that decentralization was not the only threat to workers. Conditions during the Korean 
war played a part, as did the investment automobile companies were putting into automation under 
the name of improving workplace safety. Local 600 continued to request a meeting with Ford head 
Henry Ford II, who refused while asserting that decentralization was not occurring. Snubbed by 
both the company and the international union, Local 600’s executive board declared their intent to 
continue contacting more surrounding communities in order to encourage them to condemn the 
policy of decentralization. As Percy Llewellyn argued, Local 600, while doing “an excellent job,” 
could only do so much: “The communities would have to be stirred up.”181  
In October, Local 600 began pursuing another strategy of resistance. The executive board 
retained the services of an attorney, Ernest Goodman, in order to issue an injunction against the 
Ford Motor Company for breach of contract. Their argument was that, had the union known what 
Ford was planning, they never would have agreed to sign the recent five-year contract. At the same 
time, relations between the local and international union disintegrated precipitously. Arguments 
between the two included matters over dues increases and relations with other unions. Local 600 
responded publicly to their disagreements with Reuther and the International UAW through their 
autonomous publication Ford Facts, such as one issues with “Betrayal” in large black letters across 
its cover or another mourning “the death of democracy in the UAW.”182  
 Local 600’s lawsuit against the Ford Motor Company was scheduled to be heard before 
federal judge Thomas P. Thornton on January 8, 1952. The suit asked the court to find that the 
five-year contract prohibited Ford from pursuing decentralization of the River Rouge complex; if 
such a decision could not be made, that the contract be declared null and void, and that an 
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injunction be issued preventing Ford from moving production from the River Rouge complex.183 
Local 600’s lawyer, Ernest Goodman, described Ford’s actions as fraudulent, asserting that “unless 
restrained by the timely intervention of this court” the Rouge plant would become “a mere shell of 
its former capacity.”184 His argument rested on section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 
which allowed for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to sue one another in federal court 
for breach-of-contract. As Ford had made assurances that employment levels at the Rouge would 
remain steady, if not increase, during the last round of contract negotiations, Goodman’s argument 
was that the policy of decentralization, where employment was being sent to other plants and to 
contractors, constituted fraud with negative material consequences for the members of Local 
600.185 
Ford responded that employment was down several thousand at the complex, but that the 
reason was to be found in government restrictions. Many, the firm argued, were employees who 
had worked less than three months. Local 600 countered that the number was closer to 20,000, and 
that at least part of the reason was the policy of decentralization.186 Regardless, Ford defended 
their right to follow the market as they saw fit. Conceding that decentralization entailed breaking 
down large centers of production into smaller units, and that there was a benefit to those smaller 
units being moved to places with less union activity, Ford argued that the overarching strategy was 
a response to markets expanding in the South and to the West. As to the accusation of fraud, the 
company’s lawyer argued, the fact that Reuther and the other UAW officers who had signed the 
contract were not party to the lawsuit spoke for itself.187  
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The bitter relations between the local and the international union colored the way that this 
suit was viewed. As one newspaper reported, “many observers viewed the union’s actions as 
another attempt by Stellato to heckle the administration of UAW President Walter P. Reuther.” 
Another newspaper declared that “decentralization is nothing new in the automotive industry.” It 
saw the only motive behind the lawsuit as “the feud between Local 600 President Carl Stellato and 
UAW President Walter Reuther.”188  
Before a decision was handed down, Local 600 was rocked by investigatory hearings 
conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). HUAC had originally 
held hearings in Detroit in late February, 1952, in order to investigate Communist influence in 
industries involved in national defense.189 On the final day of the hearings, Bereniece Baldwin 
testified for four hours. Baldwin was the dues secretary of the Michigan Communist Party; and, it 
turned out, an FBI informant. She informed the committee that the Communist Party was actively 
holding membership drives in Detroit factories associated with defense production and that the 
Party had targeted the Rouge for “special consideration” in its recruiting efforts. 190 Committee 
member Charles Potter, a Republican Representative from Cheboygan, Michigan, announced that 
HUAC would return in March in order to pursue further investigations into Communist influence 
in Local 600. Taking the opportunity to score political points off Michigan Democrats, Potter 
charged that Governor G. Mennen Williams and Senator Blair Moody “might try to stop the 
committee from returning to Detroit.” The state’s governor retorted that “Potter’s statement is an 
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example of guttersnipe politics based on falsehood and innuendo. It’s McCarthyism at its 
worst.”191 
The HUAC hearings that March into Local 600 provided many dramatic moments. Just as 
Ernest Goodman represented Local 600 in their lawsuit against Ford Motor Company, so he 
represented the nineteen Local 600 officers targeted by HUAC.192 The recording secretary of Local 
600, William Hood, refused to answer any questions except to proclaim “that it was a damned lie 
that he was a Communist Party member.” Pat Rice, the vice-president of the local, invoked his 
rights under the Fifth Amendment, to which committee member Donald Jackson, a Republican 
from California, responded that while taking the Fifth did not legally entail an admission of guilt, 
“what the American people think and what assumption they draw is an entirely different thing.”193 
Dave Moore, an officer in the local, also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, but not before 
condemning the hearings as an “inquisition” in which “I am damned if I do and I am damned if I 
don’t.”194 
With the threat of a HUAC investigation into the UAW in the background, Reuther and the 
UAW leadership were put in a difficult place. They sacrificed Local 600 in order to keep HUAC 
at bay. Reuther cooperated with  HUAC, out of fear that not doing so would put the UAW “in 
jeopardy.” Reuther was on record as opposing the tactics of HUAC, as was the CIO. Yet, while 
there were “kids in Korea dying,” Reuther worried that HUAC would move “to try to put the union 
in a position where we were condoning the communists and were covering up for the communists.” 
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Given that Local 600 was the main locus of Reuther’s opposition within the UAW, it was a choice 
that did not give Reuther and his allies much pause.195  
Two members of Reuther’s staff, Elesio “Lee” Romano, a former vice-president of Local 
600, and Shelton Tappes, a former recording secretary of Local 600, were called by the committee 
to testify. “They would never have done it,” Local 600’s counsel, Ernest Goodman, stated later 
regarding Reuther’s condoning the testimony, “could never have done it, if he hadn’t give his 
consent . . . . It was sickening to so many of us.”196 Romano stated that there were around four 
hundred Communist Party members working for Ford, with around two thousand fellow travelers, 
and that 175 of them ran Local 600. Stellato, Romano explicitly testified, was not one of them, but 
the committee declined to hear testimony from Stellato in defense of the Local 600. Both Romano 
and Tappes named names, and both testified as to Reuther’s anti-communist record. The UAW 
under Reuther, according to Tappes, was “the most active organization in this country against the 
efforts of the Communist Party.”197 Those UAW members that were named in the testimony faced 
reprisals when they went to work. They faced firing, sit-down strikes, being hung in effigy, threats, 
and simply being run out of factories.198 These reprisals were a reminder that rank-and-file workers 
did not necessarily share the viewpoints of either their local’s leadership or of the union’s 
leadership. 
Stellato, while not allowed to testify in person, nonetheless sent a letter to the committee 
defending Local 600 and his administration. The attempt of communists to infiltrate American 
factories and other institutions was a fact, Stellato wrote, but their mission was aided and abetted 
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by the American government. “The lack of proper legislation,” the Local 600 president continued, 
“and enforcement of laws that guarantee all of the American people their civil rights, the unfair 
price and wage policy forced upon us by Government control, the inequitable income tax program 
coupled with the corruption and thievery on the part of higher Government officials” all worked 
to “hinder the efforts of those of us in the trade union movement who chose to direct the course of 
the trade union movement to exclude communists and communist objectives and methods.”199 Not 
all Local 600 members were convinced. A bulletin circulated among the Maintenance and 
Construction Unit, condemned “the unholy alliance” between the Local 600 officers and the 
Communist Party, calling them “political prostitutes” who hid “behind the banner of Local 600,” 
and derided “the Fifth Amendment boys.”  “The overwhelming majority in Local 600,” the bulletin 
stated, “honestly and sincerely believe in Free American Trade Unionism,” and ended by granting 
Stellato “the crown of Chief Flip Flop Artist of Local 600!”200 An anonymous flier demanded, 
“Ford Workers – Do you want Joe Stalin to run your union or do you want to run it yourself? . . . 
Let’s clean out Local 600!”201 
The day following Romano’s testimony, Reuther charged Stellato and other members of 
the local’s leadership before the International UAW’s Executive Board for failing to follow the 
union’s constitution. It barred Communists, along with Nazis or members of other Fascist parties, 
from being members or holding office. If found guilty, a local’s leadership would be removed from 
office and the local placed under receivership.202 “Failure on the part of Local 600 officers,” 
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Reuther wrote in a telegram to the officers, meaning the failure to purge communist leaders, “. . . 
is strengthening the efforts of anti-labor corporations and competing union to undermine the 
organization work of our union.”203  
The local’s leadership received only one day’s warning before the hearing, and they were 
not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. The presiding UAW officer, Vice-President John 
Livingston, supported the charges against the local’s leaders, with the result that the proceedings 
were more or less one-sided. Reuther attacked Stellato for nearly three hours before the latter was 
allowed to speak in his defense. Not all UAW officers approved of the decision to bring the Local’s 
officers up on charges. Leonard Woodock, by contrast, argued against giving in to the “neo-
fascists” of HUAC. Reuther conceded that none of the officers of Local 600 were Communist 
Party members; rather, Reuther railed against Stellato’s persistent criticisms of the International 
UAW’s policies. Local 600’s leadership rebutted that disagreement was the essence of union 
democracy, but to no avail. After more than eleven hours, the International Executive Board voted 
to strip the Local’s officers of their positions and to place Local 600 under receivership.204  
Local 600 remained under the direct control of the International UAW through an 
administrative board headed by Reuther, its elected leadership powerless, until September. In 
elections that month, fifteen Rouge buildings elected anti-Reuther candidates, and 80% of the 
members of the local’s general council were anti-Reuther union members. Carl Stellato was 
reelected as president – he ran unopposed, and he continued filling that office for the next 
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decade.205 The antagonism between the international leadership and the local, however, played a 
part in undermining Local 600’s legal case against Ford. The international union had assumed 
control of the local as the case was heard in the United States District Court in January 1952. A 
year and a half later, in July 1953, Judge Thomas P. Thornton dismissed the case. In his legal 
opinion, Thornton argued that if the contract between the union and Ford had been, in fact, 
breached, then the International UAW would have supported the case. Noting this, Thornton 
upheld the right of Ford to run and locate their business as they so chose.206 Following this 
decision, decentralization largely disappeared from discussion within the Local.207 Local 600’s 
membership continued to rapidly decrease. With over 60,000 members in 1950, the local stood at 
42,000, a decrease of 30%, ten years later.208 
Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the campaign of Local 600 against decentralization as an important 
precursor to later economic changes in the 1960s and 1970s, and as a vital historical case study 
complicating the dominant narrative of the 1950s as a time of shared prosperity. Rather, cracks in 
the foundations were beginning to form, and economic tensions and migrations were already 
forming in American cities in the immediate postwar period. Local 600’s campaign provides an 
insight to how Detroit auto workers saw these changes, and the potential danger such changes 
posed for themselves and their communities. Yet, while this chapter finds the local’s campaign a 
significant act of resistance to industrial decentralization, it also wants to resist casting them as 
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heroic Davids to the nefarious Goliaths of the UAW and the Ford Motor Company. The difference 
between Local 600 and the UAW laid in part in the fact that the local union was concerned with 
the effects of decentralization on workers, their families, and their communities on the ground, 
while the international union took a top-down view. It balanced job losses in one place with new 
factories and employment opportunities elsewhere, while maintaining a working relationship with 
the automotive companies.  
Reuther’s concerns were broad and long-ranging. Such a perspective had been long part of 
Reuther’s strategic vision, harkening back to his early days organizing. At the end of 1936, for 
instance, when Reuther and the fledgling UAW targeted a parts supplier, the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel 
Company, Reuther was able to convince union members to end a sit-down strike, despite the 
lackluster concessions from the company. “Reuther proved not only that he could deal with 
management,” Reuther biographer Nelson Lichtenstein wrote about this moment, “but that he 
could persuade a reluctant rank and file to accept a poor settlement […] in the interests of a larger 
collective interest.”209 Reuther’s position towards the Local 600 campaign in the early 1950s was 
similar: the interests of the Rouge workers were a reasonable short-term sacrifice to make for the 
larger, long-term, interests of auto workers nationwide.  
Granting this charitable interpretation of Reuther’s actions, it does not follow that the part 
of villain should go to Stellato, even though there are historians who have tried. Kevin Boyle, for 
example, in pursuit of praising Reuther, resorts to attacking Carl Stellato. The president of Local 
600’s criticisms of Reuther and the International Union were, in Boyle’s words, “nothing more 
than gamesmanship.”210 The entire decentralization campaign, in Boyle’s hands, was a mere anti-
Reuther power play. Apparently Stellato’s motivations are self-evident, as Boyle offers no 
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evidence in support of this assessment. Stellato, Boyle writes, in early 1951 “decided to use the 
restiveness among the rank and file to see just how weak the Reuther machine had become.”211 
Boyle’s condemnation of Stellato is odd. He characterizes the local president as an 
opportunist and not as someone with legitimate concerns about how Reuther was leading the union. 
Then, to make it more bizarre, Boyle criticizes him for being too conservative. Missing the point 
of the decentralization campaign, Boyle argues that “Stellato could have offered a radical, even 
syndicalist alternative to Reuther’s social democratic agenda. Had he done so, it is at least 
conceivable that Reuther would have shifted to the left.”212 It may have been conceivable, but the 
entire argument rests on the assumption that what Stellato and Local 600 were criticizing was 
“Reuther’s social democratic agenda” and not his top-down and centralized leadership style. As 
for Local 600’s proposed policies, such as the 40 hours of pay for 30 hours, this were “essentially 
conservative” positions that “accepted labor’s subordinate position.”213 Yet another assertion left 
unexplained, as quite a few people would be surprised to learn that a proposal to disassociate 
income from labor is “essentially conservative.” 
Given that Stellato had begun working at the Rouge when he was 18, with his formal 
education ending after the eighth-grade, it seems particularly insidious to criticize him for having 
not presented, in opposition to Reuther, a fully-functioning alternative vision of the future of 
industry in the United States at a time when great transformations were beginning to take effect. 
This is not to argue that Stellato and Local 600 presented perfect solutions to the problem of 
decentralization. Rather, it is to highlight that Stellato and Local 600 were attempting to address a 
problem – how large-scale job loss hurt local working-class communities – that neither Ford nor 
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the UAW took especially seriously. In other words, it is not a matter of who was right and who 
was wrong; to present Local 600’s campaign in those terms is to miss its significance entirely. But 
even if one grants that Local 600’s campaign was only to needle Reuther, it is still meaningful that 
it was decentralization that they picked as an issue. The ways that they addressed decentralization 
are still revealing of how Detroit autoworkers understood their city and their communities in the 
postwar period. It is revealing that local municipalities and city councils publicly agreed with Local 
600 on this issue. In this study, however, Local 600’s campaign is taken as a sincere attempt to 
resist structural changes. Even that resistance, as unsuccessful as it was, and as shortsighted as it 
might have been, should still be taken seriously, as the people behind it took it seriously.  
The paradox is that while workers of different backgrounds mobilized to protect their 
communities from job loss, white workers also mobilized to protect their communities from 
integration, just as the residents of Grosse Pointe did, chronicled in the next chapter. As one UAW 
official put it, the union “helps [workers’] economic interests until they can have a front porch, 
and for that they become capitalists.”214 In other words, the increased stability and security that 
collective bargaining provided, and of which the Treaty of Detroit was an exemplar, led workers 
to work to protect those economic gains at the expense of broader social change. It is noteworthy 
that the union official above turned to housing as a prime example of such a gain.  
As Local 600 and various communities foresaw, the policy of industrial decentralization 
had a profound impact on metropolitan Detroit. The problems that the city and its residents have 
faced over the decades since the 1950s are multiple, complex, and interweaving, but most 
observers agree that the loss of mass employment in the auto industry was a significant, 
                                                          





foundational, cause of Detroit’s distress. In the face of the auto industry’s pursuit of profit, the city 
of Detroit and its residents were, ultimately, disposable, or at least irrelevant. 
Local 600’s campaign was predicated on understanding this, as the repeated use of the 
imagery of ghost towns showed. Decentralization threatened the employment of union members, 
but also threatened the structure of the communities where they lived. That Local 600 received the 
support of local governments and politicians in their campaign suggests that the local union’s 
arguments were understood to be motivated by something more than a labor dispute. This would 
remain true even if that was Local 600’s only motivation. Its arguments resonated beyond the 
factory gates, revealing an acute understanding on the part of different metro-Detroiters that the 
loss of industrial employment threatened the existence of their communities.  
Nevertheless, the support of city councils and community members paled next to the power 
wielded by the Ford Motor Company. Even if Reuther and the International UAW had chosen to 
put its formidable influence and power behind the anti-decentralization campaign, the campaign 
then would have had to challenge the legal and economic structure of the United States. The 
campaign asked that the prerogatives of business take into account the interests of their employees 
and the communities in which they are located. This is not an impossible arrangement, but it 
challenged conventional and deeply held thought in the United States in the 1950s. The Ford Motor 
Company pursued policies meant to maximize their profits in relation to the market, but such a 
policy was not self-evident or natural, and should be understood as a deliberate choice that 
devalued workers and local communities in the interests of economic “efficiency.” Similarly, the 
ruling of Judge Thornton is reasonable within the context of a system that prioritizes the drive for 
profits over the stability and well-being of workers or their communities, but that does not mean 




Even though they lost their campaign, Local 600’s resistance is important in that it revealed 
an awareness of the negative outcomes of what would come to be called deindustrialization. It 
called attention to these issues quite earlier than the popular conception of deindustrialization does, 
and it received support from people outside of the UAW and Local 600. It reveals how the 
leadership of Local 600 and community members such as city council members understood their 
city and their relationship to the automobile industry and industrial labor. It is a historical moment 
that contributes to an intellectual history from below, in an effort to trace the thoughts and 
worldviews of, not scholars and professional philosophers, but autoworkers and other metro-
Detroiters.215 
Despite the resistance organized by Local 600, the end results compose a familiar narrative. 
Factories moved away from the old centers of industry; the power and influence of labor unions 
in the United States eroded; and the role of manufacturing in the national economy declined 
relative to other sectors. At the River Rouge complex, employment fell from 85,000 in 1945 to 
54,000 in 1954, and to only 30,000 in 1960.216 The reasons behind the failure of Local 600’s 
organization of communities against decentralization in Detroit are indicative of how various 
national trends intersected to shape local history: the Cold War, anti-communism and red-baiting, 
the factionalism within organized labor, and the dependence of manufacturing cities on the 
continued presence of industry. The conflict between the leadership of the local, which had a 
grassroots and local point-of-view, and the UAW international leadership, which was top-down 
and focused on an international analysis, only added yet another obstacle for Local 600’s campaign 
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to confront. To the local union, decentralization meant job loss and the destruction of communities, 
whereas the International UAW saw the expansion of industry and union influence.  
As old industrial centers continue to struggle to gain their footing in the present global and 
increasingly service-based economy, it should be kept in mind that these quandaries are more than 
half-a-century old. Local 600’s campaign against decentralization raised questions almost seventy 
years ago which continue to be pertinent in the present: to what extent do businesses have 
obligations or responsibilities to the communities which house them, if any? Should workers or 
communities have a voice in business decisions that drastically affect them? Could workers or 
communities have such a voice? This conversation was stifled for Local 600 in the early 1950s by 
the Cold War climate, in defense of an ideological position in support of free business and 
capitalism, and the House Committee on Un-American Activities investigations of the threat of 
Communism. In this milieu, the objections raised by Local 600 were overwhelmed and drowned 
out, and the industrial policy of decentralization continued, to the detriment of the health and 













CHAPTER 3 “THIS POTENT, THOUGH INVISIBLE, BARRIER”: HOUSING 
SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN SUBURBAN DETROIT, 1943-1973 
I have a dream this afternoon that one day right here in Detroit, Negroes will be able to buy a house 
or rent a house anywhere that their money will carry them. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.217 
 
On opposite end of metropolitan Detroit from Dearborn, a decade and a half after Local 
600’s campaign, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council invited Martin Luther King to speak 
in their community. He gave his address less than three weeks before his assassination, and after 
the fact, he described receiving “the worst heckling I have ever encountered in all my travels” in 
Grosse Pointe, Michigan. While King gave a talk on “The Other America,” a couple hundred 
demonstrators gathered outside the Grosse Pointe high school on March 14, 1968. They were not 
loud or boisterous, but they carried unambiguous signs and posters and “overshadowed” the talk 
inside. “Red Scum Get Out of Town,” read one. “Antichrist Must Go,” opined another. “Beware 
– King Snake,” announced one more. Inside the building, the tactics of the protesters were more 
aggressive. As King attempted to speak, “brazen hecklers” interrupted him with shouts of 
“Traitor!” and “Commie!”218  
The civil rights leader, who had faced down physical violence and jail repeatedly for over 
a decade, was as if “mourning” after the address, according to an Associated Press reporter. “I 
can’t talk right now,” King said, when the reporter, Hugh Morgan, asked what King thought of the 
protest. As King put his head in his hands, he closed his eyes and sighed “in a series of short 
                                                          
217 Martin Luther King, Jr, “Address at the Freedom Rally in Cobo Hall,” June 23, 1963, 
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/address-freedom-rally-cobo-hall, accessed October 11, 
2018.  
218 Lee, Paul. "Up North: Martin Luther King, Jr., in Grosse Pointe; Part I of II." Michigan Citizen, Jan 24, 2004; 
Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council (GPHRC) Board Meeting April 2, 1968, Box 2, Folder 5, Grosse Pointe 
Civil Rights Organizations Papers, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 




breaths that was more like a sob.” “I have never received a reception on this level,” King later told 
reporters at a news conference.219 
The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council had invited King to speak in the hope of 
encouraging “meaningful and forceful programs” in their community, which borders Detroit’s 
eastside, on matters of race in the wake of the events during the summer of 1967.220 That King 
spoke in Grosse Pointe, specifically, was a symbolically rich moment, resting on the history of 
discrimination and segregation in the wealthy, exclusive Detroit suburb. It is a history that 
intertwines race, class, and geography in metropolitan Detroit, which was a network of racialized 
borders and boundaries, divisions and fragments, unofficial yet well-understood fault lines that 
were policed and protected and jealously guarded. The organizing principle used to defend these 
divisions was property values; more specifically, the fear of property losing value due to the 
perception that certain city residents were, on the basis of their ancestry, less desirable neighbors 
than others. Nor was this solely racial prejudice, though it certainly encompassed racial 
segregation. It was also about ethnicity, class, and social status.  
Grosse Pointe is made up of five small, individual yet related, municipalities often referred to 
collectively as either Grosse Pointe or the Pointes. They are situated on the southwest shore of 
Lake St. Claire, adjacent to Detroit and less than ten miles northwest of downtown. The five 
Pointes – Grosse Pointe, Grosse Pointe Farms, Gross Pointe Shore, Gross Pointe Woods, and 
Grosse Pointe Park – together comprise an total area a little more than ten square miles overall, as 
compared to the 138 square miles of the city of Detroit.221 Residents historically have included the 
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Dodge and Ford families, an indication of the Pointes’ position as one of the wealthiest and most 
exclusive suburbs of Detroit. The Edsel and Eleanor Ford estate, designed by Albert Kahn and 
sitting on eighty-seven acres on Lake St. Clair, is admittedly one of the grander homes in the area, 
yet it serves as an example of the historical character and social milieu of the Pointes.222  
The first half of this chapter focuses on the so-called Grosse Pointe point system, a method 
that was, as far as it is possible to know, particular to Grosse Pointe from about 1945 until 1960, 
whereby potential homebuyers were rated and scored according to their “desirability.” More than 
racial restrictive covenants written into deeds or the financial discrimination at the heart of 
redlining, both discussed in more detail below, the point system was, in the words of one local 
realtor, a conscientious and sincere attempt to practice what was wide-spread discrimination, 
practiced nationwide, in a fair and intelligent manner.223 Yet, African Americans and other 
minorities were still “undesirable” as neighbors even if they were well-off enough to afford to buy 
a home in the exclusive Grosse Pointe community. As explained in the introduction, housing had 
been a divisive issue in Detroit since the Second World War. While the stresses on affordable 
housing for workers was not a major concern for Grosse Pointe residents – it was one of the city’s 
wealthiest suburbs, after all – the same objections to integration found in Grosse Pointe were 
forwarded by working-class neighborhoods in metropolitan Detroit with significantly less 
economic resources. Therefore, the focus on Grosse Pointe in this chapter is not because housing 
segregation was peculiar to the Pointes.  
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Rather, segregation was found across Detroit and its suburbs, as it was in most communities 
across the country. Instead, the focus on Grosse Pointe is because it offers the benefits of a case 
study in which economics is removed as an overriding consideration in the issue of housing 
segregation. The relationship between segregation and property values revolves around a number 
of interrelated issues, such as the cultural stereotypes of ethnic and racial minorities as incapable 
of maintaining a home in proper shape or, more materially, the discriminatory lending practices of 
banks and other financial institutions. The result of the latter practice was a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: ethnic and racial minorities denied the same access to credit as other homeowners were 
unable to buy as nice of homes or to maintain their homes in as nice of condition.224 However, in 
a community such as Grosse Pointe, the simple fact was that only those with means could afford 
to purchase property in the Pointes.  
Yet, the same arguments against integration regarding property values are given in the 
Pointes as in less well-off neighborhoods. To argue that integration, ethnic and racial, would still 
lead to lowering or eroding property values despite the individual means of minority homebuyers 
was to argue that something else was at play. The financial precarity of working-class 
neighborhoods where one’s home is one’s largest and often only investment is more distant, even 
as the professional class is none less concerned with their financial security and stability. For 
working-class Detroiters, the combination of racial and ethnic prejudices could combine with 
financial uncertainty to create a potent mixture of precarity, mistrust, and fear. The first part of this 
chapter explores how this dynamic appeared in a metropolitan Detroit community with greater 
access to financial resources and stability.  
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As the history of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council reminds us, however, there 
were white Detroiters and suburbanites who dissented from the prevailing racial and ethnic 
attitudes and worked to counter them. The second half of the chapter examines the successes and 
failures of the local residents in Grosse Pointe who sought to combat the discriminatory practices 
and reputations of the Pointes following state investigatory hearings into the point system in 1960. 
These hearings were given significant local media attention, and spurred some Grosse Pointers to 
take a stand for integration and civil rights in their community and in metropolitan Detroit. Within 
the context of the Civil Rights Movement, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council was mainly 
concerned with welcoming African American homeowners into their community. By the late 
1960s they also explored ways to increase interracial understanding and appreciation, such as 
through an arts festival, in addition to legal strategies revolving around discriminatory home-
selling practices. While the point system has a local notoriety unto the present, the history of the 
Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, which joined with similar Human Relations Councils 
across the metropolitan area, has garnered less historical attention. Yet, they reveal that 
communities were not always unified in their attitudes, and speak to the complex reality of racial 
politics in postwar metropolitan Detroit.  
The Grosse Pointe Point System 
Segregation could be an ad hoc affair – which houses a realtor chose to show, where they 
advertised, which loans banks approved – but the Grosse Pointe point system, developed circa 
1945, shows that it could be highly organized. Additionally, given the role that suburbanization 
played in Detroit’s postwar history, looking at Grosse Pointe in this chapter, similar to looking at 
Dearborn in the last, is intended to shift the analytical framework beyond the municipal boundaries 




as an island unto itself, divorced entirely from the large suburban community surrounding it, 
except when the suburbs emerge as some kind of white flight deus ex machina in the late 1960s.The 
relationship between the city and its suburbs was economic and financial; it was racial, and it was 
classed. This uneven relationship became only more significant as suburbanization drained the city 
of its professional, middle-class, and upper working-class white residents. The suburbs, as 
historian Robert Self and others have argued, were not just sites to which city residents fled. They 
actively enticed and drew city residents into them.225 That is to say, certain city residents. Using 
the case study of Grosse Pointe to explore the dynamics of segregation reminds us that the suburbs 
were carefully constructed racial and social sites.  
As mentioned above, the details of the Grosse Pointe point system reached the light of day via 
a public state investigatory hearing. On a basic level, this is a benefit because it ensured that the 
details of the point system were well-reported and commented upon. More significant is that the 
sworn testimony of the architects and guardians of the system shows clearly that they considered 
the system both reasonable and justifiable. Rather than seeking to evade legal responsibility or 
otherwise excuse the system, they defended it. On the other hand, the fact that there was an 
investigation, and the responses registered by newspapers, suggests that the pro-segregation 
sentiments evinced by the Grosse Pointers questions were not as universally shared as they 
presumed.  
It is not clear as to when or how, exactly, the point system came into existence. The Grosse 
Pointe Brokers Association (GPBA) and the Grosse Pointe Property Owners Association created 
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the system around 1945 and maintained it through 1960.226 The groups designed the system to 
replace the widespread use of restrictive covenants, clauses written into property deeds restricting 
who could purchase or inhabit a property by one’s ethnic or racial background, which had been 
ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in their 1948 decision in  Shelley v. Kraemer.227 
Restrictive covenants originated in California at the end of the 19th century in order to limit where 
Chinese immigrants could live. The use of these covenants was frequently challenged in court, so 
that one way of tracing their spread across the United States from the west coast is by noting 
challenges in the South by 1904 and in the North by 1922.228  
Over time, restrictive covenants were used to target and restrict the housing choices of 
blacks, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans, including, in some cases, all non-Caucasians. The 
use of restrictive covenants arrived in the northern United States around the time of the first Great 
Migration north of African Americans, who fled failed cotton crops, sharecropping, and the 
increasing racial violence in the South, including recurring incidences of lynching in the 1910s. 
The expanded use of restrictive covenants also occurred in the wake of the 1917 Buchanan v. 
Warley decision by the Supreme Court, which overturned the use racial zoning, one of the first 
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major legal victories for the NAACP.229 Black urban spaces were carved out in cities where the 
beginning of the First World War and anti-immigrant policies had created severe labor shortages. 
With these new black urban communities and employment opportunities came labor conflicts and 
housing disputes.230  
Until the 1948 Supreme Court ruling against them, restrictive covenants were enforceable 
in court as a private contract. In 1911, a New York Times editorial described the use of “covenants 
of restriction” as effectively protecting neighborhoods from “negro invasion,” even as they 
claimed that the covenants were “solely for the purpose of preventing depreciation of property 
values.”231 Over a quarter of a century later, the Federal Housing Administration’s 1939 
Underwriting Manual advocated restrictive covenants, along with zoning and other regulations, as 
the ideal means to preserve the stability of neighborhoods. They explicitly meant occupancy by 
“the same social and racial classes.” Even after the Supreme Court declared covenants 
unconstitutional, the FHA did not make it a policy to cease insuring properties protected by 
restrictive covenants until 1950.232  
In the case of Grosse Pointe, restrictive covenants declared homes to be for the “Caucasian 
race only.” “No lot or building,” declared one such covenant, “or part of any building thereon shall 
be used or occupied by any person or persons other than those of the Caucasian race, except that 
domestic servants not of the Caucasian race may occupy the premises where their employer 
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resides.”233 By no means, however, was Grosse Pointe unique in the metropolitan Detroit area for 
deploying restrictive covenants to maintain the racial and ethnic make-up of the community. In the 
1940s, over 80% of the housing in Detroit, except for the inner city, was covered by racial 
restrictions. In a study of the deeds of ten thousand subdivisions in Detroit, sociologist Harold 
Black found that no land developed prior to 1910 had a restrictive covenant, while every 
subdivision developed between 1940 and 1947 restricted ownership or occupancy by African 
Americans. Despite their ubiquity, “restrictive covenants have never,” as a Grosse Pointe Brokers 
Association leaflet fretted, “given more than partial protection.” They were a piecemeal solution. 
They were expensive to implement as their efficacy demanded that every property deed in a given 
neighborhood or community include one. Besides, they were facing legal challenges in Detroit by 
1944, and were ultimately overturned in 1948.234 
The point system took housing segregation a step further. The details of the system were 
revealed in two lawsuits and an investigatory hearing in 1960, but the testimony of those involved 
suggests that not much changed during the fifteen years the system was in use.235 The arrangement 
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was straightforward. Real estate brokers submitted names of potential home buyers to the Grosse 
Pointe Property Owners Association (GPPOA) and Grosse Pointe Brokers Association (GPBA). 
These organizations in turn engaged a private detective to fill out a two-page form on the potential 
home buyers. The form, a type of survey, worked on scale of one hundred possible points granted 
or taken away for various reasons. Everyone needed at least fifty point to be approved to purchase 
a home in the Grosse Pointe, although some demographics needed more than fifty points in order 
to pass. A person of Polish descent needed at least 55 points, for example, to pass. Southern 
Europeans, defined as Greek, Italian, or Lebanese, needed 75 points, and Jewish buyers needed 85 
points. There was not a defined protocol for those of African or Asian descent for, as a real estate 
office president stated, “Asian and Negroes had never become a problem.” Other criteria used to 
evaluate whether a prospective home buyer was “undesirable” included speaking with an accent, 
family size, “swarthiness,” education level, or considering oneself an “hyphenated American.”236  
The secretary of the GPPOA, R. Noble Wetherbee, testified in 1960 that 1,597 
investigations had taken place since 1945 (of the 1,597 reported investigations, 658 home buyers, 
41%, were determined to be undesirable by the guardians of Grosse Pointe). This would average 
out to about 106 investigations a year. As each investigation cost between $100 and $150, it meant 
that, on average, between $10,640 to $15,960 was spent annually on investigations. While the 
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averages are revealing, they cover up the yearly fluctuations. By 1960, about 300 investigations 
were taking place in a year. That meant that in 1960, the cost of the point system was between 
$30,000 and $45,000 a year. The average income for an American family in 1960 was $5,600. 
Despite spending at least five times the income of an average family on these investigations, the 
secretary of the GPPOA asserted the findings were advisory only.237  
Indeed, if a prospective buyer failed to meet score enough points, the twenty-four brokers 
and eleven associated brokers and builders of the GPBA were all advised of the fact. Failure to 
heed the results would lead to the personal intervention of the executive secretary of the GPBOA. 
According to the GPBA’s own regulations, “the penalty for selling to an ineligible shall be 
forfeiture to the Association of the full commission, including the salesman’s share.”238 Paul W. 
Rowe, a former mayor of Grosse Pointe Woods, testified about the consequences of violating the 
GPBA’s advisory system when he related how he was expelled from the association in 1957 for 
selling houses to two Italian families.239 Expulsion from the broker’s association was a serious 
matter for a business that depended on having access to a network of critical contacts and 
information.240 
In a joint statement by the GPBA and GPPOA, the guardians of the point system defended 
their interference in the private market as “a matter of supply and demand,” that is, as a function 
                                                          
237 Cost of the investigation detailed in Jack Casey, “Grosse Pointe Resident-Screening Plan Defended,” Detroit 
Free Press, April 20, 1960;  1,597  and 658 figures comes from Don Beck, “40 Pct. Flunk Grosse Pointe Realty 
Test,” Detroit Free Press, April 21, 1960; average income for an American family given in “Average Income of 
Families Up Slightly in 1960,” US Bureau of the Census, June 9, 1962, available online at 
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-036.pdf, accessed August 11, 2016.  
238 Jack Casey, “Grosse Pointe Resident-Screening Plan Defended,” Detroit Free Press, April 20, 1960; Joseph E. 
Wolff and Robert A. Popa, “GP Point Plan Detailed,” Detroit News, May 3, 1960;  from “Regulations Governing the 
Screening Process of Grosse Pointe Brokers Association,” quoted in Don Beck, “40 Pct. Flunk Grosse Pointe Realty 
Test,” Detroit Free Press, April 21, 1960. 
239Jack Casey, “G.P. Brokers Air Reprisal in Point System Violation,” Detroit Free Press, undated; Popa and Wolff, 
“Rebel Realtor to be Called in Pointe Quiz,” Detroit News, undated; Ray Giradin, “Violated Point System, Broker 
Expelled – Tells of GP Association’s Reprisal,” Detroit Times, May 12, 1960. 




of the private market. If neighborhood begins to become home for “a cliquish or clannish group of 
families unlikely to absorb local customs,” then it was only to be expected that potential home 
buyers (of the non-cliquish or -clannish variety, one guesses) would prefer to buy “where he 
believes his investment will be more secure.” It was a matter of home values and appraisals, “a 
vicious circle” in which the guardians noted that “even the unprejudiced person is affected.” The 
fear of integration lowering home values had the effect of lowering home values.241 
The GPBA and the GPPOA were not off the mark, either. Lowered housing values were 
not caused by integration, but by racial and xenophobic reactions to integration, or even the 
possibility of integration. The vicious circle existed, confirming the worldview of the prejudiced, 
and it was exploited by the less scrupulous of the real estate profession. In a move known as 
blockbusting, realtors and brokers would sell a house in an all-white neighborhood to a black 
family, or begin the rumor that such a transaction was soon to take place. Fearing a “takeover,” 
fear actively encouraged by the realtor or broker, the white residents would sell their homes quickly 
and – more importantly – cheaply. The broker or realtor would then sell the houses, no longer so 
cheap, to African Americans who were searching for a way out of the low-quality inner-city 
housing that residential segregation had forced them to accept in the first place. As economist 
Richard Rothstein phrased it, “Blockbusting could work only because the FHA made certain that 
African Americans had few alternative neighborhoods where they could purchase homes at fair 
market values.”242  
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This process in the city of Detroit was exacerbated by the changing economic landscape, 
as the postwar movement of industry out of the city coincided with the changing racial landscape. 
Working-class white Detroiters consequently sought “to defend a world that they feared was 
slipping away,” as historian Thomas Sugrue notes, but in their view, “they blamed blacks for their 
insecurity.” The urban landscape racism had created served to further confirm the racism of white 
Detroiters. In reality, the first black family to move into an all-white neighborhood was often on 
better financial footing than many of their new neighbors.243  
But it was not working-class Detroiters, white or non-white, who were house-hunting in 
Grosse Pointe. The economic argument around property values seems less convincing when, as in 
the case of those looking to move to Grosse Pointe, the people involved were far from financial 
instability. Economics and property values do little to explain the following three cases.  
The first is that of Dr. Jean Braxton Rosenbaum, a psychiatrist and inventor who was also 
a direct descendant of a signer of the Declaration of Independence. In a letter to the Michigan 
Attorney General Paul L. Adams, Dr. Rosenbaum described how he was told he would have to 
wait to be passed by the GPPOA before purchasing a house in Grosse Pointe. Later, his broker 
informed him that “I could not buy, or even look at, a house in Grosse Pointe because I was 
Jewish.”244 Incidentally, the point system did not exclude those of Jewish background entirely, at 
least in theory. As Paul Maxon, the head of the Maxon Brothers, Inc, real estate office, explained, 
a person such as Albert Einstein could purchase a home in Grosse Pointe “because he was of 
sufficient prominence.”245 
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Second is the testimony of Bruce N. Tappan, the president of the GPBA and a resident of 
Grosse Pointe Park. While on the stand, Tappan was asked by Solicitor General Samuel J. Torina, 
“Suppose a person in the Beaconsfield-Jefferson area has the money to move onto Lake Shore. 
Why should he be investigated?” Tappan shot back, “Just because a man is loaded with money 
doesn’t make him a gentleman.”246 
Third, and last, consider the testimony of Orville F. Sherwood, to the effect that decisions 
over desirability could be reversed. In one case, Sherwood related how one prospective home 
buyer, who had run a real estate office on Woodward, and “employed a racially mixed staff of 
salesmen and office workers,” was “blacklisted from buying in Grosse Pointe.” However, it was 
later discovered that that the prospective home buyer had moved his business to a new location 
and had hired a white-only workforce. His blacklisting was repealed.247  
In the first case, a man in the medical profession with a family history directly connected 
with the American Revolution was considered undesirable because he was also Jewish. The second 
tells us that personal finances or wealth were irrelevant. The guardians only allowed “gentlemen” 
to penetrate their cities’ borders. The term is vague. It easily could include self-made gentlemen 
but taken in conjunction with Dr. Rosenbaum’s experiences, perhaps it was more a declaration that 
“breeding” or background matters. In the third case, a businessman was undesirable not for any 
personal or financial characteristic but because his hiring practices were objectionable to the 
guardians of Grosse Pointe. The decision to reverse his blacklisting after he changed his business 
practices demonstrates this.  
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It also demonstrates how insidiously racial segregation and discrimination operated. The 
economic argument forwarded by the guardians of Grosse Pointe rested on rotten foundations. 
That this businessman’s hiring practices had no direct connection to his desirability as a neighbor, 
and certainly not to housing values, did not stop him from being blacklisted. His undesirability 
was rooted in his hiring a “racially mixed staff” in an office nowhere close to Grosse Pointe. His 
subsequent desirability came from his adopting discriminatory hiring practices. It is difficult to 
conceive how this criterion relates to matters of supply and demand in the housing market or 
matters of property appraisal.  
 Yet, the defenders of the point system maintained that it was merely “the most careful and 
considerate method possible for making the best of a difficult fact – of prejudices which affect real 
estate value, just as street paving and water systems are also facts affecting value.” With not a hint 
of irony, the attorneys representing the GPBA and GPPOA publicly stated that the point system 
was “a plan that recognizes that all property owners, of whatever extraction, should be free to sell 
to whom they choose.”248 After Bruce N. Tappan expressed his opinion on the difference between 
being a gentleman and merely “loaded with money,” he testified that “it is pretty well known 
throughout Grosse Pointe that the brokers are always standing guard.”249 Again, that realtors in the 
Pointes were always guarding the housing market belies their claims that housing was a matter of 
a free market, personal choice, and supply and demand. 
Always standing guard, but against whom? The defenders of the point system argued that 
they were standing guard in defense of stable property values, but they were not reluctant to testify 
that they also stood guard against Jewish medical professionals moving next door and businessmen 
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who, in their private practices, hired employees who were not white. The emphasis on property 
values should not be dismissed, even as it appears unable to bear the weight placed on it by the 
guardians of Grosse Pointe. In spirit, if not in the details, this was in no way unique to Grosse 
Pointe or metropolitan Detroit. “This plan is being conducted,” testified realtor Paul Maxon, “in 
fine residential communities all over the country, but in a more informal manner, in a more 
haphazard, less fair, less intelligent manner than our own conscientious, sincere attempt to make 
the best of these well-known prejudices as they exist.”250  
Again, there was a bitter truth behind the words of the defenders of the point system. 
Violence over integrated housing was a staple of early 20th century Detroit history. In 1925, Dr. 
Ossian Sweet moved his family into an all-white neighborhood, causing a mob to crowd the street 
outside on September 9, pelting the house with stones, until someone inside the house fired into 
the crowd, striking two. The resulting murder trial brought the NAACP and Clarence Darrow to 
Detroit to defend Dr. Sweet and his friends who had been inside. Darrow achieved acquittals from 
an all-white jury after detailing the pervasive violence faced by African Americans over housing, 
and arguing that firing in self-defense was justified.251 In February 1942, fighting broke out among 
a crowd of over a thousand people when the Sojourner Truth public housing project, for black 
residents in a white neighborhood, opened. The result was at least forty injured, over two hundred 
arrested, and over a hundred sent to trial.252  
More pervasive was the more mundane, yet sustained, forms of violence faced by black 
pioneers in white neighborhoods: in cases from the late 1940s through the 1950s, these included 
thrown rocks and bricks, break-ins, water damage, thrown paint, smashed windows, constant 
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phone calls, crowds outside at night, cars slowly driving at night, thrown eggs, salted yards, 
picketing, effigy burning, arson, slashed car tires, burning crosses, shouted epithets, torn down 
fences, trampled gardens, firebombing, burning trash cans, dumped garbage and waste.253 Between 
1943 and 1960, at least 192 home owners associations were formed in the city of Detroit. As the 
flyer of one such association’s emergency meeting in March 1950 alerted the public to the 
beginnings of integration, “Neighborhood Invaded by Colored Purchase on Orleans & 
Minnesota.”254 The commonly-used language of invasion and calls for defense and protection 
indicate the degree to which urban spaces was divided into zones of occupation in the imaginations 
of city residents, with borders not to be crossed. Granting the premise of boundaries and borders, 
the logic of forceful response, including violence, follows in the case of unauthorized crossings.255  
While racial prejudice was widespread – and in the case of Grosse Pointe, ethnic and 
religious prejudice as well – it is also accurate to characterize lowering of property values as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, in the same way that a run on banks produces the outcome that everyone feared 
and had acted solely in order to avoid.256 The threat to property values were not just a case of 
prejudice, but of material circumstances, even if those material circumstance were, in turn, created 
by prejudice. As Jane Jacobs once noted, however, “credit-blacklisting maps, like slum-clearance 
maps, are accurate prophecies because they are self-fulfilling prophecies.”257 
The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was established in 1933 to underwrite 
mortgages in order to reduce foreclosures. Its long-term appraisal system included the building 
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itself as well as the surrounding neighborhood. In the case of the latter, homogenous, native-born, 
white-collar communities were privileged over diverse, working-class, and ethnic or black 
neighborhoods. As historian Kenneth Jackson has argued, the HOLC created the practice of 
redlining, named for the color used to designate high-risk neighborhoods on HOLC maps. More 
importantly, Jackson notes how this appraisal system rested on assumptions about the causes of 
neighborhood decline. It took decline to be the natural outcome of the age of structures and 
declining incomes. Just as importantly, there was no provision in the HOLC appraisal system to 
distinguish between changing demographics as a cause of decline, or of decline as the cause of 
changing neighborhood demographics.258 Private lending institutions, in turn, took their cue from 
this system of appraisal.259  
When the HOLC was incorporated into the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 
1934, it also incorporated these standards of appraisal. A 1938 FHA Underwriting Manual stated 
that, “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be 
occupied by the same social and racial classes.”260 The boundaries between different classes and 
races were often symbolic, but they could be all too concrete as well. In the 1930s, white Detroiters 
who moved near a black enclave on 8 Mile Road (today the northern limit of Detroit proper) could 
not secure FHA insurance due to the geographic proximity of black and white homeowners. In 
1941, a developer built a concrete wall between the white and black communities, and the FHA 
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then approved the mortgages for the white properties.261 The wall still stands today. It was this 
federal support of segregation that allowed local initiatives, like restrictive covenants, to work 
effectively. In 1955, Charles Abrams, whom Architectural Forum described as “the foremost 
housing consultant in the United States,” described deeds with restrictive covenants due to FHA 
policies as “the common form of deed.”262 
Even as the HOLC and FHA polices encouraged and reinforced racial segregation 
throughout the United States, their loans made homeownership a possibility for more Americans 
than ever before, including working-class families. However, the means by which homeownership 
was put within the purview of more Americans – and its privileging of new, single-family, 
construction – also resulted in the residential hollowing out of inner cities via suburbanization.263 
The same programs that made home ownership an obtainable goal for the first time for many 
Americans also encourage those new homes to be built outside central cities, in suburban areas, 
while also condemning minorities to segregated neighborhoods, often in aging, inner cities. The 
causal relationship between integration and lowered property values was a fragment of the larger 
interlocking mechanisms of racial inequality in the United States, composed of self-reinforcing 
and self-fulfilling prophecies that blamed the victims of prejudice for the discrimination they faced 
while simultaneously denying minorities the means to create better lives.  
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The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council 
The Grosse Pointe point system is often mentioned when segregation in Detroit is under 
discussion. Its systematic nature, based on rationality and efficiency, made it much more grotesque 
in a post-segregationist world. It was not a matter of passionate hatred, but rather a pragmatic 
solution given, calmly and reasonably, to difficult social tensions and conflicts. It is a reminder 
that racial discrimination can manifest in many different forms, and some of them can be banal in 
appearance, a far cry from the popular images of racism in the South. Photographs of lynchings or 
civil rights demonstrators being attacked spring readily to mind, but more structural forms of 
prejudice, such as housing segregation, are more difficult to see and compound over generations. 
To borrow from Hannah Arendt, we can speak of a banality of racism, and, to borrow from 
President John F. Kennedy, all that is required is for everyday people not to question the status 
quo, to follow orders, or, in this case, to follow the rest of the neighborhood.264  
 This is why it is so important to say that not all Grosse Pointers approved, supported, 
condoned, or appreciated the efforts of the Grosse Pointe segregationists. As is broadly true 
throughout human history, there were those who disagreed with the majority, and acted to the 
contrary. Held up as the bastion of segregation in metropolitan Detroit and as the home of the over-
the-top point system, it was rarely, if ever, noted that other Grosse Pointers organized to combat 
segregation and racism when the point system became public knowledge in 1960. This newly-
formed group continued to challenge segregationist policies for the next thirteen years. None 
would have stood out as rabble-rousers or trouble-makers on paper: they were professionals, 
upper-middle class, homeowners, men and women concerned with education and reaching out to 
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houses of worship. They began by meeting secretly in each other’s homes, but by the mid-to-late 
sixties they were marching in the street, knocking on doors, and pushing for a more inclusive 
community.  
In 1960, the year of the investigatory hearings into discrimination among the real estate 
industry in Grosse Pointe, community members organized into the Grosse Pointe Human Relations 
Council (GPHRC) to promote integration and cross-racial understanding. Admittedly, the 
founding members recognized that their social views were in the minority in Grosse Pointe, and 
so their meetings were held clandestinely in members’ homes. At these first meetings, members 
largely “listened to Negro and white speakers, and tried to find ways to encourage integration and 
open housing.”265 By 1962, the group had developed a wide-ranging general program of action.  
The GPHRC discussed education and the hiring practices of schools. They showed the 
“support of our group for hiring Negro teachers [and] for the general hiring practices at all levels 
in the system without regard to race or creed.” They discussed school curriculum and whether it is 
“designed to strengthen the concept of equality and brotherhood as American ideals.” They 
wondered if the books in the local library “treat[ed] minority characters naturally and without 
stereotype,” and they suggested erecting exhibits “emphasizing the contribution to American life 
and culture made by various groups, institutions, races, and nationalities.” They talked about 
hosting teas or autographing parties with contemporary authors, “including authors from minority 
groups.” Council members proposed that recreation was an efficient means to their goals. They 
suggested promoting athletic contests between “teams from the wider metropolitan area” and 
organizing a baseball or other athletic clinic with “teachers, prominent sports figures representing 
                                                          




racial and national origins,” The also explored how to make it “comfortable for minority group 
friends of residents” to visit the waterfront parks of Grosse Pointe.266  
The Council did not ignore commercial matters in their program. They intended to research 
public accommodation in Grosse Pointe among restaurants, motels, stores, banks, and other 
businesses. They wanted to know about their employment practices and how they could indicate 
their support of businesses with fair hiring practices. They investigated how public servants such 
as police officers were hired in Grosse Pointe and noted that many of the postal workers serving 
their community were African American. The Council planned to meet with labor unions, such as 
those of retail clerks, municipal workers, and waitresses, to further investigate hiring practices in 
the Pointes. Finally, there was housing, which was an issue “so broad and significant” to the 
organization. 
After a few years the organization decided to publicly push for open housing and 
integration in Grosse Pointe. Members of the Council, the January 1963 GPHRC newsletter 
declared, “will agree that an all-white suburb stands as a symbol of the racism which troubles our 
society. Grosse Pointe residents need to make clear that they do not support racial 
exclusiveness.”267 Thus, in 1963, the same year which saw police dogs and fire hoses let loose on 
civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council organized 
a walk through Grosse Pointe in support of open housing. They organized their demonstration for 
June, the same month that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., led a march down Woodward Avenue in 
Detroit and delivered a speech at Cobo Hall. Flanked by Reverend C.L. Franklin, the father of 
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Aretha, and the Detroit Council of Human Relations, Dr. King proclaimed that “segregation is a 
cancer in the body politic, which must be removed before our democratic health can be 
realized.”268  
“In a real sense,” Dr. King continued, “we are through with segregation now, henceforth, 
and forevermore.” Before launching into his conclusion, which announced the same dream later 
delivered at the March on Washington, King encouraged his Detroit audience, “to work with 
determination to get rid of any segregation and discrimination in Detroit, realizing that injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere [….] we must come to see that de facto segregation in 
the North is just as injurious as the actual segregation in the South.”269 King’s campaigns against 
housing segregation in the North are popularly associated with Chicago in the later 60s, yet at the 
height of the voting and anti-segregation campaigns in the South, King was in Detroit sounding 
the alarm on racial segregation in Northern cities.270  
The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council was just one of many Human Relations 
Councils across metropolitan Detroit to answer King’s call. In 1964, there were twenty-five such 
groups, including Human Relation Councils in Grosse Ile, Redford, Rochester, Trenton, Warren, 
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Centerline, Allen Park, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, and Pontiac.271 The Grosse Pointe Council 
officially incorporated in 1964, with Dr. Charles E. Brake as its president. Seventy-nine Grosse 
Pointe residents attended its first membership meeting. Within one year, the Council had grown to 
334 members. By 1969, it was over 500.272 Once the Council had decided to take the step to 
become a public presence in Grosse Pointe, they did not back down. In 1966, they sent a letter to 
their members requesting permission to print members’ names in the Grosse Pointe News and the 
Grosse Pointe Press, “as an expression of welcome to the 2 Negro families who are now residents 
of the Grosse Pointes.”273 The two families, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Wright and Mr. and Mrs. Glenn 
Brown, both later moved out of Grosse Pointe in 1967 due to job transfers. When the Wrights 
moved in, the GPHRC not only welcomed them, but it also made sure that the family was not alone 
at the house, especially at night. After sunset, according to GPHRC member Sally Brown, a large 
number of cars would drive by the Wright’s home until roughly 10:30 p.m., a chilling reminder 
that the Council’s integrationist position was far from universally shared in the Pointes. The 
Council developed written plans on how to intervene in the case of “mob action” when families 
moved in, when houses were sold but not yet occupied, and when there was just the anticipation 
of a house being sold.274 
As its members organized for integration and open housing in the Pointes, the Council 
found allies among local religious institutions. In 1966, David W. Palmer of the Grosse Pointe 
Congregational Church wrote to the Council that, “I believe that the Council’s efforts have resulted 
                                                          
271 The Open Door, June 1964, Vol 11, No. 1, Greater Detroit Committee for Fair Housing Practices, Box 1, Folder 
8, GPCROP. Another indication of the spread and importance of Human Relation Councils as a movement is that 
Michigan State University hosted a Conference on Human Relations on June 3, 1967. See “University Resources 
and the Role of the Human Relations Committee in the Community: Proceedings on the Conference on Human 
Relations,” Box 1, Folder 9, GPCROP. 
272 1970-1971 GPHRC membership flier and the 1969-1970 GPHRC membership flier, Box 1, Folder 7, GPCROP. 
273 Blair Moody Jr. to members of GRPHRC, July 31, 1966. Box 1, Folder 5, GPCROP. 
274 “Emergency Plan A,” Box 1, Folder 3 and “Proposed Plan for Dealing with Move-In Problem in Grosse Pointe,” 




in a reasonable degree of tolerance, and that you should feel encouraged.”275 The spring of that 
year, the Council handed out pledge cards at local churches, so that churchgoers could publicly 
signal their support for the belief that “We who live in Grosse Pointe believe that any family should 
be free to choose its place of residence. We welcome neighbors on a personal basis without regard 
to race, creed, or country of origin.” 276 
Additionally, the Council spent a decade working to promote cross-cultural understanding. 
To them, segregation was not just a matter of economic and political inequality. Practical 
responses, such as escorting families during house visits, or planning to intervene in the event of 
a mob action, were a central part of their program. But so too were speakers, cultural events, panel 
discussions, and education aimed at furthering open housing as well as understanding between 
black and white Detroiters. For the Council, increased understanding and communication between 
the races was part of the remedy to segregation and racism in the metropolitan area. Many of these 
efforts were done in cooperation with ethnic and racial organizations. The Council, for example, 
encouraged its members in 1968 to support The Now People Arts Festival in East Detroit as part 
of their Human Relations Week. “Art,” the Council reasoned, “is to be the good common 
denominator for people to work together in an interreligious, interracial setting.”277 It was how 
they understood art and cultural events to be an essential ingredient in combatting racism. It also 
demonstrated how the Council was interested in not just creating a more inclusive community in 
Grosse Pointe but in Detroit and other suburbs. Additionally, they sought out ways to work with 
other organizations to improve relations across ethnic, religious, and racial lines.  
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That same year, 1968, the Council brought Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to speak in Grosse 
Pointe. This was their most well-known action as an organization. It would be difficult to say that 
it was their most important, for how could one devise a metric to measure the importance of 
providing support, solidarity, and friendship to black families moving into a hostile white suburb? 
Nonetheless, Dr. King’s speech in Grosse Pointe, especially in conjunction with the tragedy of his 
murder on April 4 of that year, was an event of historical significance in its own right.  
The Council began organizing in 1967 to bring Dr. King to speak the following spring, 
likely as part of their commitment to “sponsor meaningful and forceful programs” following the 
Detroit riots.278 In addition to Dr. King, the Council considered inviting Roy Wilkins, of the 
NAACP, or Patrick Moynihan, of the Moynihan Report.279 By the beginning of 1968, rumors of 
Dr. King’s proposed visit to Grosse Pointe caused the president of the Council, Harry C. Meserve, 
to write to members. On February 12, 1968, he wrote that “while a great many rumors have 
circulated about this meeting, we believe that it will prove to be an important occasion of value to 
our whole community.”280  
Once again the views of the members of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council were 
not universally shared by other residents of Grosse Pointe. In March of 1968, the Grosse Pointe 
Property Owners Association, one of the two organizations behind the point system, sent a letter 
to all residents of Grosse Pointe. The letter listed the officers and directors of the Human Relations 
Council and the members of the Board of Education who had voted to allow Dr. King to speak the 
Grosse Pointe High School. The GPPOA’s epistolary attempt at intimidation did not end there. 
Seeking to drive community opinion against the GPHRC and the appearance by King, the GPPOA 
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chided in their mass letter that “Grosse Pointe taxpayers will be forced to pay for additional police 
protection.” The letter then threw out the inflammatory supposition that “the [Grosse Pointe] 
Farms police are greatly concerned about the possibility of violence resulting from the appearance 
of Rev. King.”281 Despite King’s well-known dedication to non-violence, the GPPOA did not shy 
away from suggesting that King, and by extension the GPHRC and the Grosse Pointe Board of 
Education, would be the ones responsible for any violence that resulted from King’s appearance 
in Grosse Pointe.  
The GPPOA also distributed an essay, detailing their opposition to Dr. King, with the mass 
letter delivered to all Grosse Pointe residents. Printed on the verso of the letter, Frank S. Meyer’s 
“Showdown with Insurrection: Principles & Heresies,” from the National Review gave the 
residents of Grosse Pointe a better and fuller description of the dangers that Dr. King presented to 
their community. The “blatant admission that the aim of the non-violent movement,” the author 
wrote 
is to provoke violence only exposes the surface. It is not merely in its commitment to the 
provocation of violence by others that this movement betrays the hypocrisy of its name; it 
is violent in its very essence, relying as it does upon a terror inspired by mobs to destroy 
the processes of constitutional government. 
 
Thus the author, and the GPPOA, warned that the Nobel Peace Prize recipient was a violent 
hypocrite who, via terror, worked to subvert the constitutional government of the United States. In 
contrast to the seemingly dangerous path of Dr. King, Meyer praised that of Booker T. 
Washington, the educator who had discouraged thinking progress could be won through direct 
challenges to segregation and disfranchisement. “Respect and access to jobs,” Grosse Pointe’s 
residents read, “must be earned.” In his call for the “preservation of constitutional order,” Meyer 
apparently saw no contradiction in writing that a group of citizens must earn their civil rights, 
                                                          




guaranteed by the constitution through citizenship. The essay also traded in the classic tactic of 
characterizing the Other as inherently dangerous, violent, and criminal. Likewise, Meyer also 
blames the recipient of prejudicial treatment for causing that prejudicial treatment; here, that the 
possibility of violence in response to a talk in favor of civil rights is the fault of the speaker, and 
not the people acting violently.282  
 While the GPPOA’s mass letter campaign was not subtle, the anti-King campaign of the 
far-right Detroit group, Breakthrough, was even less so. In a flyer entitled, “A Call to Action,” the 
group wrote to residents of the metropolitan area that “with your help we hope to give Mr. King 
[sic] the kind of reception he deserves.” Later in the same flyer, the group griped that “An 
American – George Wallace – was not allowed to come into our city to speak.” The group 
unfavorably compared Dr. King to Governor Wallace, the notorious Dixiecrat from Alabama and 
presidential candidate who once declared that he stood for “segregation now, segregation 
tomorrow, segregation forever.” The designation of Wallace as “an American” implies that Dr. 
King was not, in keeping with the othering of King, and all African Americans, as dangerous, 
violent, and suspect. Immediately, the group lumped their own difficulties in finding meeting 
spaces, including halls that had canceled their contract with Breakthrough, to the alleged 
censorship of George Wallace in Detroit. “Yet the Groppis, the King’s, and the Carmichael’s,” the 
flyer concluded, “can come in here at their leisure and preach their hate and treason with 
impunity.”283 While the GPPOA told the residents of Grosse Pointe that Dr. King stood for 
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violence and the subverting of constitutional order, the far-right Breakthrough called him a 
preacher of hatred and treason. Rhetorical differences aside, the two analyses were not far apart.  
 Another flyer from Breakthrough, titled “Join the Protest Demonstration Against Martin 
Luther King,” managed to be even more belligerent towards the civil rights leader. Throughout the 
flyer words like riot, peace, and civil rights were always put in quotation marks. At one point, the 
author accused King of seeking to “bring our country ever closer to a state of total anarchy, 
communist revolution, overthrow and finally conquest.” It is not too surprising, given this line of 
reasoning, that the flyer concluded that anyone who attended King’s talk had to be a communist, 
a betrayer of the American forces in Vietnam, and guilty of treason.284  
These flyers reveal more than just racial conflict in Grosse Pointe and metropolitan Detroit. 
There were claims about free speech, fears over the failure of the democratic process, the Cold 
War struggle between communism and capitalism, and the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. 
Finally, the Detroit riots of July 1967 were still stalking in the backs of many minds in the spring 
of 1968. This was especially so in communities immediately adjacent to Detroit, such as Grosse 
Pointe. “The riots polarized the races,” Kathy Cosseboom recalled her mother remarking, “The 
fear of the riots spreading to Grosse Pointe was very real.”285 Consequently, tensions were high in 
the Pointes preceding King’s speech. Given their “concern about the possibility of violence,” and 
“anticipat[ing] that any expense resulting from damage to school property” would be more than 
the Council could afford, two of the school board members, Arnold Fuchs and Calvin Sandberg 
insisted that the Council insure for the school for $1 million for the night of March 14. The two 
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school board members had previously voted against the GPHRC and King being allowed to use 
school property.286  
Over 1,700 people came to hear King’s speech, “The Other America.” Despite the “brazen” 
interruptions and heckling King received, the Council considered the event successful despite the 
bill of $2,300 for police protection.287  The Council organized a panel discussion on his speech on 
April 9, “in order to preserve the awakened thoughtful feeling that . . . Dr. King has inspired in the 
community.” Unfortunately, the event was overshadowed by the assassination of King on April 3, 
while he was in Memphis supporting striking sanitation workers. The Council decided the 
postpone the event for two weeks. The members of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, 
like many across the nation and the world, were shaken and shocked by King’s violent death.288 
Members of the Council discussed ways of commemorating Dr. King’s life, including publishing 
his speech delivered in Grosse Pointe in a commemorative book. They donated $500 to Detroit’s 
Department of Parks and Recreation in memoriam.289  
 By the late 1960s, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, like many other civil rights 
organizations in the United States, was increasingly frustrated with the seemingly slow pace of 
change. The night before Dr. King’s assassination, the Council held a board meeting at which a 
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member demanded that the organization answer the following question: “Are we going to be a 
reactor group only or are we going to initiate action?” The meeting minutes of a board meeting in 
October, 1968, succinctly yet eloquently summed up the night’s meeting by reporting that it was 
“regretted that the council has been all talk and no action.”290 
 In 1969, the Council poured its energy into a Fair Housing bill in Grosse Pointe Farms, 
which ultimately was defeated, 2,200 to 1,500 votes, after “an exceptionally large turnout for a 
spring election.” Despite the loss, the Council noted that there were at least 1,500 residents 
welcoming to minority home-buyers.291 In their campaign, the Council was assisted by the Grosse 
Pointe Students Council on Racial Equality (SCORE), which took a more direct route to 
organizing. Whereas Council members would affix brochures to doorknobs, the students insisted 
on ringing doorbells and having discussions on fair housing with the inhabitants then and there. 
“There were,” the Council’s Board noted, “some complaints and problems with the police.” 292 
 Just as the Council was learning to work with more ardent student activists, so they could 
not avoid the issue of the war in Vietnam. In 1971, the Grosse Pointe Human Rights Council 
connected civil rights with the war in Vietnam. Much like others had done during the previous 
wars the US fought in during the 20th century, the GPHRC noted that black soldiers were dying in 
Vietnam yet faced discrimination at home. In advertisements in the Grosse Pointe News, the 
Council apologized to readers for bringing up dead or maimed black Americans soldiers in 
Vietnam. In a slight towards respectability politics, the advertisement asked what a better topic of 
conversation would be. “Daylight saving time?” the text demanded. “Municipal boatwells? 
Improved snow removal? . . . Meanwhile, back in Viet Nam, Harlem, and Cambodia choices are 
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more limited.”293 In addition to the moral case being made over sacrifices of life and limb, the 
language also carries an argument about citizenship.  
With the new decade of the 1970s, the public statements of the GPHRC contained a new 
urgency. Housing continued to be a concern. “The Grosse Pointe real estate complex continues to 
be uncooperative,” the Council’s Housing Committee reported in 1971, “and resistive to assuming 
its moral obligations to people or its legal obligation to the spirit of the MI Fair Housing Law, 
Public Act 112 of 1968.” The Housing Committee continued:  
Our business should and must be to break down the relatively unchallenged control which 
the real estate complex holds. Real estate firms seldom show blatant discrimination, but, 
with few exceptions, engage in subtle tactics aimed at effectively discouraging minority 
home-seeks. 
 
The Housing Committee reiterated the need for the Council to accompany home-seekers in order 
to “record all interactions, and act as witnesses if necessary.”294 
 The next couple years did not show much improvement in terms of housing integration, as 
far as the Council’s Housing Committee was concerned. Dr. Douglas A. Sargent, the chair of the 
Housing Committee in 1973, reported in late September of that year that “It is our opinion that the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 has had little practical impact upon the pattern of minority housing in 
Grosse Pointe.” All minorities, the report continued, but especially those of African ancestry, could 
find housing in the Grosse Pointe community “by the exercise of great initiative and persistence.” 
Such energy and work, the author noted, “would not be necessary for similarly qualified white 
buyers.” By qualifying the latter group with “similarly qualified,” Dr. Sargent emphasized that 
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discriminatory housing practices in the Pointes were due solely to racial and ethnic prejudice. He 
went on, underscoring this point, writing, “the present racial composition of our community is not 
accidental, but has come about through long-standing resistance to minority buyers by all parties 
involved in real estate transaction,” which included sellers, brokers, and lenders. Sargent 
referenced restrictive covenants explicitly, observing that their use “until recent years” had 
“created a community pattern which persists until the present day, partly by its own momentum.” 
Additional “subterfuges” such as “the infamous Point System, now happily defunct,” had 
contributed to patterns of segregation, as did “other covert, restrictive measures, which are still 
practiced.” Dr. Sargent concluded by expressing his fear and that of the Housing Committee that 
segregation in Grosse Pointe, “this potent, though invisible, barrier,” would continue unless there 
was meaningful, vigorous, and sincere action on the part of sellers, lending institutions, and 
community leaders to attract minority home-seekers.295  
 The increasing frustration with the slow pace of change led some members of the Human 
Relations Council, such as Reverend Albert A. Fenton, the chair of the Membership Committee in 
1971, to rethink how long it would take for integration to take place. “The improvement of the 
racial climate of the Pointes,” Rev. Fenton wrote to the members of the Council, “is a process that 
will not end in our lifetimes.” Accurately describing the work of organizing for social change as 
“long and tedious” and “below the surface and unspectacular,” Rev. Fenton reminded the 
membership of the Human Relations Council that “the struggle for human dignity will not be won 
by faddists or hobbyists.”296 
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 Following the 1967 riots, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council concluded that 
desegregation was not merely a matter of signaling welcome to potential home buyers from 
minority communities. Rather, they realized that communities such as Grosse Pointe that had 
established themselves as hostile to minority groups held little appeal to home buyers from those 
groups. Instead, they largely, and understandably, sought their homes elsewhere. Thus the Council 
considered how to encourage integration in the Pointes. One idea was to established a public 
relations committee, “which would actively sell the Grosse Pointe community to the Negro 
community,” as “nowhere has there been a positive program developed with the specific intent of 
pointing out to the Negro and other minority groups the positive advantages of residence in Grosse 
Pointe.”297 One could imagine that, given its history, the reputation of Grosse Pointe was largely 
negative, rather than positive, for many Detroiters. Members of the Council recognized this. One, 
for example, wrote to the council president in September of 1967 that “at some point, the Negro 
must be enticed with the idea of living in Grosse Pointe.”298 
 Sally Brown, the chair of the Grosse Pointe Committee for Open Housing, a kindred 
organization working for integration that merged with the Human Relations Council in 1969, wrote 
a review of their committee’s work between 1966 and 1969.299 She noted the lessons the 
Committee had learned from their “experiences over the past three years in accompanying Negroes 
as they were seeking homes to buy” in Grosse Pointe. First, Brown wrote that many African 
American home-seekers were “genuinely interested” in the good schools, recreational facilities, 
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and municipal services that the Pointes had to offer. However, this interest was undermined by the 
fact that, “lacking the assurance of an equal opportunity to buy property here, they are reluctant to 
commit time and effort to an endeavor that may prove fruitless and, in some instances, involve 
experiences which are unpleasant for them.” Second, integration would not be achieved unless 
African American real estate brokers were allowed to bring their clients to Grosse Pointe 
properties, and, third, those selling property in the Pointes should list their properties with brokers 
who supported open housing and who reached African American buyers.300  
 There was little faith in the brokers in Grosse Pointe who, while they might follow the letter 
of the law, would not go out of their way to recruit black home buyers. Part of the problem was 
that Grosse Pointe brokers feared that “their business would suffer were they to sell a home to a 
Negro and are therefore not eager to do so.” When the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council 
had invited members of the Grosse Pointe Real Estate Brokers Association, including Paul Maxon, 
to a board meeting on October 3, 1967, the brokers told the Council that it was not up to the brokers 
to create open housing in Grosse Pointe, but, rather, the people who lived there. The brokers of 
Grosse Pointe, they told the Council, were the “servants of the People.” Besides, they assured the 
Council, “the first agent to sell to a non-white would be put out of business.”301 
On the other hand, African American brokers had such negative experiences working in 
all-white or nearly all-white communities that “they feel it a waste of time and money to bring 
clients to Grosse Pointe.” Over three years, Sally Brown wrote, “society has experienced 
increasing pressures which encourage division and polarization of the races. Hence, while growing 
more difficult to attain, the goal of an integrated community has become vastly more crucial to the 
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health of the society as a whole.”302 It was a vicious circle of distrust as far as the brokers were 
concerned. Several years later, in April of 1972, the Open Housing Committee of the Grosse Pointe 
Human Relations Council attempted to organize a social event that mixed together the members 
of the Grosse Pointe Real Estate Board with black realtors in the city. The event was cancelled 
after sixty-nine realtors contacted “were not receptive” to the idea.303  
Conclusion 
 Grosse Pointe was surrounded by a potent, though invisible, barrier, as noted by Dr. 
Sargent. In metropolitan Detroit, geography was imbued with political and social significance, and 
these urban boundaries were vigilantly policed and fervently, sometimes violently, enforced. In a 
basic sense, the story of housing is also a matter of labor, as the social tensions over race and 
housing in Detroit occurred due to the increasing demand for labor in the burgeoning industrial 
behemoth. As African Americans moved to Detroit in the war years, racial tensions grew, and 
occasionally grew violent, as shown in the 1943 Detroit riot. Shortly thereafter, in the midst of the 
Second World War and in the twilight years of restrictive covenants, the real estate brokers and 
property owners of Grosse Pointe organized to systematically protect their community from the 
conflicts present elsewhere in the metropolitan area.  
 The 1949 mayoral election between Edwards and Cobo showed that housing and race were 
not minor concerns in postwar Detroit. Slum clearance, public housing, and highway construction 
were major issues, and their racial and class component was a part of the conversation. Naturally, 
as neighborhoods were targeted as “blight,” it was city residents who had money, clout, and a 
voice who could resist such a designation. It was city residents who had neither money, clout, nor 
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a voice who were cleared away.304 But by the 1960s, de facto segregation was no longer a routine 
phenomenon. The modern Civil Rights Movement stirred consciences. Even in staid, wealthy 
Grosse Pointe, citizens organized to dismantle racial segregation and discrimination. Housing was 
one of their main concerns, but so too was increasing understanding across racial lines through 
education, culture, sports, literature, talking, and meeting people from outside their community.  
 By the numbers of housing gained or neighborhoods integrated, the Grosse Pointe Human 
Relations Council was not successful. The Pointes continue to be largely white and, indeed, 
continue to have a reputation for dividing themselves from the city of Detroit, predominantly 
African American by the mid-1970s. Why did the GPHRC fail in their aims? They were several 
hundred strong. Given that they were Grosse Pointers, many of them held positions of influence: 
doctors, lawyers, judges, ministers, businessmen, and their spouses. They had a clear 
understanding of the problems of racism and discrimination: that it was multifaceted, and required 
not just work in housing but in education, commerce, employment, and many other fields, to fight 
against racial prejudice. They consistently were a voice in their community, while they existed, 
against segregation and discrimination, even as they provided real and concrete support to minority 
home-buyers. They were hurt when Dr. King was killed, and they worried over youth, whether it 
be casualties in Vietnam or causalities of a growing heroin epidemic in the city. 
 Maybe the problem of racial segregation was too large for one organization to take on. Or, 
it may be that, much as restrictive covenants required every property in a neighborhood to 
participate in order to be effective, so does a truly integrated society require that all neighbors in a 
community foreswear prejudice, fear, and distrust of people from other races, ethnicities, religions, 
and nations of origin. It might also be that integration will never truly be successful until, in the 
                                                          




spirit of protecting property values, individuals see themselves as having a financial stake in it, 

























CHAPTER 4 THE CITY THAT MIGHT BE: DOXIADIS AND THE URBAN DETROIT 
AREA RESEARCH PROJECT, 1965-1970 
Dr. Doxiadis smiles when he discusses the common denominator of all cities, whether they be 
Detroit or Royal Oak: “They’re build for humans.” 
Jerome Aumente305 
 
 During a flight from India to the United States in 1963, Walter Cisler, the chair of the 
Detroit Edison Company, conceived of the idea behind the Urban Detroit Area study: a forward-
looking and comprehensive study of the metropolitan Detroit area in the year 2000. He talked with 
friends of his about this idea, including Clarence B. Hilberry, then-president of Wayne State  
University, Jerome P. Cavanaugh, then-mayor of Detroit, and a Greek urban planner named 
Constantinos Doxiadis. Doxiadis was internationally prominent, known for designing the capital 
city, Islamabad, in the new nation of Pakistan, following the partition of India in 1947. Cisler and 
Doxiadis had met each immediately after the Second World War, when both worked for the 
reconstruction of Europe, with Cisler on the United States-side of the Marshall Plan and Doxiadis 
on that of Greece.306 
 For Cisler, the motives behind such a comprehensive research project were practical.  As 
the chair of the board of the area’s electrical provider, Cisler was interested in planning for future 
infrastructure needs in the 7,600 square miles served by his firm.307 By the mid-60s, Cisler had 
been involved in national and international projects and planning. In 1941 he served on the War 
Production Board in Washington and then in Europe, with the Supreme Allied Command, where 
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he organized the restoration of electric, gas, and water facilities. During postwar recovery, notably 
under the Marshall Plan, Cisler was active in the recovery effort in Europe and Japan. Through the 
State Department, he was involved in the development of emerging nations.  He had been in India, 
for instance, to conduct an energy study for the Indian government. “My endeavors,” he explained 
in 1965, “ in helping nations to examine their energy resources and future requirements for 
effective economic progress has taught me the importance of approaching such problems in an 
orderly way, utilizing the skills of well-versed specialists in gathering the facts, analyzing them, 
establishing goalposts and setting realistic goals for the future.”308 Cisler’s interest in a 
comprehensive and systematic study of the greater Detroit region’s future infrastructure needs was 
a continuation of these postwar experiences planning and executing massive rebuilding efforts.  
Doxiadis’s interests tended to the more abstract. He loved cities and understanding cities 
and planning cities, and he was the developer of an entire system of thought for understanding 
human settlements, which he called ekistics. Through ekistics Doxiadis hoped to move urban 
thought into the realm of science more than one of philosophy, but it also hoped to do so in a 
resolutely human-centered way. The Urban Detroit Area study was a chance for a deep and wide 
application of his urban thinking to one of the largest cities in the United States. 
 The resulting three-volume study and Doxiadis’s public statements about it are indicative 
of how he, as an urban planner, and those who supported him, including Detroit Edison and Wayne 
State University, understood the urban crisis and the future of Detroit. As the first two chapters 
have shown, Detroit from World War II to the 1960s was an urban area divided by class and race, 
where industrial decentralization and racial segregation were powerful social and economic forces 
shaping the lives of city residents. During the five-year long Urban Detroit Area research project 
                                                          




(from 1965 to 1970), planners were faced with an era of urban riots and uprisings, including Detroit 
in 1967.309 Remarkably, in his work, Doxiadis avoided discussions of racism, deindustrialization, 
and riots. His public comments reveal that he was not unconcerned or unsympathetic to those who 
lived with the consequences of racial discrimination and bigotry. Nonetheless, when it came to 
analyzing and planning Detroit’s future, such social divisions and tensions were largely absent in 
Doxiadis’s work.310 
Constantinos A. Doxiadis 
 
The Detroit News in 1967 described Doxiadis as “the world-renowned Greek urban 
prophet” and in the Congressional Record by Congressman James H. Scheuer of New York the 
year before thus: “His work over five continents in the troubled cities of the world has placed him 
in a special pale of eminence – not only in his profession, but among humanitarians of the world. 
He has planned better urban environments for over 10 million people, and as provided housing – 
mostly low-cost – for over 1 million persons.”311 Even as Doxiadis founded a macro-level theory 
of urbanism that combined philosophy with prophecy, he was an accomplished practitioner. He 
planned the new capital for the new nation-state of Pakistan, Islamabad. Over twenty-years, he 
won over $5 million in grants and contracts from the Ford Foundation. His relationship with the 
Ford Foundation was such that Ford staffer and chronicler Louis Winnick characterized this 
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monetary flow as “the largest personal award in Foundation history,” even though all the money 
was directed towards appropriate nonprofit channels.312  
 Doxiadis was not without his critics. There were those who saw him and his systems of 
ekistics as an urbanist swindler peddling so much snake-oil. Those with more nuanced criticisms 
admired his methods, even as they pointed out the blind spots his methods contained. Nonetheless, 
even his critics appreciated that Doxiadis was a relentless voice and advocate for addressing issues 
and problems of urbanism in the post-war world.  
 Appropriately enough for someone considered a voice for global urbanism, Doxiadis’s own 
life was often shaped by the global forces that shaped the 20th century: wars, revolutions, 
reconstruction, migrations. He was born in 1913 in the Greek community in Bulgaria, but his 
family fled to Athens after World War I broke out, as the Bulgarians and the Greeks found 
themselves on opposing sides during that terrible conflagration. The elder Doxiadis was a 
physician. He involved himself in issues of refugees and resettlement following the war, as the 
younger Doxiadis would be involved with postwar planning less than three decades later.313 
 Constantinos Doxiadis attained his first degree in 1935 from the Athens Technical Institute 
in architecture-engineering. Afterwards, he went to Berlin for a post-graduate degree from the 
Berlin-Charlottenberg Technical Institute, where he received a doctorate in civil engineering in 
1937. While in Germany he encountered the urbanist Walter Christaller, who had a large influence 
on Doxiadis’s thinking on cities.314  
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 After his two years in Germany, Doxiadis returned to Greece to become the director of 
studies in the town planning office of Athens. He then  worked in regional planning. When the 
Second World War began, Greece was occupied first by Italy and then by Germany. Doxiadis 
joined the military, where he was put in charge of surveying damage from the war at the Ministry 
of Public Works. At the same time, he joined the Greek resistance. Acting at the head of a cell, he 
passed data he could access through his work to the British intelligence service. This, and his other 
activities during the war, resulted in the British awarding Doxiadis a military decoration.  It had 
the more practical result of establishing his bona fides with the Allied forces.315 
With the peace, Doxiadis was became undersecretary and then Director General of the 
Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction in Greece from 1945 to 1948. In 1946 he wrote a report 
titled Ekistic Analysis. In 1948, he became the Minster-Coordinator of the Greek Recovery 
Program—the coordinator of the Marshall Plan in Greece, a crucial position with connections that 
later brought Doxiadis to Detroit. According to a Ford Foundation staffer, it was at this point that 
Doxiadis gained an international reputation for talent and honesty. He represented Greece at 
several international meetings, such as 1945 peace conference in San Francisco and the 1947 
United Nation (UN) International Conference on Housing, Planning, and Reconstruction. In 1948, 
he was placed as chairman of the UN Working Group on Housing Policies. The following year 
saw him as the head of the Greek delegation at the Greco-Italian War Reparation Conference.316  
 In 1951, however, Doxiadis’s life took a strange turn.  He was forced out of office, while 
he was hospitalized for ulcers, due to a coup d’etat. He and his family left for Queensland, 
Australia, where he was supposed to work in the housing and resettlement of immigrants. The plan 
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fell through after the Doxiadis family arrived in Australia, where they became now stranded 
without funds, while Constantinos still was experiencing ill-health. The family, in an incongruous 
turn of events, took up tomato farming, searching for paper cups thrown out by restaurants in order 
to grow seedlings. This misadventure was relatively short-lived for the family, and they made their 
way back to Athens in 1953.317 
 Once there Doxiadis opened his office of consulting engineers, Doxiadis Associates, with 
expertise in redevelopment and Marshall Plan administration. The office was successful, growing 
to hundreds of employees and branch offices globally, including one in Washington, DC. By 1963, 
Doxiadis Associates had projects in forty countries. Doxiadis and his colleagues continued to 
develop what they considered the science of human settlement, ekistics; and in 1955 they launched 
the journal Ekistics.318 By 1958,  Doxiadis founded the Athens Technological Organization (ATO), 
a nonprofit institution that housed the Athens Technical Institute, comprised of technical schools 
and the Athens Center of Ekistics. The latter included research, graduate training, symposia, 
publications, and a library devoted to the field.319  
Ekistics 
 
 A summary of what Doxiadis meant by ekistics is essential to understanding his approach 
to urban planning as it underpins his thinking on all cities, including Detroit.320 The word, as 
Doxiadis described to an audience in 1959, came from the Greek noun ekos, or habitat, and the 
verb eko, or to settle down, the same root of the words economy and ecology. Thus, “ekistics is the 
science of human settlements, which explores the nature, the origin, and the evolution of our 
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species. It seeks to establish rules that underwrite the evolution of human settlement and to analyze 
and classify all the phenomena surrounding this evolution.”321 Of particular note is that Doxiadis 
considered ekistics a field of science, rather than a theory or a philosophy. However, Doxiadis was 
always upfront that it was a science in its infancy. “We can ask ourselves what this science of 
Ekistics should be,” he informed his 1959 audience in Southampton. “Quite frankly I think it is 
too early to outline it in full detail.”322 
 Nonetheless, such a scientific understanding of human settlements became necessary in the 
postwar world, as cities were facing problems that no one, it seemed, had previously encountered 
or could solve. Planners had developed responses, ranging including “a new technique in design 
or by the use of different scales, or by working on our plans in cooperation with economic and 
social planners.”  Such responses, Doxiadis argued, were not systematic, but ad hoc, with no set 
methodology. Therefore, they were not universally applicable but, instead, were rooted in “mostly 
the cities of the Western world and not all of those but really the Western cities after the industrial 
revolution.” This was, Doxiadis commented, a very narrow basis for understanding. “A single visit 
to new areas under development now will convince us that we do nothing but repeat solutions 
which may have been good for Western countries of the post-industrial era but whose application 
in the new areas show a complete lack of a scientific approach.”323  
 There were, as Doxiadis saw it, three fundamental types of urban problems: those that are 
eternal, those that are contemporary, and those that will develop in the future. The eternal problems 
included economic, social, political, technical and cultural challenges. At first glance this type of 
urban problem covers quite a range of territory, but Doxiadis is clearing the ground in order to 
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understand how the urban problems of the mid-20th century were different from problems that 
confronted cities throughout human history. Elaborating on his typology, a rarity for Doxiadis, he 
noted that social problems end up creating economic ones, “because social habit and tradition 
affect the supply of economic factors drastically.” In one example, Doxiadis mentioned rural to 
urban migration, which resulted in new city residents with rural habits and  “the resulting friction 
that we see in the forms of slums and blighted areas.”324  
 The contemporary problems were of a different nature. These were the ones that occupied 
Doxiadis’s attention. Contemporary cities faced the problems of machines versus humans, of 
increasing discretionary incomes, and new family patterns; or, as he said in an address in Oslo the 
following year, “the unprecedented universal increase of population, the introduction of the 
machine into our lives, and the gradual socialization of the patterns of living.”325 The fundamental 
problem, which was central to his urban vision, was the increasing scale of cities. New 
technologies, from building techniques to transportation, meant that cities were built in a new way. 
“They can now become much bigger,” argued Doxiadis,  
perhaps impossibly bigger, than before; it is also expressed in the new conception about 
other dimensions, other elements in the city, like highways, the streets, the squares, such 
buildings as garages, etc. But more than anything else, it has affected the psychology of 
man, who now feels like a displaced person within his city. He has lost his freedom of 
movement, he cannot walk freely, he cannot let his children move around the city because 
the machine is there, a constant menace. 
 
 It was this psychological impact, according to Doxiadis, that led to the misery of mid-20th century 
cities, the pervasive sense of displacement. At its root was the fact that cities were no longer built 
for human beings.326 
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 Eleven years later, in 1970, Doxiadis had a more thorough definition for ekistics, as he 
detailed in an article for Science. “Ekistics,” Doxiadis told readers, “starts with the premise that 
human settlements are susceptible of systematic investigation.” He once again emphasized that 
ekistics was systematic and scientific. He listed the five prescriptive principles that made up the 
field. First, human beings desired the maximum amount of contacts with the natural world, with 
other people, and with the works of human hands. This, Doxiadis asserted, “amounts to an 
operational definition of personal human freedom.” If this is true, then it seemed that Doxiadis 
conceived of human freedom, and thus nature, as needing to spread out. Otherwise, humans would 
feel “imprisoned” and need to “increase” their contacts with the world around us, which is to say, 
to “abandon the Garden of Eden” and seek to “conquer the cosmos.”327   
 The second principle of ekistics was minimizing of the effort it took for humans to achieve 
their “actual and potential contacts.” As we will see shortly, Doxiadis thought often about the 
amount of energy it took to navigate urban areas and how it was related to quality of life. Third, 
the “optimization of protective space,” by which Doxiadis meant the distance humans could 
maintain between themselves and other people, animals, and objects, while also maintaining the 
maximum number of contacts (the first principle) “without any kind of sensory or psychological 
discomfort.” This protective space began with the clothes humans wore and up to the walls of 
houses and the walls built around cities.328  
 The fourth principle was that humans needed the optimal relationships with the 
environment, which included nature, society, “shells” (that is, housing and buildings), and 
networks, the latter meaning anything from roads to telecommunications. “This is the principle,” 
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Doxiadis explained, “that leads to order, physiological and esthetic, and that influences 
architecture and, in many respects, art.” The fifth principle was the optimal synthesis of the 
preceding four principles, “dependent on time and space, on actual conditions, and on man’s ability 
to create a synthesis.” These principles were based on creating and managing meaningful and 
beneficial interactions and relationships. Thus it is no surprise that Doxiadis defined human 
settlements as “systems of energy mobilized by man.” Echoing his earlier concern that cities were 
dominated by machines and buildings, Doxiadis proposed in a 1970 article that “the answer to this 
problem is, I think, a city designed for human development.”329  
 Doxiadis straddled two views of cities. One was resolutely based on the future, in 
predicting where cities will go if conditions remain unchanged and where they had the potential to 
go if we acted in the present, for better or for worse. Doxiadis consistently argued for the better as 
he saw it. This first view, which we can call his visionary half, was complemented by the second, 
which was his wide experience in practice, in urban planning around the world. Often in his writing 
and talks he would draw on various examples from projects he had worked on. In an address to 
the Oslo Arkitekforening in 1960, Doxiadis drew on examples from Baghdad; Washington, DC; 
Philadelphia; Athens; Khartoum, Sudan; Beirut; Caracas, Venezuela; and Karachi, Pakistan. His 
interest was in identifying the abstract, universal structures of human settlements that could apply 
to all.330   
 An essential aspect of his urban vision was the belief that cities would only continue to 
grow in the future. His view here was intimately tied to the impact of the industrial revolution and 
Fordism, although Doxiadis did not use those terms. In 1960, Doxiadis argued, for instance, that 
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cities used to be only, at most, several hundred of thousands of people (here he is thinking of 
ancient Rome and Constantinople), because more than that “led to a loss of cohesion and identity.” 
By the mid-20th century, however, “the machine has made cities of about ten million people quite 
possible,” and made increased  production and income possible. “The machine” had led to the 
Fordist city, as modern technology “has in fact brought large concentrations of people in the same 
area by reducing distances, by making possible multi-story structures and by introducing mass 
production for large numbers.”331  
 There was, in Doxiadis’s view, no return from this level of urban concentration. It was 
tantamount to a revolutionary moment in urban history, in which city walls were broken and 
disregarded. Now, “the modern city is spreading all around endlessly and continuously.” Higher 
birth rates and migration from rural areas caused the urban population to expand even more, and 
“this added influx of people cause the cities to swell and expand over much larger areas than they 
occupy today.” This urban form Doxiadis identified as the Dynapolis, or the dynamic city.332 By 
the mid-1960s, Dynapolis had given way in Doxiadis’s thinking to what he called the universal 
city. “This is not imagination,” he cautioned the annual meeting of the National League of Cities 
in 1966, “This is a realistic view of the future. Any careful study of the real forces surrounding our 
cities shows that within one generation’s time we are going to witness the emergence of a major 
continuous systems of metropolises and megalopolises.” By way of illustration, he pointed to the 
seemingly emerging conglomeration of Milwaukee to Chicago to Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh, an urban area 600 miles long.333   
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 While the emergence of this universal city was more or less inevitable, the form it would 
take depended on choices made in the present. Continuing the ad hoc solutions then being used to 
address urban problems, Doxiadis argued, was merely surgery that treated the symptoms but failed 
to address the underlying causes. Doing so was to allow cities to decline, while some people 
escaped to isolation, “leaving the others to struggle in the downtown areas which manifest the 
coming crisis.” Moreover, “present trends” suggested a society that was heading to “an autocratic 
system of complex networks, big buildings and fascist administration with the human values 
increasingly forgotten.”334 The following year, Doxiadis described the universal city in the 
Saturday Review as not the dynapolis, but the ecumenopolis.335  
 When Doxiadis considered emerging megalopolises, the Detroit metropolitan area was his 
main example, likely because of his work there beginning in 1965. His 1968 article, “The 
Emerging Great Lakes Megalopolis,” appeared in the Proceedings of the IEEE, the journal of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Building on the French geographer Jean 
Gottman’s 1961 study, Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States, 
Doxiadis proposed that the megalopolis developing in the Great Lakes region would surpass that 
on the east coast by the end of the century. A megalopolis, importantly, was not a continuous 
unbroken cityscape. Rather, it was “characterized by its large size in area and population, its high 
regional densities, the inclusion in it of several large centers strongly interacting with each other 
and with the surrounding region.” In the Great Lakes region, the potential megalopolis were the 
increasingly interconnected metropolitan clusters of Chicago-Milwaukee, Detroit, and Cleveland-
Pittsburgh. As the Great Lakes are shared by the United States and Canada, the Great Lakes 
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megalopolis also could extend through Ontario, from Windsor to Hamilton and Toronto, and into 
Montreal, Quebec.336 
The Urban Detroit Area Research Project 
 When Walter Cisler brought Constantinos Doxiadis on board to lead the Urban Detroit 
Area Research Project, the scale of the project was thus congruent with the latter’s conception of 
a megalopolis. Whereas the city proper of Detroit is nearly 139 square miles, and the metropolitan 
area is 1,337 square miles, the Urban Detroit Area (UDA) was defined as 23,059 square miles, 
stretching from southwest Ontario through southeast Michigan and into northern Ohio.337 The 
large scale of the project did not alter the fact that the city of Detroit was considered the heart of 
the region, and therefore received a good proportion of the research project’s attention. Nor did 
the large scale of the project mean that it was merely about structural analyses. Doxiadis often 
talked about human needs and human suffering, and Cisler himself wrote that he conceived of the 
project as more than just one of urban planning. It was intended to be of use to “all who are 
concerned with the advancement of human as well as economic values.”338 
 That contemporary cities had become inhuman was one of Doxiadis’s main concerns. 
“Man today had lost the battle for control of his cities,” he began the first volume of the study. “As 
a result of this the cities are getting worse with every day that passes and man is more and more at 
a loss on what to do about them – he is in great danger of being tamed by the on-going forces 
which lead to his sufferings.” Humans were fundamentally confused by their own creations, and 
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therefore were unable to adequately address the growing problems of cities.339 Moreover, the 
decisions made in the present determine the future. Thus, “we commit ourselves everyday with 
thousands of decisions that, unless we provide a system to face the future of Detroit as soon as 
possible, will tie us and our descendants with thousands of chains.”340 Elsewhere in the study, 
cities are described as being “laid out on an improvised basis,” as “decisions tend to be made on a 
sporadic and uncoordinated basis, leading to helter-skelter construction and expansion to meet 
only current needs.”341 
 The UDA Research Project was conceived as a thorough, systematic, and orderly 
investigation of the entire Detroit region, the whole urban system rather than an isolated part. It 
was not just concerned with five or ten years down the road. The year 2000 was chosen as a target, 
partly for symbolic reasons (to “fire the imagination of the people”), but also because it would be 
a generation ahead. It was long enough for fundamental change to occur, yet close enough in the 
future to make reasonable assumptions about technological, social, cultural, economic, and 
demographic developments.342 The results of the five-year project were made public in three 
volumes. The first, released in 1966, was focused on a thorough analysis of existing conditions in 
the UDA. The second volume, released in 1967, detailed how all possible future alternative 
scenarios were computed and then the millions of projections filtered down into the one most 
optimal future scenario. Finally, the third volume, released in 1970, elaborated on the optimal 
future alternative and how the UDA could move towards that optimal future. Coming after 1967, 
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the third volume changed its arguments and emphases slightly, with a new focus on racial 
segregation as requiring at least minimal attention.  
 The first volume described itself as “concerned primarily with an analysis of existing 
ekistic conditions,” and it truly was that.343 Beginning with North America as a whole, the volume 
addressed matters of geology, climate, water supplies, vegetation, population, economics, 
agriculture, mining, energy, manufacturing, and transportation.344 Its focus was then directed 
towards what is identified as the emerging Great Lakes Megalopolis. The term refers, not to a 
continuously build-up area, but rather clusters of urban and metropolitan areas with interconnected 
functions – in this case, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland/Pittsburgh. Ten such megalopolises were 
identified as forming around the world, and the volume “anticipated that one of the more important 
of these will develop in the Great Lakes area of the United States.” Consequently, great attention 
was paid to income distribution, employment, and transportation networks.345 An overview of the 
Great Lakes Area was also provided, defined as Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indian, Ohio, 
Ontario, and parts of Pennsylvania and New York. Much like the section on North America in its 
entirety, the volume detailed the geography, climate, water supply, natural features, socio-
economic features, transportation, and economic base of the region. Of particular note was the 
prominence of manufacturing in the region. The Detroit area especially was dependent on the 
manufacture of automobiles and other durable goods. Consequently, “the recent trend of 
decentralization in the automotive industry has had a marked effect” in the area.346 
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 Only after these preliminaries did the volume address the Urban Detroit Area specifically. 
Arguing that an urban center transcended municipal borders and other visible boundaries due to 
its “large, complex, dynamic and influential” nature, the UDA was defined in generous terms. It 
extended 100 miles to the northwest, 100 to the north, 100 to the west (where it reached Chicago’s 
sphere of influence), 100 miles to the southwest (approaching Cincinnati’s sphere), 75 to the 
southeast (approaching Cleveland), and 75 mile to the east, into Canada. Thus it incorporated 25 
counties in Michigan, 9 in northern Ohio, 3 in Ontario, with a total area of 25,059 square miles. 
Within the UDA was the metropolitan Detroit area, defined by the six counties of Wayne, Oakland, 
Macomb, St. Clair, Washtenaw, and Monroe, which together contained 52.9% of Michigan’s 
population.347  
 In examining the economic base of the UDA, the research project judged that it had not 
capitalized on its “inherent advantages.” With the Great Lakes and the proximity to Canada, one 
would have expected the UDA to have become a center of US-Canadian trade and the gateway for 
international trade for “the entire north central region of the United States.” However, for “what 
seems to have been accidental” reasons, the UDA instead became the heart of automotive 
manufacturing worldwide.348 The overinvestment in automotive manufacturing was “a mixed 
blessing,” especially considering, as the research project stressed many times, the automotive 
industry was decentralizing and moving away from Detroit. “Since the 1950s,” the study 
explained, “Detroit has been passing through a critical phase in its economic history. Several 
postwar developments, primarily a trend toward the decentralization of the automobile industry, 
have weakened the employment potential and caused some migration from the area.”349  
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In addition to decentralization, the postwar loss of defense contracts, increased automation, 
and the 1958 recession all took their toll on the automotive industry in the Urban Detroit Area. 
While in 1950 the UDA, including northern Ohio, accounted for 55% of all automotive 
employment in the United States, by 1960 it had dropped to 44%. Over those ten years, 97,000 
automotive jobs were lost in the Michigan and Ohio sections of the UDA. While a record-breaking 
demand for automobiles began in 1960, automotive employment in the UDA from 1960 to 1964 
dropped almost as much as it had in the 1950s in the UDA, by 93,000 jobs. While the automotive 
industry had accounted for 53% of manufacturing employment in the UDA in 1950, it had fallen 
to 33% in 1964. As if to emphasize how drastic of a change this was, a footnote was added that 
simply noted that the number of lost jobs was “certainly high for a period when the automotive 
industry has been experiencing record years in production and sales.”350 
 In the central region of the UDA, which was defined as the tri-country area of Wayne, 
Oakland, and Macomb, the numbers were more severe. The amount of automotive employment in 
these three counties relative to the UDA overall fell from 71% in 1950 to 66% in 1960 and finally 
to 56% in 1964. The percentage of automotive employment relative to total manufacturing 
employment showed a similar downward shift in the central UDA from 60% to 46% to 33% in the 
same period. A drastic shift in employment, this downward movement was notable as the UDA, 
especially in Michigan, had grown earlier in the century largely due to the growth of the 
automotive industry. It had provided good-paying jobs, which in turned “attracted new residents, 
mainly semi-skilled and unskilled workers from other parts of the nation and the world.” 351  
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 The loss of those jobs had a significant impact on the metropolitan area. While skilled 
workers could still earn high wages, the decentralization of the industry led to a loss of stability 
and security for those working in it. Semi- and unskilled workers were affected, as were 
professionals whose employment was altered or threatened the changing nature of the automotive 
industry. The future shape of the UDA thus depended on “the extent of further decentralization,” 
as well as economic diversification, a more balanced distribution of economic activity throughout 
the area, as well as “higher levels of training and education attainment.” Unless businesses 
diversified and educational capacity was expanded, the “structural weaknesses of the UDA 
economy,” and the resulting “disadvantageous conditions,” would continue to become apparent.352  
 Nor were economic concerns the only ones confronting the UDA. Commercial 
decentralization, from the downtown business district to suburban shopping centers, posed 
problems, as did the state of transportation networks throughout the area. Indeed, as the latter 
volumes of the study demonstrated, transportation networks were crucial to Doxiadis’s 
understanding of urban systems. “Transportation networks are of great importance to ekistic 
evolution,” he asserted. “They are the arteries that nourish the cells. Their efficiency or inadequacy 
determines the pattern of movement and the distribution of the various forms of urban 
development.”353 Additionally, “the transformation of the United States from an urban to a 
metropolitan nation has come about quickly” and created a situation of governmental and 
administrative fragmentation. In the six counties constituting the metropolitan Detroit area, there 
were 221 separate and independent governments, including the 6 counties, 67 cities, 39 villages, 
109 townships, and an additional 18 special districts. School districts were not included in these 
numbers. For the UDA overall, there were 1,112 governments. As industry and commercial 
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activities decentralized from urban centers, so too had local governments decentralized.354 This 
first volume study, however, said nothing about racial segregation in the UDA. 
 Doxiadis’s divorcing of the condition of urban spaces from those who inhabited is 
demonstrated in his 1966 testimony in front of a Senate hearing on the role of the federal 
government in urban affairs. “Our cities are weaker than in the past,” Doxiadis informed the 
committee, chaired by John L. McClellan of Arkansas and members which included Robert 
Kennedy and Edmund Muskie of Maine. “They are gradually becoming irrational […] They are 
shapeless, and ugly; the parking lot has come to replace public gardens and squares.” Given that 
his testimony came after the Urban Detroit Area research study was already underway, and the 
first volume published, many of Doxiadis’s examples came from Detroit. Nevertheless, in 
discussing the “holes and pits in the urban tissue,” and those who fall into them, he stated, “we 
notice their color, their race, or their religion, and we connect the problems with these causes, 
when the real cause is the fact that we have allowed our cities to develop such pits in the first 
place.”355 
 Doxiadis continued by noting that those who fall into the “pits in the urban tissue” were 
“the weakest economic groups” and that “this problem is connected with social and racial 
problems.” Yet, the problem was not the social and racial problems, but “getting rid of these pits,” 
which demanded that “we reverse our thinking.” Part of that reversal of thought involved shifting 
resources away from cities, to create new settlements that could relieve the pressure from inner 
cities. Not doing so in a planned and thoughtful manner meant that it was done in a haphazard 
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manner, which had led to “the escape into the suburbs and new towns conceived not as parts of a 
whole settlement but as isolated units for a certain economic, social, or racial group.”356  
Doxiadis told the Senate committee that addressing urban problems required immediate 
action, as it took decades to change urban trends. He brought up the patterns in Detroit as evidence, 
informing the senators that “study of the changing patters of land in farms around Detroit has 
demonstrated that many urban decisions have been taken by private people, industry, and 
authorities many years before actual construction started.”357 The solution proposed by Doxiadis 
was not the avoidance of cities, but embracing them, on a grand scale. The Ecumenopolis was 
unavoidable, so “our real challenge, if we are to create a better way of living, is not to avoid the 
universal city, but to make life in it human.” At stake was not just the quality of urban life. “If we 
do not achieve this in time,” Doxiadis warned, “then the present crisis will lead to disaster for man, 
to an inhuman, undemocratic society.” Decentralization was an illusion, as new settlements still 
existed in relation to city centers, and therefore continued to add pressure to these suffering 
areas.358 
 At this point in Doxiadis’s testimony, Robert Kennedy jumped in. “Could I just interrupt,” 
the senator inquired. “I know it is wrong of me, but I don’t understand some of this.” Kennedy 
asked if Doxiadis could use an example, such as from Detroit. “Yes,” the planner responded, “the 
city of Detroit now receives in its downtown area pressures of 7 million people who live within 
the city and within the broadest urban area.” All of them, even those in the broadest area, ultimately 
depended on Detroit’s downtown, and thus exerted pressure to various degrees on it. By the year 
2000, Doxiadis predicted that 7 to 8 million more people would join the existing population in 
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exerting pressure on the center of Detroit. “If we continue these policies,” Doxiadis added, “we 
will kill our cities.” The solution was a twin urban center, to relieve that added pressure.  
To this, Kennedy asked if suburbanization did not already provide this release function. 
Yet, despite suburbs, “the core city is disintegrating because industry is not coming in there and 
new buildings are not being constructed there. They are rather moving to the suburbs […] where 
there is more wealth.” Doxiadis agreed that this was the case, but did not match quite what he was 
proposing, as those suburbs still relied on urban centers where companies, banks, and “all the 
services” where located.359 Here Kennedy launched his main critique: namely, if suburbs were 
shaped by class and racial exclusion, what would stop the same tendencies from shaping the new 
twin urban centers Doxiadis was proposing? Those with financial resources, and the taxes they 
paid, were moving out of city centers, “and the people who are moving into the city are the poorest 
of our population; namely, the Negro, so that the result is that the whole area becomes more and 
more stagnant.”360 
“How are you going to deal with this?” Kennedy demanded of Doxiadis. How, Kennedy 
continued, did establishing a new city in the state of New York a hundred miles away from New 
York and housing General Motor’s new headquarters help those in New York City who were 
struggling with employment, struggling with hope, “and are gradually being strangled to death 
themselves? I speak of the ghetto areas of the city.” Doxiadis, not to put too fine a point on it, 
dodged Kennedy’s question. He said that the senator was right, adding vaguely that “unless we 
look at the whole system of cities we cannot solve any of their problems.” Kennedy offered some 
of his ideas on urban renewal, which centered on “trying to bring private enterprise into the ghetto 
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area,” arguing that that was “in the last analysis, going to be the only solution for the city.” “The 
private enterprise system” was, the senator added, “what has made this country as successful as it 
has been.” Doxiadis merely responded that all available resources should be used, but that there 
were parts of the city where “there is not hope of any profit.” In those areas, one could not rely on 
private enterprise, but rather “the Government must sacrifice funds to save the people and to save 
the whole structure.”361 Doxiadis ended his comments by remarking that “The Demonstration 
Cities Projects,” which would become the Model Cities program, “have great meaning, I think, if 
properly carried out.” They only addressed parts of the city, however, and Doxiadis encouraged 
his listeners to consider how to help the whole urban region. “It is imperative for us to understand 
this.”362 
After delivering his prepared comments, the committee members asked the urban planner 
a number of questions. “To be fair and honest and realistic with ourselves,” Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff, of Connecticut, prefaced his question, “the American city has been complicated by the 
fact that there has been a great influx of Negroes, and an exodus of whites.” Was this, he inquired 
of Doxiadis, “a basically different problem physically, socially, economically, and 
psychologically” than that faced in the slums of Rome, London, and Paris. Doxiadis conceded that 
it was, “but only in a tertiary way,” as “it is not the color that creates the problems but the great 
difference in incomes.” In this answer, Doxiadis was thinking in global terms, including his work 
in Africa and the Middle East. The true problem was that cities allow areas to develop that are like 
“open sores” and into which “the weakest economic groups flow,” to which “we have the racial 
problem added as a new dimension.” “I would say,” Doxiadis answered further, “certainly that 
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where we have racial differences, the problem is more aggravated, because you see the difference, 
where in other areas you cannot.”363 
Senator Ribicoff followed up with a question about industrial decentralization, especially 
in the context of Doxiadis’s plan to create new urban centers. “The Negro and the poorer groups,” 
Ribicoff observed, “who don’t have automobiles and don’t have means of public transportation, 
live in the core city,” and thus trying to travel to “a job of the most menial task or type” might take 
hours. ‘Now what,” the senator asked, “do we do in the interim in finding employment or work for 
the people in the core cities, when industry is making an exodus into the suburbs at the present 
time?” Acknowledging the difficulty of the problem, Doxiadis repeated that the solution required 
examining “the urban structure as a whole, as a system.” A program that created 50,000 new jobs 
might not accomplish much if you have a million people “belonging only to the weakes social, 
racial, and economic groups in the center of the city,” and that population continues to grow year 
after year. To grasp the ever-evolving dynamics of cities, Doxiadis urged the senators, “unless we 
understand that we are entering a new era beyond the era of the cities, into the era of the universal 
city formed by a system of cities, we will be wrong in our action.”364 
When Ribicoff fretted that too much federal money was being poured into urban areas, 
Kennedy jumped back in with the observation that it was “absolutely essential that the free 
enterprise system [. . ] take a role in the future of the city.” Doxiaids responded that it was not clear 
“exactly what and how” urban areas were changing and operating around the world, and therefore 
businesses distrusted old urban centers, before reiterating that he considered the main challenges 
as related to increasing populations and increasing pressures inside the central cities. To this, 
Kennedy rejoined, “I emphasize that the fact that the cities are in such financial difficulty at the 
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present, largely due to the great influx of lower income people and the outflow of the middle-class 
white into the suburbs.”365  
Here Kennedy entered into a prolonged statement on the need to “rebuild those areas, and 
make it attractive for industry to come into that area.” He mused that “our philosophy in the past 
has been mistaken,” and lamented the lack of results by welfare payments, public housing, and job 
training. The latter, he added, “train[ed] people for jobs that are not available in the ghetto, so that 
if they get trained they move out of the ghetto into other areas, and if they don’t get trained, they 
stay there and go on welfare.” If the federal government continued its current policies, Kennedy 
concluded, which he characterized as pouring funds into cities, “we are going to get so far into the 
depth of a cavern that we will just never be able to extricate ourselves.” Again, Doxiadis repeated 
the need to understand the urban system as a whole, avoiding Kennedy’s remarks directed towards 
welfare and political philosophy, and instead, in line with his overall approach, Doxiadis 
consistently circled back to this key point.366 
 The second volume, published the following year, aimed to comprehensively examine the 
possible futures of the UDA: “the alternative solutions that were studied, classified, evaluated and 
selected for projections to the year 2000,” while reiterating the research project’s focus on human 
values, “man’s happiness and safety,” as well as economic ones. Qualifying their proposals with a 
disclaimer that it was the start of a process, and not a “definite and final solution,” the research 
project hoped to start a conversation on methodology and applications not just for the Detroit area, 
but “cities throughout the world.”367  
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 With a mathematical formula never made explicit to readers, Doxiadis’s basic equation 
combined five elements (nature, man, society, shells (buildings), and networks) with five 
perspectives (economic, social, political, technological, and cultural) for a possible maximum of 
33,554,431 combinations.368 Given this number of possible alternative developments for an urban 
system, the research project developed the IDEA method – the Isolation of Dimension and 
Elimination of Alternatives – to evaluate and screen out “weaker” alternatives according to an 
established criteria. The study, however, acknowledged that this method required “a great number 
of assumptions for the future” and that, if the assumptions did not materialize, then the outcomes 
would be different.369 
 From a purely Doxiadian perspective, the project argued that there was no goal for a city 
better than that Aristotle declared: happiness and safety. To reach this, the five elements of nature, 
man, society, shells, and networks were broken down.  The resulting goals revolved around the 
preservation of natural resources, population densities, and networks that provided for the 
maximum of human needs with the minimum of disturbances.370 Before detailing the alternatives, 
the volume briefly reiterated the specific history of the Detroit area. “It is worthwhile,” the 
researchers wrote, “to look into the problems which the exceptional and unique development of 
the automotive industry has created for Detroit.” Despite being the automotive capital of the world, 
and the automotive industry being responsible for the city’s population and income growth, the 
reliance on a single industry had created challenges for the area. The automotive industry’s 
domination of the area’s financial and labor resources, to name just one obstacle, “resulted in the 
atrophic development of the other sectors of activity, particularly services.”371 
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  Furthermore, the dominance of automotive manufacturing shaped the city itself. It led to 
an influx of blue-collar workers and did not attract service and professional workers to the same 
degree. Manufacturing centered near Detroit, giving the city an industrial environment “with 
limited service facilities and unattractive housing.” The city grew low and horizontally, with parts 
of the city so far from the downtown that services could not be administered efficiently. With the 
advent of suburbanization, residents with high and middle incomes left the city. Those left behind 
had lower incomes and fewer employment opportunities. The result was that parts of the city 
became overcrowded, and others “fell into disrepair and deteriorated into slum areas.”372 The 
project rarely mentioned racial segregation and that, principally, after the 1967 riots in Detroit. 
Even then there was not sufficiently critical analysis of the forces that concentrated city residents 
in over-priced, aging housing while simultaneously denying them credit or well-paid jobs. While 
the study occasionally attempted to address the creation of inner-city slums, it often only touched 
on how these changes occurred, but not why. 
 Similarly, the study notes that, out of 43,060 acres of land in the city of Detroit, 4,018, or 
roughly 10%, were considered blighted. These, readers were told, corresponded to the housing 
stock in the city that was built before 1930. Moreover, the volume quotes a Detroit City Plan 
Commission report that these areas “fail to qualify for conventional or governmentally insured 
mortgages.” No explanation was provided for these phenomena, nor was racial segregation and 
discrimination mentioned. Thus the volume danced around the mechanisms that created racial 
segregation in cities, as detailed in our first chapter, in which African Americans were concentrated 
in aging housing stock in inner cities and denied access to credit. Instead, the research project 
                                                          




casually and unqualifiedly commented that “when an American family feels it can afford a better 
house, it moves to a better neighborhood.”373 
 Returning to the millions of possible alternative futures for the UDA, the volume then 
further explained the IDEA method, in which fifty million alternatives were developed and then 
each put through eight rounds of elimination. The progressive rounds of elimination narrowed the 
field of urban futures to 11,000, then 300, followed by 28. The addition of further criteria raised 
this number back up to 40 and then narrowed it to a final round of the top seven optimum futures 
for the area. The final round of elimination, however, Doxiadis noted, “requires very detailed 
investigation.” In one of Doxiadis’s characteristic asides, he assured the reader that “past, present, 
and future are connected to form a meaningful whole by which ‘the future takes shape on the 
merits of the past,’” recalling to the reader “what was written thousands of years ago in the palace 
of Priam of Troy.”374 
 One of the most novel and distinctive proposals of the UDA research project was then 
introduced: a twin urban center to complement downtown Detroit. The idea arose out of Doxiadis’s 
conviction that urban renewal was merely surgical, addressing symptoms but not causes. Indeed, 
“the possibility of relieving the existing center has proved completely wrong.” Whether planned 
or occurring naturally, “in both cases it has failed to save the downtown area from pressures.” 
Thus, the creation of a new urban center of “equal or higher order” to Detroit in the UDA would 
help relieve the pressures weighing down on the old urban center. Nine possible locations were 
considered for such a center, including Bay City, Flint, Toledo, and Port Huron.375   
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Such a twin urban center would be supported by the expanding manufacturing economy in 
the UDA as, in a unexplained reversal from the first volume, the second assured readers that “all 
indications show that the decentralization trend of the automotive industry has just about run its 
course.” Even while cautioning that “by the year 2000 radical changes could take place in the 
industrial structure of the region,” the research project predicted that manufacturing employment 
in the UDA would increase from 950,000 in 1960 to 1,260,000 in 2000. Nonetheless, the project 
predicted that the increase in industrial employment would be located completely outside of 
Detroit. Half of new industrial employment would be in a secondary industrial center in the UDA 
outside of Detroit. “This,” the study explained, “reflects the existing trend of industries to relocated 
outside the Detroit region.”376  
A set of fourteen criteria, including a breakdown of population between Detroit and the 
new proposed twin urban area, were used to further refine the alternative future scenarios generated 
by the research project. How the criteria were ranked in this process reflected biases of the research 
project. “Scenic attractiveness” was one category of evaluation. It was simply assumed that low 
density areas were more attractive than high density areas. Further, “for areas which do not present 
attractive features high permissible densities were assumed.” Nevertheless, through this process, 
the research project arrived at a final output for the most optimal future for the UDA, known as 
Alternative 120. The third and final volume of the project was devoted to describing this alternative 
future.377 
Before the study could be released, Detroit, like so many other cities in the United States, 
experienced an urban disorder rooted in anger and frustration over the continuing racial 
segregation and discrimination against African Americans. These cataclysmic events were such 
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that, while the first two volumes of the UDA research project never mentioned racial inequality in 
urban America, the third volume conceded that racial and economic segregation were forces that 
needed to be addressed.  
 Whether called a riot, an uprising, or a rebellion, the events in Detroit during the long, hot 
summer of 1967 have cast a long shadow over the Motor City, 20th century liberalism, and 
American race relations. Beginning with a police raid on a blind pig in the early morning hours of 
Sunday, July 23, the unrest in Detroit spread from a crowd watching arrests on 12th Street and 
Clairmount Avenue at 4 o’clock in the morning to three thousand throwing bottles and rocks at 
only a few hundred police officers.378 By noon, Hubert Locke, the administrative assistant to the 
police commissioner, told the latter that police had lost control and that it was a “lost cause.” By 
that afternoon looting and arson were reported, and the National Guard had been called to the city. 
By the evening, a curfew had been imposed, sniper fire directed towards fire fighters was reported, 
and all the city’s gas stations were shut down. At midnight, Michigan Governor George Romney 
declared Detroit and nearby communities Highland Park, Ecorse, and River Rouge to be in states 
of emergency.379 
 On Monday Mayor Cavanaugh and Governor Romney asked for the deployment of federal 
troops to Detroit, yet a bureaucratic two-step kept the request in limbo for six hours. The US 
Attorney General first told Romney that such a request had to be “formally” submitted. When 
Romney sent a telegram recommending immediate deployment, the Attorney General responded 
that he had to “request” troops, not “recommend” them. When the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
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arrived later in the day, he announced that there was “insufficient evidence” that federal troops 
were required. By midnight, after two full days of unrest, Hubert Locke described “veteran police 
officers” who “were convinced that they were engaged in the worst urban guerilla warfare 
witnessed in the United States in the twentieth century.” 
 Perhaps that siege-mentality explains the indiscriminate use of violence used on the part of 
police officers and the National Guard. Brutal and gratuitous violence by police, such as shooting 
of three unarmed men and the beating of other residents at the Algiers Motel in the early morning 
of Wednesday, July 26, joined together with the reports of snipers, arson, and looting.380 By 
Thursday morning, 1,671 people were being held in custody by Detroit police, and on Friday the 
National Guard began to withdraw from the city. Curfews remained in effect over the weekend, 
and would only be lifted on the following Tuesday. The National Guard only fully left the city the 
following Friday. Over the course of the week, unrest had spread to cover over a hundred square 
miles. Two thousand five hundred and nine buildings were damaged, accompanied by a loss of 
$36 million in insured property. Over seventeen thousand members of law enforcement were 
present in the city, which included the five thousand federal troops deployed by President Johnson 
at the request of the governor. Seven thousand two hundred and thirty one people were arrested, 
and forty-three died.381  
 All this occurred in what had been considered the “model city” for race relations in the 
United States. “For years,” a Washington Post editorial lamented on July 25, “Detroit has been the 
American model of intelligence and courage applied to the governance of a huge industrial city.”382 
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Yet, a Kerner Commission staffer later reported that not a single black Detroiter interviewed 
reported being happy with conditions in the city before the riot.383 While Detroit was still 
smoldering, on July 27, President Johnson announced the creation of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders. While Detroit was considered the worst, over a hundred American 
cities experienced riots over the course of the summer of 1967.384 The commission, popularly 
called the Kerner Commission after its chair, Illinois Democratic governor Otto Kerner, released 
its report in March, 1968. “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white,” the 
report famously concluded, “separate and unequal.” In the course of their investigations into urban 
conditions in the United States, the eleven members of the commission “came to feel that America 
was in the midst of its greatest domestic crisis since the days of the Civil War,” in the words of 
commission member and Oklahoma Democratic senator Fred Harris.385 
A Concept for the UDA’s Future Development 
 
 The era of urban disorders permeated the third Doxiadis volume in a way it did not in the 
first two. The idea of an “urban crisis” had been treated academically, but it became, in the third 
volume, a real and threatening presence. “The urban crisis is an universal phenomenon,” the 
introduction began,  stating that “the situation has reached threatening proportions and is becoming 
more menacing every day.” The crisis, the introduction continued, was not just a problem in the 
slums. It was not a problem of affordable housing, or systems of transportations, or in the quality 
of air and water. It was “a crisis of the whole system.” With those who argued that there was no 
crisis or that cities were not dying, the research project responded, “we do not agree simply because 
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many cities all over the world continue to deteriorate, and because death has indeed already struck 
large or small parts of these cities.”386 
 This begged the question, however, of what the causes of the urban crisis were. It could 
not be that cities had grown too large, as human beings could adequately run large governments, 
corporations, and institutions. Nor did too rapid growth seem a satisfactory answer, as human 
beings had demonstrated that they could rapidly organize and operate armies, governments, and 
corporations. Rather, the research project located the crisis in two forces. The first was that cities 
had grown out of balance. The rate of growth of population, energy, and economy did not 
correspond with one another. The second was that cities were growing in complexity, but the 
physical and institutional structures of cities had not grown to adequately serve that new and 
increasing complexity. In the study, the race and class structure of Detroit and its uneven political 
development remained an unexplored facet of that complexity.387  
 In addition to the causes of the crisis, the research project argued, there were four reasons 
why humankind was unable to control the crisis. The first was that the conditions of crisis were  
addressed via different disciplinary silos, with agents tackling portions of the whole in isolation 
from one another, which the research team compared to “refusing to see that man himself is a 
single organism which cannot be looked at separately as body or senses or mind.” The second 
reason was that researchers and policymakers looked at the crisis in the wrong areas and at the 
wrong scale. This in turn was due to a belief that cities were only physically built-up areas or 
confined within municipal boundaries. Instead, ekistics defined a city as the “kinetic field” within 
which a human can “move within a certain area, within a certain time-span and always within the 
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same day.” The third reason was thinking within too narrow of a time-frame—in one, five, or ten 
year increments. Instead, the research project suggested seventy years for parts of the city and 
double that, 140 to 150 years, for the entire city. The fourth reason was a too narrow conception 
of the future. Instead, a four-fold understanding of the future was proposed involving the constant 
past, the declining past, the continuing past, and the created future. The most important was the 
last, which was “the ability of man to create the future.” Without this, the only possibility was 
stagnation.388 
 The bulk of the third volume was given to elaborating the most optimal future alternative 
for the UDA, Alternative 120. Building off the idea of a twin urban center, Alternative 120 
proposed, “among other things, a new twin urban center to Detroit on the St. Clair River in the 
vicinity of Port Huron, Michigan.” With a projected population of one million, the new city would 
be as integrated in the UDA as Detroit was. Further, it would “relieve the pressures now exerted 
on Detroit and permit revitalization and remodeling of its suffering and declining areas.” In 
addition, the final alternative planned for a continuing population decline in Detroit’s central city. 
In reference to out-migration to suburban communities, the third volume concluded, “the shift of 
the more affluent economic forces from the city to these communities is the principal phenomenon 
having an adverse effect on the city.”389 
 The third and final research volume warned that, “what it does not present are specialized 
aspects of economic, social, racial and institutional problems and ways to solve.” “This research 
project,” it continued, “is very concerned with the human settlement as a whole,” but that to 
address all problems at all scales was beyond “the capabilities of any group within a reasonable 
period of time.” Instead, the project hoped to provide an understanding of “the geographical and 
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functional components” of the overall urban system, which in turn would provide insights into 
other problems, whether they “economic, social, racial, political, technological or cultural.”390 This 
was a different tone from the first two volumes of the UDA research project. Not only was there a 
new need to justify not looking at social problems, the introduction introduced the element of race, 
a category absent from the first two volumes. What the third volume did not explicitly mention 
was the Detroit riots, but nonetheless the research project articulated “the conviction that Detroit 
is faced with a great urban crisis which is becoming more and more acute.”391 
 The first two volumes, while not explicitly addressing racial inequalities, did discuss 
economic inequalities, albeit obliquely. This, too, changed in the third volume. Not only had the 
population of the UDA grown from 4.7 million in 1940 to 7.1 million in 1960, but “social and 
economic barriers have also developed with the flight of the more privileged sections of the 
population to the suburbs.”392 The result was the concentration of the lowest incomes in the central 
city.  Unlike earlier volumes, the third acknowledged that there were barriers, and not merely 
economic ones, that kept certain city residents in the inner city. In keeping with the first two 
volumes, the third identified “trends of decentralization” as having “resulted in a sharp decline of 
employment in the automobile industry since 1960, a decline which has not been counterbalanced 
by non-durable manufacturing activities.” The result was an overall decline in manufacturing 
employment, which was “indeed an unusual trend for the economy of UDA.”393 It was a trend that 
also underwrote the growing inequality that the volume finally acknowledged. 
 Nonetheless, while the percentage manufacturing constitute of total employment in the 
central region fell from 48% in 1950 to 40% in 1960 and then 39% in 1965, the numbers in the 
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central region of Detroit were still higher than those in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. The effects of decentralization and automation, however, were still felt, 
even among skilled workers. Between 1963 and 1969, 119 industrial establishments moved out of 
the Detroit central city. A growing service sector absorbed some unemployed industrial workers, 
but service jobs were located in the suburbs, which were “relatively inaccessible to the lower 
income, mainly non-white workers of Detroit.”394 They also required a different skillset, let alone 
higher levels of education within social services or clerical work, which was something the study 
did not explore. Also unexplored was the growth in female employment or women’s 
disproportionate share of public and service sector work. This also had implications for the subject 
of the research project.395  
Besides unequal access to outlying metropolitan areas, one of the problems of 
decentralization, whether it was industrial, commercial, or residential, was that it meant more 
energy had to be expended to navigate the metropolis. “Confusion begins,” the study reported, 
“when there are too many automobiles and industrial plants, resulting in a revolutionary increase 
in energy available to people as a community and as individuals. They spread their installations 
far out and create confused patterns in the countryside and within the urban areas.” This related 
back to the increasing complexity of urban systems that was beyond the control or understanding 
of those who had build them or lived in them. Regardless, “these problems have not arisen by 
chance; they are the result of forces at work over long periods of time.”396 And yet, automobiles 
and transportation infrastructure explained how cities became decentralized, but not why. 
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The history of the Detroit presented by the research project underscored this point. The 
moment that city became the automotive capital of the world, between 1910 and 1930, also 
contained the seeds of the outmigration of the well-off population. By the 1920, the movement of 
high-income residents to suburbs such as the Grosse Pointes, Birmingham, Bloomfield Hills, and 
Dearborn “assumed the dimension of an exodus.”397 This outward movement was counteracted by 
immigration from Europe and upward migration from the South, with the latter becoming 
increasing more important over the decades. In 1910, European immigrants in the central city 
outnumbered nonwhite migrants from the south four to one, although the ratio evened out between 
1920 and 1930 and reversed by World War II. With this demographic shift, the research project 
noted, matter-of-factly, the total income of the central city declined. It gave no explanation why 
the incomes of black southerners would be lower than European immigrants in the same central 
urban area. At the same time, commercial and service activities began leaving the central city, as 
well.398 
Between 1950 and 1960, this outward migration reached the automotive industry, which 
“began decentralizing its operations to new locations, some even outside UDA.” The nail in the 
coffin, so to speak, was the construction of the highways, which “became the channels of 
decentralization while at the same time they completely broke up the physical structure of the 
central area.” Middle-income city residents also moved away, so that the central city became the 
largely the residence of “the lowest income groups of non-whites.” This was, the study remarked, 
“the most characteristic phenomenon of the 1950-1960 phase.” With the loss of income came “the 
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creation of numerous social problems in the ghettoes.” In the following decade, “per capita income 
of residents will drop even further and the area will acquire all the characteristics of a ghetto.” This 
section marked the only time the central city was described using that term in all three volumes.399  
 As if afraid that too much attention was being paid to social issues at the expense of the 
abstract, structural focal points of ekistics, the volume at several moments repeated its caution that 
it and the research project as a whole could not adequately address all the sundry specific 
challenges facing urban systems. “There are urgent problems,” the volume conceded, “such as 
human relations, poverty, social welfare, etc. These are grave problems which must receive 
immediate, substantial and continuing attention. They are not, however,” the volume continued, 
“directly caused by the city nor is their solution intrinsically related to the overall structural 
problems of the city. Thus they are dealt with only indirectly in this volume.” For the research 
project, their proposed improvements to the urban system were designed to help alleviate and 
contribute to solving all these other problems.400 
 Still, the research project drew a distinction between “human problems” and “urban 
problems,” and lamented the “confusion” that blurred the two together. “Man looks at the suffering 
of people in the cities,” the study sought to explain, “and speaks of their problems as urban ones.” 
But these so-called urban ills were not necessarily urban in nature. Rather, they were the results of 
low incomes, and “if the same people, of very low incomes, lived in the countryside, they would 
be faced with the same problems, perhaps even greater ones.” Perhaps that would be true of some 
city residents, but it entirely ignored – if , indeed, the authors were aware of – the economic and 
legal structures of segregation under which black city residents were charged exorbitant rents for 
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dilapidated and overcrowded housing, because they could not, were not allowed to, find housing 
elsewhere, regardless of income. This segregation led to other ills, such as the epidemic of rat bites 
among children in the inner cities, which was also the focus of a public health campaign by 
President Johnson in cities nationwide. One imagines they might have been, on the contrary, better 
off in the countryside after all.  
 Thus the inability to see the workings of racial segregation in urban areas, rooted in a belief 
that it was more or less natural, worked against the best intentions of those who sought to address 
the urban crisis. If one accepts that nonwhite city residents naturally had lower incomes, then it 
follows that they would have lower quality housing, and that naturally they would concentrate in 
the same inner city communities, either out of preference or out of economic necessity. Yet such 
a belief that it was natural for nonwhites to earn lower incomes or that they would naturally 
segregate suggests an underlying racial bias that shaped the entire study. This is not to say that the 
UDA research project or other planners and policy creator thought segregation was desirable.  
Often, the opposite was the case. Rather, it is to underline that they did not understand the origins 
of segregation, and they were willing to allow assumptions and even prejudices guide how they 
approached it.401  
 The research project acknowledged that these problems existed but then explained why 
their study did not specifically address them. They were not “concerned with all problems here, 
but primarily with those which cause people to suffer because of the urban system in which they 
are living.” This was a point that Doxiadis made several times, such as when he gave testimony in 
Congress regarding the problems facing American cities in the late 1960s. When explicitly asked 
about certain problems, like segregation, he agreed that they should be addressed, but his 
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understanding of cities encompassed a more abstract, structural view of the urban system. He was 
more interested in the relationship between population densities and transportation networks, 
which he saw as being unique to the urban system and not to other more general problems. Racism 
and other social ills, on other hand, might be manifested in cities, but they were not of the city, and 
occurred independent of cities as well. This assumed, however, that all racism was the same, and 
that there was nothing particular and nor any unique forms or variants of racial inequality, some 
of which, I would argue, are specific to urban systems. Further, Doxiadis argued that cities were 
created by humans, yet somehow he believed that they were immune to the biases and prejudices 
of their human creators; that is, that cities were purer forms than societies or politics.  
 Nonetheless, there was a new-found sensitivity to racial inequality in the third volume. In 
discussing the demographics of Detroit, the volume included maps with the distribution of 
population according to race; and it noted that the nonwhite population of the central region of 
Detroit in 1960 was three times as large as that in 1940. In actual numbers, the non-white 
population increased from 155,000 in 1940 to 495,000 in 1960. Of this population, 87.3% was 
concentrated in the central city, and 76.2% in what the research project identified as the critical 
area. Within the critical area, the non-white population had increased from 12.5% in 1940 to 53.1% 
in 1960, while the corresponding numbers for the central region overall were 8.9% and 28.4%, 
respectively. Furthermore, the per capita incomes of non-white residents in the critical area were 
roughly 60% of their white neighbors, or $935 and $1500 respectively. Areas of the city that were 
predominantly nonwhite were, the project concluded, “not only spreading but intensifying.” At the 
same time, some areas had a non-white population that had declined between 1950 and 1960, 
“largely as a result of land clearance and urban renewal.”402 Despite this discussion of racial 
                                                          




demographics in Detroit, no explanation was offered for why the non-white population was 
distributed in this way, nor why non-white communities were targeted for land clearance and urban 
renewal. 
  The increased focus on racial inequalities in the city led the research project to comment 
that “one of the greatest problems in all American cities today is segregation and the growing 
conflict among racial groups.” The analysis continued, in seeming contradiction to the basic 
contours of American history, as well as those of Detroit, by explaining that racial conflict was 
growing as “the inhabitants of large settlements today have many more contacts with other people 
and consequently encounter more differences and potential conflicts.” Segregation was the tool by 
which city residents avoided “contacts they do not like.” While it might start out informally, 
segregation became more rigid over time. With the construction of highways in Detroit, “social 
segregation has become a much more critical problem because these physical structures break up 
the unity of the city.” The social prejudices of the city were manifested in concrete.  
 To argue that racial conflicts were growing in urban areas during the 1960s due to city 
residents confronting each other’s differences for, presumably, the first time, is to misunderstand 
urban racial inequalities on two fronts. On the one hand, it is to identify racial frustration as the 
result of personal, or interpersonal, bigotry and prejudice. To suggest that African American 
Detroiters in the 1960s felt frustrated by the differences between themselves and their white 
neighbors, rather than the systematic and pervasive practices of segregation and discrimination, is 
to minimize and dismiss the desire for civil rights in northern cities. On the other hand, it also 
fundamentally misunderstands, or is willingly blind to, the history of slavery, the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, Jim Crow and lynching throughout the United States, or Detroit’s own history of 




 This analysis also put forward to an idealized answer to those conflicts. The study 
comments that an imbalanced racial distribution of the population “intensifies the overall problem 
and leads to a lack of communication and understanding among social groups,” suggesting that 
the problem is just a failure of communication and not of power and profit. Similarly, the research 
project warned that the task of addressing racial segregation was “extremely difficult” and needed 
to be “pursued with caution and patience.” The upmost consideration was to be given to “the 
reduction of conflicts” and the “improvement of communication and understanding among social 
groups,” as if the demand for desegregation, in 1970, was too much, too soon. The implication 
was that the conflict was the fault of those asking for, or frustrated by the lack of, change.403  
Running through discussions of race in the UDA research study was the underlying belief 
that it was not so much a problem of racial inequality that caused urban disorder as it was  economic 
inequality and lack of economic opportunity. While encouraging the improvement of 
communication and understanding between social groups, the research project assured readers that 
“as the economic condition of the less privileged groups improve and the economic gap is reduced, 
social taboos may have less relevance in the future.”404 In a similar vein, elsewhere the authors 
argued that not all city residents had the same ability to choose what contacts they wish to make, 
but “this is not due to racial discrimination alone but also to economic discrimination.”405  
Conclusion 
 The Urban Detroit Area research project was one of Doxiadis last projects. He passed away 
in 1975, five years after the third volume was published, from ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s disease, after 
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a three-year fight. He was in his early sixties.406 Nonetheless, the UDA research project stands as 
a testament of his love and concern for the future of cities and the system of ekistics he developed 
to explain and plan them. The critiques forwarded in this chapter should not overshadow his 
considerable understanding of the macro-processes governing urban systems, nor his openness to 
the possibilities of the future. Driverless cars, underground highways, high-speed trains, and 
factories contained within mountains were ideas that excited him.  He believed they pointed the 
way to future cities that were vitally designed for human life and health.  
 The point is not that Doxiadis and the UDA research team  got some things wrong. The 
point, rather, is that to someone with as much experience and knowledge as Doxiadis, how race 
and class operated as divisions and boundaries within the metropolitan area were not seen as 
important as the city was concerned. In other words, classism and racism were not spatialized. 
They happened, but they happened anywhere; and so they just happened to also happen in the city. 
As the first two chapter argued, this was not an objective view, but thoroughly subjective. For 
those discriminated against, segregation occurred in specific spaces. For those who enforced 
segregation, it, too, occurred in a specific space. Similarly, for the workers at the River Rouge 
complex, their jobs and communities were rooted in particular spaces, and, in fact, those jobs 
helped create and constitute their communities. To say that racial and class inequalities occurred 
outside of space, or independent of geography, is to reveal a worldview in which those inequalities 
are, while intellectually recognized, nonetheless unexperienced and unacknowledged.  
 The UDA research project did not ask what the human causes, or political forces, were that 
created conditions of inequality in cities. Rather, the inequalities are accepted in and of themselves. 
Thus, while decentralization was a problem facing Detroit, it was not questioned at any point why 
                                                          





residents and businesses and industries were decentralizing. That automobiles and highways 
allowed people to move further away from downtowns did not mean that they necessarily would 
do so or even would want to do so. Perhaps these human causes were legitimately thought to be 
irrelevant, but it might be because the study was funded by a major regional business. Such a 
discussion might have been deemed inappropriate or too controversial given the context. Or, 
perhaps, it was taken for granted that readers would know the context of racial and class tension 
in the city–that it was an open secret that did not need to be explicitly referenced.  
 One reason social ills fit uneasily within Doxiadis’s framework was the result of scale. The 
smallest scale used in the UDA research project was 4-6 square miles.407 Using the concept of 
ekistics, Doxiadis took a large regional perspective, and the details could only be so finely-grained. 
The UDA research project freely admitted that they had made a certain set of assumptions and that 
these assumptions might be wrong. If they were, then the results for the UDA would be different 
than they had forecast. Additionally, the research project straddled the line between trying to accept 
how people wanted to live with what would be the optimal scenario. Given that people wanted to 
live outside of Detroit, Doxiadis proposed a twin urban center for them. Given the tendency 
towards decentralization in so many facets of urban life, building another entire city does not 
intuitively seem a desirable or achievable goal. Yet, one could argue that Doxiadis fully accepted 
the premise of decentralization and suburbanization – that people no longer wanted to live in 
Detroit – and formulated a solution that was still predicated on being connected to an urban system.  
 In any case, it was not for the existing city residents who lived in Detroit that the UDA 
research project planned for in the 1960s. Rather, they planned for imagined residents in an 
imagined city.408 The goal was not how to improve life for the real residents, but how to attract the 
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kind of city residents – high-income, white – whom the planners saw as desirable and valuable to 
the future prosperity of the city. Even as problems of inequality and barriers were identified, there 
was an inability to confront why those problems existed.  
 While the UDA research project was invested in the Detroit region and paid close attention 
to its dynamics, they nonetheless understood Detroit to be a case study, as a stand-in for  other 
cities facing similar problems. In a way, this further explained the lack of interest in the experiences 
of city residents or those who had to navigate the city on daily basis. What was of interest was the 
built environment, transportation networks, and people in the aggregate, as data or sociological 
phenomena. What is singularly lacking in the three volumes of the UDA research project was 
people, certainly as seen or understood as individual human beings, an ironic turn given that 
Doxiadis emphasized the need for a human city. Planners, policy makers, and politicians were and 
are able to ignore existing city residents, and what they are living through and experience, because, 














CHAPTER 5 FROM DETROIT TO WASHINGTON: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO 
THE URBAN CRISIS AND THE FIGHT FOR MODEL CITIES, 1966-1970 
The attractiveness of cities is not gotten by subtraction. It builds up from lots and lots of 
different bits and details, lots of different bits of money, lots of different notions, all coming 
out of the concern, the affection, and the ideas of lots and lots of different people. The 
amenity of cities cannot possibly be planned or bought wholesale. 
 
Jane Jacobs, speech at the fifth monthly women doers luncheon, sponsored by Mrs. Lyndon 
B. Johnson, the White House, Washington, DC, June 16, 1964409 
 
 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society was the most ambitious legislative reform 
since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, and cities were at the heart of it. Johnson announced the 
Great Society during a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the spring of 1964, declaring that “it 
demands the end to poverty and racial injustice – to which we are totally committed in our time,” 
and that “in the next forty years we must rebuild the entire urban United States.” “Our society will 
never be great,” Johnson argued in his speech, “until our cities are great. Today the frontier of 
imagination and innovation is inside those cities and not beyond their borders.”410  
Having grown up in the rural hill country of central Texas, Johnson knew and understood 
poverty, and was consequently far from indifferent from those who lived with it and around it. He 
worked building roads and as a janitor to put himself through college, and later taught 
impoverished Mexican students in rural south Texas.411 The rediscovery of poverty in the United 
States, heralded by Michael Harrington’s 1962 widely-read study The Other America, coincided 
with the increasing concern over the so-called urban crisis – the overlapping and entangled 
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conditions of major cities in the United States that included segregation, poverty, poor housing, 
unemployment, crime, health, and juvenile delinquency, among other things.412 Thus, in the wake 
of declaring war on poverty in his 1964 State of the Union address, President Johnson oversaw the 
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964; the Housing Acts of 1964 and 1965; the creation of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965; the National Capital Transportation Act 
of 1965; the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 (known as Model Cities); and the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968.413 As much as these programs might be considered the heart of 
the Great Society, they also were a continuation of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.  
While the Johnson administration declared war on poverty and oversaw the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the details of the Great Society legislation 
often failed to appreciate or fill in the details. As historian Robert Dallek later described the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, “neither the President who sponsored it, the director-designate 
who would administer it, nor the congressmen who passed it really knew what they had done.”414 
This failure is reflected in the Model Cities legislation, in which the policies enacted to benefit city 
residents do not seem to address the actual conditions facing urban residents in the decades 
following the Second World War. The reasons for this are varied, ranging from the faulty 
understanding of the architects of the legislation to the compromises the Johnson administration 
had to make in order to get such sweeping reforms passed through Congress. Regardless, it is 
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evident that the plans meant to aid cities fundamentally failed to grasp the driving forces of the 
urban crisis and therefore failed to offer meaningful solutions.  
In this moment the postwar city was the site of experiments in urban forms. Planners, 
experts, and technocrats strove to address the changes in cities since the war—population growth, 
suburbanization, industrial restructuring. These plans were not useless or irrelevant. While they 
might not have succeeded in solving the problems confronted by cities in the United States, they 
made sincere efforts to take the best knowledge and insights in urban problems and challenges and 
create solutions. The perception of what constituted social ills and what society should do about 
them, however, revealed the worldviews of those policy makers. As historian Tracy Neumann has 
argued, the visions for industrial cities following the Second World War were often postindustrial 
visions.415 As such, they often failed to include in any real way the industrial working classes, just 
as they similarly failed to address racial inequalities. 
While this chapter focuses on national conversations and federal policy, it still revolves 
around Detroit in several ways. First, it intends to demonstrate that Detroit was not unique in the 
challenges it faced after the war. Many other cities in the United States confronted similar 
conditions. Second, as one of the recipients of Model Cities aid, the discussion of the ideals and 
the shortcomings of the Model Cities legislation had concrete local significance. In different ways, 
Detroit played a central role in the history of federal urban policy and in the Model Cities program. 
Indeed, the idea originated with UAW President Walter Reuther, neatly connecting Model Cities 
with Detroit and the labor movement. This link, however, makes it that much more ironic that 
legislation like Model Cities was unable to address unemployment and job loss in industrial cities. 
                                                          




Even when these urban vision originated with working-class city residents at their center, it did 
not last. The policies soon morphed into postindustrial urban visions. 
The Social Urban Vision of Walter Reuther 
 That Model Cities originated with Walter Reuther is a consequence of the UAW leader’s 
immense interest in creating mass affordable housing. This was true during the war, when he was 
involved in adequate housing for defense workers. It was true in the mid-1950s, as well, when 
Reuther helped create the Citizens Redevelopment Committee, which brought Ludwig Mies van 
der Rohe, the famed Bauhaus architect, to Detroit to design the city’s Lafayette Park community. 
For Reuther, housing it was not merely a physical structure but rather a means to “rebuild the 
whole inner cores of our great cities and produce in those inner cores an attractive, healthy, 
wholesome living environment that will be so exciting that everyone will want to live there.” In a 
similar way to Constantinos Doxiadis, Reuther argued that a revitalized and whole urban 
environment would mean that “the racial thing will get lost in the shuffle.” Later, Reuther would 
champion federal support for mass-produced prefabricated housing in an alliance with former 
Michigan governor George Romney, who served as the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development under Richard Nixon.416  
 It was not surprising to find Reuther, in the spring of 1965, encouraging President Johnson 
to organize a planning committee to select cities for a program to “demonstrate” the wide-range 
of Great Society programs and their efficacy. It would be, Reuther wrote to the president, a 
“Marshall Plan for the Cities.”417 Working with his friend and architect Oskar Stonorov, Reuther’s 
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original proposal, in the words of his biographer Nelson Lichtenstein, “perfectly targeted LBJ’s 
Rooseveltian ambitions,” following the Watts riots of 1965. Conceived as an “urban TVA,” the 
duo proposed building entire communities on tracts of urban land, seven hundred to a thousand 
acres in size, where one could find “new technologies of housing construction and prefabrication, 
new types of schools, old-age centers, and recreational facilities,” to create a “physically beautiful 
and socially sound America.”418  
Based on this description, one can imagine Walter Reuther’s urban vision was ran contrary 
to the urbanist movement in the mid-1960s. People like Jane Jacobs and sociologist William White 
were moving away from overly planned urban environments. “Their appreciation,” as Lichtenstein 
phrased it, “of an organic and complex urban synthesis evoked little sympathy from the UAW 
president.” As one Johnson aide, Harry McPherson, recalled, Reuther was for “bull-dozing and 
rebuilding.”419 Nonetheless, Johnson found Reuther’s vision of a “Marshall Plan for the cities” 
compelling. He met with Reuther on September 17, 1965, to hash out a fuller plan from the labor 
leader’s original proposal to used six cities—Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, DC, Los Angeles, 
and Houston—as demonstrations of a new federal approach to aging cities. Following the meeting, 
Johnson appointed a task force to work out the details to implement Reuther’s idea. The nine 
members included Whitney Young of the Urban League, Charles Haar of Harvard Law School, 
and Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, as well as Reuther. As the taskforce moved from 
idea to fleshed-out plan, it was Reuther, in the words of one committee member, who supplied 
“the vision, drive and sometimes mere rhetoric that has kept us moving.”420 
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 Reuther was not the first prominent Detroiter to bring the attention of the federal 
government to the plight of American cities. As historian Roger Biles described, “Mayor Frank 
Murphy of Detroit took the lead in pleading the case of urban America” to the Hoover 
administration. In doing so, Murphy argued for increased government spending as the pathway to 
saving cities, countering those who urged a balanced budget. Such a thing “isn’t a god, a sacred 
thing that is to be accomplished at all costs. It is not right to shatter living conditions and bring 
human beings to want and misery to achieve such an objective.” “To sacrifice everything,” Murphy 
concluded, “to balance the budget is fanaticism.” The Detroit mayor invited twenty-six big city 
mayors in 1932 to petition the federal government for a $5 billion public works program. This 
initiative failed, but it did serve as the foundation for the US Conference of Mayors, membership 
in which was open to mayors of cities with other 50,000 residents. Murphy’s plan in many ways 
prefigured the Great Society’s urban initiative.421  
 Reuther was not just an advocate in the spirit of Mayor Frank Murphy. Reuther also 
organized a nonprofit, the Metropolitan Detroit Citizens Redevelopment Authority, to organize 
and facilitate Model Cities funding to the city. He served as the Authority’s chair. His mission, as 
he understood it, was “rebuilding the inner core of Detroit . . . so that people living in a slum can 
move into neighborhoods worth of citizens of the Great Society.”422 Moreover, President Johnson 
leaned on Reuther’s position as a prominent liberal voice in order to defend Great Society 
programs. For instance, on January 27, 1966, LBJ aide Joe Califano sent the president a memo 
referring to an “extremely unfair” Washington Post editorial from the day before. He informed the 
president that he had called Reuther in order to have the AFL-CIO make a public statement in 
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support of Demonstration Cities.423 The US president listened to and relied on Reuther, and the 
UAW president gave public and visible shows of support for the Johnson presidency. At the UAW 
convention in the spring of 1966, Reuther presented Johnson with the union’s Social Justice 
Award.424 While Reuther might have been outside the urbanist trends of the 1960s as represented 
by those like Jane Jacobs, he was a go-to authority on urban affairs for the Johnson administration.  
Creating Model Cities 
In contrast to the ensuing debate over urban policy, the expanding war in Vietnam was a 
major focus of President Johnson’s 1966 State of the Union address, but he did not ignore domestic 
issues. “There are men who cry out that we must sacrifice,” President Johnson calmly and 
deliberately pronounced, scanning his entire audience. “Well, let us rather ask them who will they 
sacrifice?” Would they sacrifice children seeking learning, the sick seeking medical care, “or the 
families who dwell in squalor now brightened by the hope of home?” Will they, he inquired, 
“sacrifice opportunity for the distressed, the beauty of our land, the hope of our poor?”425 The 
Great Society, he stated, meant growth, justice, and liberation. He argued for ending racial 
discrimination and expanding the war on poverty, for helping “that other nation within a nation, 
the poor whose distress has now captured the conscious of America.” It meant addressing rural 
poverty but also helping to “rebuild entire sections of neighborhoods containing in some cases as 
many as 100,000 people.” Uniting private interest with the power of the federal government, 
Lyndon Johnson urged that the country “press forward with the task of providing homes and shops, 
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parks and hospitals, and all the other parts of a flourishing community where our people can come 
to live the good life.”426 
In his January 26, 1966 presidential address to Congress on cities, President Johnson made 
a rousing call for a response to the urban crisis. “What we may only dimly perceive,” the address 
went, “is the gravity of the choice before us: whether we shall make our cities livable for  ourselves 
and our posterity, or by timidity and neglect damn them to fester and decay.”427 While words do 
not necessarily translate into action, especially within the realm of politics, the rhetoric used by 
the Johnson administration in regards to the urban crisis were revealing. It is clear that they 
understood that race and class were at the root of who suffered in cities and who did not. “The 
special problem of the poor and the Negro” and the “the flight to the suburbs of more fortunate 
men and women” were listed as part of the crisis.428 Johnson mentioned the “social and 
psychological effects of relocating the poor” that had arisen from urban renewal and noted that 
they were “the unavoidable consequences of every urban renewal project, demanding as much 
concern as physical redevelopment.”429 Even the conflicting tendencies of federal policy were 
acknowledged in Johnson’s address: “the goals of major federal programs have often been 
conflicted, some working for the revitalization of the central city, some accelerating suburban 
growth, some building and some destroying urban communities.” He recognized that those who 
were impoverished and non-whites suffered disproportionately, that those who could fled to 
suburban communities, and that the response of the federal government up to this point had been 
inchoate and disorderly.430  
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The response of the Johnson administration was clear. In the Demonstration City program, 
there would be a focus on entire neighborhoods and their impact on the entire city. There would 
be a focus on the total environment and the use of available social programming, “so that the 
human cost of relocation is reduced and new opportunities for work and training are offered.”431 
There would be more housing, with a focus on creating equal opportunity for housing for those of 
different races. There would be the “maximum occasion for employing residents of the 
demonstration area in all phases of the program” and the fostering of “local initiative and 
widespread citizen participation.”432 Modern technologies would be used, and there should be 
“attention to man’s need for open spaces and attractive landscaping.”433 Returning to the statement 
that relocation had been destructive in  human terms, Johnson stated that the program “should 
make relocation housing available at cost commensurate with the incomes of those displaced by 
the project,” as well as offering “counseling services, moving expenses, and small business loans 
[as well as] assistance in job placement and retraining.”434  
Johnson argued that the development authority should include “a broad cross-section of 
community leadership” and the municipality should provide “adequate municipal appropriations 
and services.” The program was to be “predominantly residential” and “consistent with existing 
development plans.”435 Moving from the more practical matters, Johnson insisted that the outcome 
would be intangible and hard to measure: that of hope, “that the city is not beyond reach of 
redemption by men of good will; that through cooperation, hard work, wise planning, and the 
sacrifice of codes and practices that make widespread renewal impossibly expensive today, it is 
                                                          
431 January 1966 Presidential Address, Box 2, Folder 1, MC. 
432 January 1966 Presidential Address, Box 2, Folder 1, MC. 
433 January 1966 Presidential Address, Box 2, Folder 1, MC. 
434 January 1966 Presidential Address, Box 2, Folder 1, MC. 




possible to reverse the city’s decline.”436 While the impact would ultimately be beyond the cost in 
dollar amounts, Johnson reassured his listeners that the benefits would be for “the ultimate relief 
of the general taxpayer, as well as for city administrators, land developers, and for the urban poor.” 
In the context of rising costs of municipal services and declining property values, Johnson 
reminded his audience, the estimated federal spending was for the common good.437 
 At this point, Johnson returned to the theme of the suburbs. He reminded his listeners that 
the “reality of urban life” was that the suburbs and the city were intertwined, “what happens in the 
central city, or the suburb, is certain to affect the quality of life in the other.”438 Much like Doxiadis 
had argued, Johnson understood cities and suburbs to part of one large regional network. Further, 
“at the center of the cities’ housing problem lies racial discrimination” – as clear-cut a denunciation 
as one could wish. “Crowded miles of inadequate dwellings – poorly maintained and frequently 
overpriced – are the Negro American’s lot in many of our cities […] Where housing is poor, 
schools are generally poor, unemployment is widespread, family life is threatened, and the 
community’s welfare burden is steadily magnified. These are the links in the chain of racial 
discrimination.”439 Johnson does not, however, argue for a causal relationship. The relationship 
between these issues was not so much a chain, with an end and a beginning, but a web.  
 Fundamentally, the basic assumtion of Demonstration Cities was that the physical 
landscape influenced human behavior. Johnson proclaimed a new approach to urban design, 
insisting that “they [cities] must also provide a rational and harmonious environment, with 
integrated transportation systems, attractive community buildings, and open spaces free from 
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pollution.”440 Another fundamental idea behind Demonstration Cities emerged relatively soon, in 
which the “the rebirth of our cities” meant “the possibility of retaining middle-income families in 
the city, and even attracting some to return.”441 The aims of the federal program, thus, had certain 
class assumptions about urban renewal. Creating middle-income opportunities for city residents – 
the poor and the non-white – were not necessarily its focus. Retaining and attracting middle-
income families – those who already had middle-income positions – was. By using a term like 
“middle-income,” however, and not “middle-class,” the gate remained open for the inclusion of 
unionized industrial workers, who would have been characterized in some cases as “middle-
income working-class.” 
 Rhetorically the rebirth of American cities was for all city residents. In a passage cut from 
the President Johnson’s Congressional address, but used in a January 26, 1966, press release, the 
dream of cities was expanded. The ideal future of cities was “to rebuild where this is hopeless 
blight, to renew where there is decay and ugliness, to refresh the spirit of men and women grown 
weary with jobless anxiety, to restore old communities and to bring forth new ones where children 
will be proud to say, ‘That is my home.’” Contrary to cities of ugliness and hopelessness, where 
the only dream is escape, Johnson proposed cities full of life, joy, beauty, prosperity, and 
vitality.442  
The Demonstration Cities bill delivered to Congress declared that “The Congress hereby 
finds and declares that improving the quality of urban life is the most critical domestic problem 
facing the United States.”443 The language incorporated those below a middle-income. The 
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legislation aimed to increase the supply of “adequate housing for low- and moderate-income 
people,” while attempting to “make marked progress in serving the poor and disadvantaged people 
living in slum and blighted areas with a view to reducing educational disadvantages, disease, and 
enforced idleness.”444 Who was responsible for the “enforcing” was not named. The legislation 
sought to contribute to “good access to industrial or other centers of employment,” as well as 
“encourage good community relations and counteract the segregation of housing by race or 
income.”445  
The program called on cities to submit proposals for federal funds, which would come from 
the recently-created Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The program 
emphasized targeting urban blight and slums, segregation, and lack of housing, offering up to 80% 
of funds for projects that addressed these urban ills via a regional plan. The basic idea was local 
control of a vast array of federal resources used to target interlocking urban problems, which would 
demonstrate the power of various federal programs and agencies working in tandem rather than at 
cross-purposes.446  
 The draft legislation received mix press, including negative responses such as the editorial 
that Harry McPherson forwarded to Joe Califano on February 12, 1966. The editorial, written by 
public conservative and open segregationist James J. Kilpatrick for the Washington Evening Star, 
was from two days earlier. “Have I lost touch with reality?” McPherson wryly asked Califano. In 
his op-ed, “Urban Crisis and Its Solution,” Kilpatrick concluded that Demonstration Cities “is 
largely a dream.” Kilpatrick’s objections were manifold, but they were indicative of conservative 
reactions to Johnson’s Great Society, revolving around fears of federal overreach and a 
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misunderstanding of human nature. They also underlined the conflicted position of urban America 
a few decades after the Second World War.447  
 Kilpatrick was not completely dismissive of Johnson’s address on Demonstration Cities. 
“If it lost touch with reality,” Kilpatrick wrote of the speech, “it was nonetheless a good message 
in many respects, filled with bright hope and grave warning.” Kilpatrick disapprovesd on two 
accounts: first, that the Constitution does not give the Federal government the authority to pursue 
such legislation, and, second, that it does not account for human nature. Putting aside the first 
objection – more ably dealt with legal scholars and, presumably, by the legal counsel of the 
Johnson administration – Kilpatrick’s defense of the second objection rested on a number of biases. 
“It has to be said,” Kilpatrick assured his readers, “realistically, that mankind never has known a 
free society that was not characterized by gaps between the haves and have-nots. To the extent that 
these gaps are diminished arbitrarily by the compulsions of the state, freedom itself is diminished.” 
Such abstractions gave way to concrete examples: “Johnson is annoyed that the affluent have fled 
to the suburbs. If he cannot drag them back to the cities, he will see that disadvantaged families 
are transplanted by their side.”448  
Kilpatrick’s irony does not mask that he understood the legislation as intended to punish 
the affluent by forcing them to encounter the disadvantaged. Conceiving as freedom as the freedom 
to discriminate, in addition to being free of governmental coercion, it became clear that 
Kilpatrick’s argument also centered on racial matters. Kilpatrick continued that Johnson “is 
aroused by the prejudice that prevents some white owners from selling their property to potential 
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Negro buyers. So he will make them sell.” Even while granting that prejudice existed, Kilpatrick 
dismissed it with the qualification of “some,” as if residential segregation was a minor eccentricity 
on the part of a handful of prejudiced individuals. The real social threat, instead, was the social 
uplift that Johnson proposed though “enough compulsion, and enough money, and a sufficiency 
of rules and regulations and certificates.”449   
 It was the means, not the ends, that caused Kilpatrick’s ire with Demonstration Cities. He 
referred to “the genuinely noble aims of Johnson,” but chided the President that, instead of 
“beneficent compulsions,” his aims should be fulfilled via “ambition, and personal incentive, and 
local zeal.” According to Kilpatrick, the legislation would undermine those very values by 
providing rent supplements, subsidies, and “federal domination.” Thus, while “the crisis of the 
American city is real,” the proposed solution was, at least as far as conservative thinking went, 
fantasy.450 
 The Johnson administration developed responses to these conservative critiques. It is 
difficult, however, to disentangle the conservative critiques from those based in both openly and 
concealed racist and segregationist thinking. While Kilpatrick, later in his life, disavowed his early 
stances on race relations, he publicly argued against the equality of black Americans and white 
Americans. He also was one of the main public proponents of southern state resistance to federal 
civil rights policies, legislation, and court decisions. Could one separate a purportedly free-market 
rationale from a racial one for white homeowners who resisted selling to a black buyer? It was true 
that such a sale often lowered property values in a given neighborhood and thus economic 
                                                          
449 James J. Kilpatrick, “Urban Crisis and Its Solution,” The Evening Star, Thursday, February 10, 1966, Box 2, 
Folder 2, MC. For an overview of conservative responses to the federal government, see the first three chapters of 
Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), especially 
78-105. 
450 James J. Kilpatrick, “Urban Crisis and Its Solution,” The Evening Star, Thursday, February 10, 1966, Box 2, 




reasoning considered such a sale as inefficient even if unfair. But such a view artificially 
decontextualizes the sale, ignoring the structural racism in the housing market. Why, we might 
ask, did the ancestry of the homeowner affect the value of the property? What social factors 
reinforced this phenomenon? And why was it so widespread as to be second-nature to all home-
sellers and home-buyers in the United States during the better part of the twentieth century? 
Even in the face of conservative critiques, the Demonstration Cities program had a number 
of influential supporters: the US Conference of Mayors, the American Institute of Architects, the 
National Housing Conference, the National Governors Conference, the NAACP, Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA), the AFL-CIO and, specifically, the AFL-CIO Industrial Union 
Department.451 The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Council formally resolved that “of all the programs 
presenting being advanced to deal with urban ills the one that offers the most promise is the 
‘demonstration cities’ concept.” The resolution criticized “the piecemeal programs of slum 
clearance and urban renewal of the last three decades, which seem to do little more than redistribute 
the focal points of urban blight.” The Demonstration Cities program, with “the goal of creating 
good city environments,” sought to bring a full program involving “all that we know about 
improving the quality of urban life,” and would focus on “city planning, job training, welfare, 
health, education, social services, and recreation.”452 
Twenty mayors testified to Congress in the spring of 1966 in support of the bill, many of 
whom came from cities facing variations of the urban crisis, including Detroit’s Jerome 
Cavanaugh. Other mayors included Hugh Addonizio of Newark, Walton Bachrach of Cincinnati, 
J. D. Braman of Seattle, Richard Daley of Chicago, Louis DePascale of Hoboken, John Lindsey 
of New York City, Ralph Locher of Cleveland, James H. J. Tate of Philadelphia, and James Walsh 
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of Scranton. Mayor John E. Babiarz of Wilmington, Delaware, who intended to testified, was 
prevented from doing so after spraining his ankle, but a representative from Delaware delivered 
his testimony for him.453  
Mayor Tate of Philadelphia was vociferous in his support, writing a letter Senator John J. 
Sparkman, and forwarding a copy of HUD director Robert Weaver. He criticized the testimony of 
the Chairman of the Washington Committee of the National Association of the Real Estate Boards, 
Alan L. Emlen, before the Senate Sub-Committee on Housing, which had opposed Demonstration 
Cities. “Private investment and business interest,” Tate argued, “had abdicated their 
responsibilities to the communities in which they live and from which they derive their resources 
by their withdrawal from the blighted and deteriorated areas of our major cities, leaving behind a 
reservoir of poverty, torment, turmoil, and distress, in times which would otherwise be described 
as a period of affluence.” Many Americans, including elected officials, city authorities, the national 
administration, and Congress, knew “that without urban renewal our cities would long since have 
been laid waste and our people reduced to a level of poverty and hardship unconscionable in the 
day and age in which we live.” The argument that the federal government was interfering in the 
realm of private businesses was undermined, in Mayor Tate’s view, by the simple fact that private 
businesses had given up on the urban realm a while ago. If they had not, there would be no need 
for the federal government to intervene. The recent past had “shown that private investment 
resources would never have begun to meet the needs of our deteriorating cities” were it not for the 
resources available through urban renewal programs. While critical of private investment, Mayor 
Tate argument for urban renewal programs was that they encouraged new investment. In 
                                                          




Philadelphia, for instance, Tate recounted how every dollar of public investment led to $4 to $6, 
or more, of private investment.454  
Even given the last fifteen to twenty years of urban renewal had not eradicated the problem, 
as Mayor Tate argued that the president, Congress, mayors, and “every responsible organization” 
knew. “The scope and scale of our urban renewal efforts to this date,” Tate pressed, “have not 
reached into the blighted cores of our large metropolitan areas and the poverty sections of our 
cities.” Alan Emlen, therefore, “does not speak for the vast majority of sound and responsible 
businessmen represented in the real estate industry of this country.” The Philadelphia Board of 
Realtors supported Demonstration Cities, as had the Home Builders of America. Far from speaking 
on behalf of the real estate industry, Mayor Tate noted that Emlen’s position was politically 
motivated. He was previously the treasurer of the Pennsylvania Republican State Committee and 
“very active and vocal in GOP affairs.”455 
Tate reaffirmed that many individuals and organizations, “Republican and Democratic 
alike,” were in support of the Demonstration Cities program. Mayors of major cities thought that 
Demonstration Cities was not only desirable, but “that it is essential to the rebirth of our cities.” 
The strength of the program was that it was not only concerned with the physical city, but with 
“social, economic, and cultural growth and opportunity,” too. The opposition, Tate concluded, was 
“a reflection of a school of thought long since rejected by the people of this country in their 
assessment of the needs of our cities and our hopes and aspirations for strength and growth in the 
future.” As Mayor Tate made clear, Emlen did not represent the views of individuals and 
organizations, regardless of political persuasion, who were involved in urban affairs. In a parting 
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shot, Mayor Tate did not even grant that Emlen spoke for Philadelphia Board of Realtors, of which 
he was the past president.456 
 For all the “noble aims” of the Demonstration Cities legislation, the law made claims that 
had, on close inspection, little support. Despite being aware of the urban crisis, and recognizing 
that the federal government should act to curtail it, those involved did not understand how the 
crisis had originated or its long-term effects. The Harlem riot of 1964 and the Watts riot of 1965 
were present in the architects’ minds. Joseph Califano, wrote a memo on June 29 to Donald E. 
Nicoll, the administrative assistant of Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, who was to deliver the 
opening statement on the Demonstration Cities bill in the Senate, underscoring this point: “The 
object of our proposal is to prevent, if possible, a repetition of the Watts-type riots in the 20-25 
‘crisis cities’ this summer.” The bill was to show the benefits of a coordinated federal-local 
program on social and physical problems of cities, “and clearly to identify the President with a 
more effective and efficient use of Federal resources in support of community action to improve 
the quality of living in our cities.”457  
 In fact, the riots of 1964 were fundamental to the outlook of President Johnson’s Task 
Force on Housing and Urban Affairs, assembled in the spring of 1964 and chaired by Robert C. 
Wood, a MIT political scientist. In Wood’s recollection, the term urban crisis was used by the task 
force due to the urban disorders that summer. It held its first meeting in Washington in the middle 
of July after the riot began in Harlem, following the shooting of a fifteen-year-old African 
American by a white police officer. The ensuing angry and violent protests moved from Manhattan 
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to Brooklyn, and then saw echoes in Rochester, NY, a Chicago suburb, three New Jersey cities, 
and Philadelphia. The developing crisis was much on the minds of members of Congress.458 
Another way that the urban revolts and Civil Rights fed into the development of the 
Demonstration Cities project was the name of the program itself. The transformation from 
Demonstration Cities to Model Cities was far from innocent. The first indication that the name 
could be flipped into a criticism came early in September, 1966, when HUD staffer Sidney Spector 
send fellow HUD worker Harry Hall Wilson the following message: “Dan Smoot has been twisting 
the name of the bill for propaganda purposes. Smoot is telling his audiences that the purpose of 
the bill is to provide funds for Civil Rights ‘Demonstrations’ in the cities and thus the name, 
Demonstration Cities Bill.” 459 The spin of the conservative commentator Smoot was not isolated. 
Earlier in the spring of 1966, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver communicated concerns to President 
Johnson over the connotations of “demonstrations” in the mid-60s: “Congressman Robert 
Stephens is concerned about the title ‘Demonstration Cities’ because he feels it suggests the image 
of racial conflict in the South.”460 By October, Representative Paul A. Fino, admonished that “This 
program is a tool of black power . . . I can just imagine what kind of city demonstrations black 
power has in mind. They will demonstrate how to burn down shops and loot liquor stores. They 
will demonstrate how to throw Molotov cocktails at police cars . . . Oh, yes, I can imagine the kind 
of demonstration program black power has in mind. Demonstration conflagration. Demonstration 
incineration.”461 
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Fino was on the more extreme end of the spectrum, but even supporters of Johnson and the 
program framed it in terms of urban disturbances, as shown in a memo from Califano. The Three-
City Pilot Project, he wrote, was “an accelerated program to combat poverty in selected cities” as 
a way of showcasing the benefits of the full Demonstration Cities program. Califano explicitly 
mentioned neighborhoods “within a Watts, Harlem, or similarly distressed sub-area” as the ideal 
targets of a program. The small-scale was desired, because cities like New York, Chicago, or Los 
Angeles were too complicated, and the pilot needed to show results within half a year.462 
Nonetheless, while those involved with the project constantly referred to poverty and 
unemployment, they did not seem to recognize or acknowledge its causes. In one memo to 
Johnson, Charles Schultze solely emphasized the need for job finding and job training, seemingly 
indicating that city residents were impoverished simply because they lacked training or were 
incapable of finding jobs on their own, not that jobs did not exist. 
 Not all the supporters of Demonstration Cities seemed so unaware of the issues facing city 
residents. The opening statement by Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine shared a remarkable 
similar to the analysis found in an essay by a radical black Detroit auto worker, James Boggs, 
although the politics of the two were fundamentally different. Beginning on a literary note – “from 
the Book of Job, to Charles Dickens, to James Baldwin, we have read the ills of cities” – Muskie 
quickly launched into a full exploration of distressed cities. Nor did Muskie focus solely on large 
metropolitan areas. “We all know,” he told the senators, “of the ‘other side of the tracks’ in smaller 
cities, where unemployment comes first and prosperity arrives last.” It was in the “slum and 
blighted areas of our cities” where unemployment struck hardest and where city residents lived in 
“dilapidated, overcrowded, or unsafe and unsanitary dwellings.” Muskie summoned the memories 
                                                          




of Watts in his statement and public welfare, right after comments on unemployment and unsafe 
structures: “It is in these areas of unrest that public welfare payments are concentrated – 24 percent 
of the population of Watts, for example, was on public assistance at the time of the riot.” The 
problem of American cities was the problem of unemployment, poverty, the lack of sanitation and 
safety, crime, and education. “Whatever its size,” Muskie asserted, “wherever its location in this 
land of ours, the city is a problem which grows as our nation grows, a problem which belongs to 
all of us, a problem which all of us must join in solving.” It was a explicitly collective problem, as 
“we are, increasingly, a nation of urban dwellers,” with 70 percent of Americans living in 
metropolitan areas.463 
 Then Muskie delivered a description of inner cities that, despite coming from a different 
perspective, echoed that of various city residents. The two halves of contemporary cities were  
crowded, decaying, and blighted areas and the surrounding, too often formless, suburban 
sprawl. […] The more affluent members of society, who still use the city for business and 
entertainment, but who have used modern transportation to escape the problems of living 
in the city, now battle traffic problems, suffer through smog, recoil at riots in the slums and 
feel more uneasy over the dangers of urban life. Too often, for the poor, for those of modest 
means, and for the rich, our cities have become nightmares rather than dreams.464  
 
Compare this description to that of James and Grace Lee Boggs. James was a black factory worker 
who had grown up in the Jim Crow share-cropper South. He was a labor activist, Marxist, and an 
early proponent of Black Power. Grace Lee, of Chinese ancestry, was also a Marxist, and held a 
PhD in philosophy. In a co-written 1966 article published in the Monthly Review, the Boggs noted 
that in the year 1970 it was projected that African Americans would constitute the majority 
population in fifty large American cities. They then argued that the historical tendency of majority 
rule in American cities to be a means of upward mobility for immigrants to the US would not work 
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the same for African Americans, against whom racism was too “deeply imbedded in the American 
psyche from top to bottom, and from right to left.” According to the Boggs, 
the accumulated problems of the inner city will become increasingly insoluble and . . the 
city itself will remain the dangerous society, [..] rendered socially unnecessary by the 
technological revolution of automation and cybernation, policed by a growing occupation 
army that has been mobilized and empowered to resort to any means necessary to safeguard 
the interests of the absentee landlords, merchants, politicians, and administrators, to whom 
the city belongs by law but who do not belong in the city and who themselves are afraid to 
walk its streets.”465 
 
Arguing that the civil disorders of 1964 in Harlem, Philadelphia, Rochester, and New York, as 
well as Watts in 1965, were not just battles in cities but battles for cities, the Boggs pinpointed 
unemployment caused by technological change, issues around policing, and, crucially, the 
economic relationship between “landlords, merchants, politicians, and administrators” and the 
city. Those who profited from the city did not go into the city out of fear of those who lived there. 
Muskie described a similar situation, but noted that even those in the suburbs were negatively 
affected by this relationship.  
James and Grace Lee Boggs were concerned with city residents and particularly the poor 
and the black. Muskie and other supporters of Demonstration Cities were careful to keep race out 
of their comments, references to Watts and Harlem notwithstanding. Muskie was clear that he saw 
cities as a problem for all Americans, including those wealthy enough to live in traffic and smog-
filled suburbs. Moreover, Muskie insisted that “our awareness of the problems of the city is not 
new,” recalling the turn-of-the-century cities in Maine, where new looms, lights, and modes of 
transportation brought both optimism and new problems in their wake.  
                                                          
465 James and Grace Lee Boggs, “The City Is the Black Man’s Land,” Monthly Review, April 1966, reproduced in 
Stephen M. Ward, ed., Pages From a Black Radical's Notebook: A James Boggs Reader (Detroit: Wayne State 




Senator Muskie’s point was a fair reminder that the postwar urban crisis did not appear sui 
generis, but was a continuation of the concern of cities rooted in the Gilded and Progressive ages. 
Ranging from the textile towns of New England, of which Lawrence and Lowell are but two 
examples to the streets of Chicago where Jane Addams and Hull House were but an example of 
the settlement house movement, the city as a place of crime, poverty, and racialized others has 
loomed large in the American imagination for well over a century.466 Muskie’s description and 
critique of technological innovation aptly echoed fellow Maine citizen Henry David Thoreau’s 
criticisms of a century earlier: “What is the advantage of travelling at 60 miles an hour if we are 
as discontented at the end of the journey?”467  
 Listing reasons why urban renewals had not helped cities in the past, Muskie noted that a 
fundamental issue was the “vicious circle” of the “financial crisis of cities”:  
The more determined the city’s efforts to raise funds to meet the need for increased 
services, the more likely that effort drives its economically affluent citizens to the nearby 
suburbs. Similarly, the greater burden the city places on industry within its borders the less 
opportunity to attract and hold the industry and commerce its economy requires. So the 
city becomes, increasingly, the home for the economically deprived, those least able to 
bear the cost of municipal services.”  
 
This downward economic spiral formed a core dynamic of cities in crisis. Those who left cities 
were those with the means to do so. But in leaving, the cities tax revenues dropped just as a 
relatively larger number of residents required. Thus, the worst off cities were those least able to 
adequately address their problems.  
As Muskie argued, the combined forces of mixed priorities, unclear leadership and 
authority, gaps in programs, and lack of resources “all prevent us from building and rebuilding 
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cities our urban citizens deserve and all of us need.” He emphasized that the urban crisis was a 
concern for all Americans, not just those who lived in the economically-deprived inner city and he 
framed the problem as one of citizenship. Much as Doxiadis had argued that inner cities and 
suburbs were part of the same urban network, Muskie asserted that one could not flee the urban 
crisis. Cities, and those who lived in them, did not exist in a vacuum separate from other 
Americans. Because President Johnson recognized these problems, Muskie stated, the president 
convened a task force to address the problems of urban life. Through this arose the Demonstration 
Cities program.468  
 A convincing analysis of the problem of urban areas did not lead to agreement on the best 
means to solve the issues. Unsurprisingly, funding the Demonstration Cities program caused a 
fierce fight in Congress. One op-ed by Norman Miller spelled out the situation: “Almost everybody 
on Capitol Hill thinks Lyndon Johnson’s plan to rebuild slums in ‘demonstration cities’ is a great 
idea. Yet the President’s plan, his most important domestic legislative proposal, is in grave danger 
of being defeated by the Democratic dominated Congress.”469 Immediately afterward, Miller 
raised the specter of urban revolt, writing that “With mass violence erupting anew in Negro 
ghettoes across the country, Republicans and Democrats alike look to the demonstration cities 
concept as the most promising response to the slum-dwellers’ angry cries for help.”470 The issue 
was the program gave $2.3 billion to sixty-six cities over six years. One Democrat in the House 
called it “too big and too little,” with that $2.3 billion being stretched far. In fact, the bill did not 
specify a figure. It only noted that funding would be available in “such sums as may be necessary,” 
while the $2.3 billion figure was based on administration promises. City administrators, for their 
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part, had hopes that the figure might turn out to be $5 or $9 billion over the life of the program. 
Offering aid to only a handful of major cities would lead to dwindling support, hence the sixty 
cities. Mayors dreaded the requirements it took to be accepted for the program, and they feared 
that other federal funding would no longer be available if it was accepted, cancelling out any 
benefit, financially, to a given city.471  
 Yet, the Johnson Administration could not put much more into the budget with the costs 
of the Vietnam War rising. In a 1966, memo to the president, following the State of the Union 
address, Califano noted that the estimated cost per year was around one billion dollars, which was 
not included “formally in your message because of the uncertainty of the Vietnam situation,” an 
important reminder of how foreign policy intertwined with domestic policy.472 This was true even 
after the program passed, as shown by a 1967 UPI ticker tape bulletin that read “President 
Johnson’s chief liaison with state governments indicated that federal money for Model Cities 
programs may be delayed until the end of the Vietnam War.” The chief liaison was Farris Bryant, 
former governor of Florida and chair of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
responded to a question at the 21st Southern Conference of the Council of State Governments in 
Louisville, Kentucky, regarding funding for Model Cities by saying, “You tell me when Ho Chi 
Minh stops, and I’ll tell you when we start.”473 While the memory of the Johnson administration’s 
domestic policies is often unable to escape the legacy of the Vietnam War, it was also the case that 
the Great Society was, ultimately, subservient to global Cold War politics.  
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 The House subcommittee on housing considered in early June of whittling the program 
down to $12 million for “planning grants.” Vice President Humphrey and HUD Secretary Weaver 
intervened, but the proposed slashing had the unintended benefit of getting cities to unite in support 
of the original program, although demands for more funding continued. A further $600 million 
was added to the bill, but, as Housing subcommittee Chairman Barrett, a Democrat from 
Philadelphia, announced, the “addition of the extra $600 million makes it all the more likely that 
the House, fearful of approving an expensive new program that will fuel inflationary pressures, 
will reject the bill outright or drastically cut it back to provide only a small sum for planning.” As 
an US Conference of Mayor’s official noted, “no bill would be better than token planning grants 
for a program with an uncertain future.”474  
The bill contained provisions that did not garner the support of urban officials. The program 
increased the Federal housing program and government insurance, to use one example, to promote 
the development of “new towns” in rural areas. As Norman Miller bluntly phrased it, mayors saw 
this as “a major threat to their desperate efforts to retain and attract middle-class white homeowners 
so entire cities don’t turn into massive black ghettos.”475 Whiteness and middle-class status 
blended together with homeownership, whereas blackness conflated with the ghetto, but not as 
enforced segregation, but as a slum. Behind it all lurked the threat of urban revolt, the “mass 
violence erupting anew in Negro ghettos” that Miller referenced at the beginning of the op-ed. In 
the struggle over “new town” aid, Wisconsin Democratic Representative Henry Reuss, who had 
supported the bill through the House subcommittee, argued that challenged the “new town” aid 
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was “an act of apostasy,” and that he would withdraw his support for the entire bill if mayors 
challenged the compromise.476  
The key opposition to the bill came from a coalition of Republicans and Dixiecrats. “The 
bill is anathema to almost all Southern Democrats,” Miller noted, “because to qualify for 
demonstration grants cities would have to present plans for demonstration projects that would 
‘counteract the segregation of housing by race or income.’”477 Republicans, on the other hand, 
fretted over the financial aspect of the bill. Representative William Widnall of New Jersey, for 
instance, criticized the threat of inflation due to the bill and described it as “conceived in ignorance 
and based on half-truths.” Opposition also came from Democrats from rural and suburban areas 
that did not see any benefit from the bill, and which were also in unsafe districts. Many had been 
beneficiaries of anti-Goldwater sentiments in 1964, and they now faced Republican challengers.478 
A member of the House from Texas, Representative de la Garza, told HUD staffers later that fall 
that Demonstration Cities was “a northern big city bill.”479 
On Tuesday, July 26, the Senate Housing subcommittee moved to strip the bill down to a 
pilot program, with a maximum amount of $900 million attached to it. The extra $600 million 
promised to cities had been pruned down to $250 million. The administration indicated its approval 
of the bill’s movement but not the limits on funding. The senators on the subcommittee responded 
that they would resist any pressure to increase the funding. They reasoned that “it’s necessary to 
establish firm limits on demonstration cities so that Congress can order changes if the program 
isn’t working right after two years.” Even public supporters of the bill, like Senator Muskie, 
disapproved of any bill that allowed a six-year blank check. The administration was forced to 
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negotiate the demands of the Senate, House, and the US Conference of Mayors. Without the 
support of the latter, it was clear that the administration would be “in the impossible position of 
advocating a program the cities don’t want.” A two-year program would threatened just that. As 
an US Conference of Mayors official observed, cities would not undertake new projects if they 
lacked “the assurance from Congress that we’ll get the kind of money the President has 
promised.”480 The hesitancy of mayors did not go far in Congress: “If that’s really the mayors’ 
attitude,” responded a Senate Democrat who helped design the compromise, “the hell with them – 
they won’t get any bill at all.”481 
 Not all analyses in favor of the bill were necessarily concerned with the plight of inner-city 
residents. Some indeed considered the ills of the city as a contagion that needed to be prevented 
from spreading outside and quickly. “Our cities are being submerged by a rising tide of confluent 
forces – diseases and despair, joblessness and hopelessness, excessive dependency on welfare 
payments and the grim threats of crime, disorder and delinquency,” a group of seventeen 
businessmen wrote in a statement in support of Demonstration Cities. They continued, “These 
forces flow strongest for the city slums, from whence they spread relentlessly to threaten the 
quality of life in every quarter.” Representing another interpretation that understood cities and their 
surrounding areas linked together, this statement revealed that some supported the legislation out 
of self-interest.482 
 On Thursday, November 3, 1966, the bill was signed at 1:00pm, with organized labor well-
represented. Walter Reuther was present, as were other members of the UAW and the AFL-CIO, 
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including its Housing Department. One notable representative of the AFL-CIO was Jack Conway, 
who had worked as Walter Reuther’s assistant since 1946, until serving as Robert Weaver’s deputy 
administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) under President Kennedy. 483 
Members of unions representing carpenters, joiners, bricklayers, masons, electricians, and other 
building and construction trades were in attendance, which might indicate their ties to the 
Democratic Party as much as hope the rise in construction brought by the Model Cities program. 
Other unions, which did not necessarily benefit directly from the bill, also signaled their support 
by accepting the president’s invitation to attend, such as garment and clothing workers, meat 
cutters and butchers, machinists, and steelworkers. In total, 172 invitations were sent out to 
business, religious, community leaders as well as union officials. Henry Ford II and David 
Rockefeller also were included. Nonetheless, the twenty-two union officials, representing 12.7% 
of the total, formed a larger percentage of the crowd than the fourteen mayors or two corporate 
vice-presidents.484 
 The president spoke for six minutes. He commented on the Model Cities program and the 
importance of employment for the future success of American cities. “It does us no good,” Lyndon 
Johnson argued, “to give workers new skills if they are unable to find any job.” The ultimate goal 
was, he continued, to create the conditions so that “our unemployed citizens can come off the 
welfare rolls and get onto the payrolls.” Providing employment was an integral aspect of reviving 
inner cities, and Johnson presented Model Cities as the means to do so.485 
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 A month after signing the bill, Robert C. Weaver, the secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development sent a memo to Joe Califano, along with an article by William Steif from the 
Washington Daily, titled “There’s a Sleeper in the Model Cities Law.” Based largely on an 
interview with William G. Coleman, the executive director of the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, Steif argued that the Model Cities legislation was designed to further 
metropolitan governance, which had “long been the goal of city planners – and often have come 
under attack from conservatives who oppose any kind of centralized authority.” Characterizing 
repeatedly the powers granted to area-wide agencies in the Model Cities legislation as a “sleeper 
provision,” the article reported that the metropolitan-wide agencies would be able to overview the 
actions and decision of local governments.486 It immediately qualified this statement with Coleman 
noting that there would be no power of veto. Nonetheless they would have a “surprising amount 
of impact.” Municipal arenas affected could be “open-space land, hospitals, airports, libraries, 
water works, sewage works, highways, transportation facilities and water development and land 
conservation.” Thus, Coleman concluded, “cities, towns, sanitation districts, school districts” and 
other municipal units would have to start working together.487  
Sending the article to Califano, Weaver asserted that Coleman, “seems to have a built-in 
problem with the Demonstration Cities program.” This was not the first time that Coleman had 
made public statements intended to stir up problems for the bill. When the bill was first introduced, 
he had written “an extremely critical analysis of the proposal” independent of the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. That analysis was then used by opponents of the bill. 
Weaver was concerned that Coleman was now trying to associate Model Cities with the idea of a 
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“metropolitan government,” a criticism that also was launched by Congressman Fino. Further, 
Weaver found “little validity in fact and only peripheral support in the language of the statute” and 
its legislative history to support such an interpretation. Regardless, Weaver could only recommend 
the White House ignore Coleman. “To make an issue of this would,” Weaver concluded, “build it 
up into an issue which is far greater than its importance.”488 
 Even as Weaver dismissed the importance of Coleman’s opposition, it revealed the mindset 
of Model Cities opponents on the Hill. The fear, fundamentally and unsurprisingly, was that local 
governance would be subsumed by increasing scales of government, resulting in diminishing 
control over local affairs. The irony resided in that this would only happen if a metropolitan area 
desired to received federal funding as delineated in the Model Cities program and not in any direct 
way, as a metro agency would not have any veto, or otherwise formal power, over the plans of 
local governments. It was rooted in a distrust of a perceived Faustian bargain, a slow erosion of 
local control bought with the promise of increasing amounts of federal funding and, consequently, 
increasing federal control. There were those who reached this position from a disregard for cities 
and their residents, but there were also those who loved cities and their residents who reached 
similar conclusions. Urban renewal alone had cost cities and their citizens much in the name of 
expertise and rational planning. It is important to keep in mind the different reasoning undergirding 
similar conclusions regarding policy and legislation.  
Federal Metro Governments 
 A small yet vocal opposition to Model Cities arose regarding the belief that the federal 
government, and HUD in particular, would take over local governments and render local and state 
levels of governance unnecessary. The reasoning that led members of Congress to this conclusion, 
                                                          




however, were not uniform, and the emphasis ranged from budget deficits to both pro- and anti- 
civil rights sentiments. Minority views of the House Committee on Banking and Currency 
accompanying the Demonstration Cities bill are a case in point. “If passed,” the fourteen-page 
dissent asserted, 
it will still give away much of the national legislative controls belonging to the Congress 
and also those local controls which belong to the communities of the Nation. It will use the 
power of the Federal purse to first stultify the local knowledge essential to the working of 
a much needed demonstration city program, and, second, to ratify the mistakes, faulty 
planning, and misleading promises of the Department which has insisted on its proposals 
in the face of their manifest impossibilities. 
 
 However, the authors were quick to state that they did not disagree with the ideas 
motivating the bill: “the minority endorses the concept of demonstration cities, its breadth, and its 
sweep as revealed in the findings and declaration of purpose.” It was the means, rather than the 
ends, which raised questions for them. The federal government, according to these critics, was 
using the lure of funds to garner support for a poorly thought-out program which required local 
government to give up power that were right theirs.489  
 Of the critics, eight authors, all of whom were Republican, submitted additional responses 
that further distinguished their concerns from one another and the general objection to the program 
they presented as a group. It was a fairly diverse group, outside of their shared objection and party 
affiliation. Paul A. Fino, “a dapper cigar-smoking man with a carefully trimmed mustache,” was 
a moderate Republican representing an Italian and Irish working-class district in the Bronx. He 
opposed school busing and the war on poverty, but he also supported Medicare and called for 
increasing Social Security.490 Florence P. Dwyer, a congresswoman from New Jersey, opposed the 
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bill and later helped bring the Equal Rights Amendment to the House floor in 1970.491 William 
“Bill” E. Brock was a vice-president for a candy company before serving in the House, later the 
Senate, and finally as Secretary of Labor under Ronald Reagan.492 Burt L. Talcott, a congressman 
from California, was a journeyman carpenter, and German prisoner-of-war during World War II, 
before becoming a lawyer.493 Delwin “Del” Morgan Clawson was elected to Congress after serving 
as mayor of Compton, California.494 Albert W. Johnson came to the House from Pennsylvania.495 
John William Stanton, a moderate Republican from Ohio, served in Congress from 1965 until 
1983, when he became a counselor to the president of the World Bank.496 Chester L. Mize, a 
businessman who also owned cattle and agricultural interests, represented Kansas.497  
 Together, these eight members of the House wrote that Demonstration Cities would not be 
“worth the havoc that would be caused by a program conceived in wishful thinking, based on half 
truths, and executed with more pride than skill.”498 The authors worried that HUD was leading 
cities and towns to think that they would get funding through the program, when realistically only 
a handful could possibly be funded. The program, then, was creating unrealistic expectations that 
would end in either disappointment or, worse, failure. The only other option would be an 
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uncontrollable flow of funding that was not voted on or approved by Congress. “The myriad 
problems confronting our cities desperately need to be solved,” the minority report argued, “To do 
so well will require the best in engineering and economic thinking – not the juggled arithmetic put 
forward by the Department as its panacea.”499 That juggled arithmetic promised Federal funds “to 
every nook and cranny” of the country, and the authors found neither sense nor honesty in those 
promises. Of particular ire was a provision that would increase the percentage of federal aid to a 
local project if additional HUD criteria were met, found under Title II – Planned Metropolitan 
Development. 
 The minority view encompassed more than the expected criticisms regarding federal 
budgets and expenditures, and the report soon moved from budget concerns to more abstract fears 
about unspecified planners and experts. Model Cities raised “once again” a situation involving 
“ivory-tower specialists” who were “secure and isolated in their cloistered retreats.” They “read 
the latest news dispatches on violent demonstrations, and too hastily produced a solution – ideal 
in concept – but short on practicality and void of impact intelligence.”500 In addition to impractical 
specialists, the report raised the specter of urban riots as a synecdoche of the urban crisis, repeating 
the linguistic link between “demonstrations,” casually associating riots with marches and picket 
lines.  
 What is it that these secluded and isolated experts proposed, concerned as they were with 
riots and full of faulty plans and inadequate solutions? The federal government’s continuing 
“intrusion into community life which it obviously hopes to expand,” via the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.501 If passed, Demonstration Cities, they argued, would create a 
                                                          
499 Minority Views, p. 136, Box 2, Folder 6, MC. 
500 Minority Views, p. 136-137, Box 2, Folder 6, MC. 




system of government in which “HUD officials from the Secretary on down, with billions of 
dollars at their disposal, will have more power over urban and suburban life than any mayor or 
Governor in the country.”502 Perhaps alarmist, but fears of federal usurpation of local and state-
level powers, along with concerns over federal spending, have been bread-and-butter American 
politics. The fear that the federal government was seeking via Demonstration Cities to not only 
meddle in urban affairs but, even more significantly attempt to control suburban communities. 
This fear was rooted in the belief that the federal government would not help cities at all; rather, it 
would reduce suburban communities to the condition plaguing central cities. The fear, as it were, 
was that a sinking tide would lower all boats. 
 The mechanism for this harm to suburban communities was to be, according to the minority 
report, was what it referred to as Federal-metro government. Just as the authors explained that they 
were not opposed to the ultimate goals of Demonstrations Cities, so they wrote that they agreed 
that “the welfare of the Nation and of its people is directly dependent upon the sound and orderly 
development and the effective organization and functioning of the metropolitan areas in which 
two-thirds of its people live and work.”503 The authors acknowledged that metropolitan areas were 
rapidly expanding, and required updated plans and programs to address that growth. The authors 
conceded that the nature of this rapid growth and the complicated overlapping of governance in 
metropolitan areas was a hindrance to effective government and wasteful. Using President 
Johnson’s own words, they noted that government could be “blind to the reality of urban life.” 
They further echoed with LBJ’s statement that “What happens in the central city, or the suburbs, 
is certain to affect the quality of life in the other.”504 
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 Yet, having agreed to all the above, the authors found themselves incapable of supporting 
Title II of Demonstration Cities, in which metropolitan cooperation is addressed. It would, as the 
authors titled a subsection of their report, create a “new level of government”: 
The proposed metro development title of this bill would serve to divide the country into 
new Federal community development districts – a new administrative or political unit that 
would look to the Federal Government rather than the States, cities, or other localities for 
guidance. Title II would place the shadow of HUD over every metropolitan area in our 
country. Virtually every local governmental division of any magnitude, in areas accepting 
supplemental Federal aid, would be subject to review by the Secretary of HUD. This, more 
than any other proposal ever to come before our committee, drastically would reshape our 
Federal form of government.505 
 
Proper attention, the authors worried, had not been paid attention to this aspect of the 
Demonstration Cities legislation, as the potential good that federal aid could provide had 
dominated the conversation. With that aid came, however, came significant strings. As far as the 
authors were concerned, the mastermind behind those strings was HUD Secretary Robert C. 
Weaver, the first African American to hold a Cabinet-level position. 
 Opposition to HUD Secretary Weaver did not originate under Johnson’s presidency, but 
earlier under the Kennedy administration, when he was appointed administrator of the Housing 
and Home Finance Agency (HHFA).506 An economist educated at Harvard, with two books to his 
name (Negro Labor (1946) and The Negro Ghetto (1948)), Weaver had worked in the Public 
Works Administration, the United States Housing Authority, the War Manpower Commission, 
and the War Production Board. At the time of his appointment, he was the vice-chairman of the 
New York City Housing and Redevelopment Board as well as the chairman of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. An advocate for integration who supported 
public housing and regional planning, Weaver garnered opposition for his allegedly leftist politics 
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and certainly for his pro-civil-rights stance. During his 1961 Senate confirmation hearings, A. 
Willis Robertson (Democrat, Virginia) raised questions about Weaver’s involvement with 
Communist groups during the 1930s. William Blakely (Democrat, Texas), noted that Weaver’s 
books had received positive reviews in left-wing publications. President Kennedy had to submit a 
letter affirming Weaver’s loyalty before witnesses could give testimony. After a congressional 
fight in early 1962 left Kennedy without his desired cabinet-level position on urban affairs - widely 
believed to be Weaver’s once created – Kennedy declared his intention of creating the new cabinet 
position and that it would, indeed, go to Weaver. “They’re [Republicans and Dixiecrats] against it 
because Weaver’s a Negro,” the president complained in private, “and I’d like to see them say 
it.”507 
 “Secretary Weaver,” the 1966 minority report continued, “and his successors would have 
substantial control over local metropolitanwide location, financing, and scheduling of any public 
facility projects that have areawide impact.”508 It would mean, in effect, that Weaver “could 
impose his judgment” over parking facilities, traffic control equipment, municipal buildings, 
recreation parks, “and even local public school facilities.”509 As the authors emphasized how 
Demonstration Cities might affect suburbs as well as cities, so they emphasized that even local 
schools could come under the purview of the HUD secretary, only twelve years after Brown v. 
Board of Education ordered their desegregation. Fears of federal influence was rooted in fears of 
enforcing integration. 
 Any local project would have to meet “the criteria established by the Secretary.” The report 
continued, “if this language doesn’t embrace practically every normal function of local 
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government, we don’t know what does.”510 The authors paused to acknowledge that, in hearings, 
Weaver had “denied that title II of the bill is aimed at creating metro governments throughout our 
country.” They were not prepared to take his word as the bill and HUD clearly sought to 
“encourage” metropolitan plans and programs for “coordinating” local development, and “if this 
isn’t the clearest definition of what constitutes the ultimate in metro government, we wish the 
Secretary would tell us what is.” Not only were the federal government, and Weaver, 
untrustworthy, but even words like encourage  and coordinating were given sinister 
interpretations.511  
 The language the authors used make it clear that they simply did not trust the motives of 
HUD or its secretary, and it is difficult to untangle their arguments about the bill from the man 
who would have authority over the program, as they often refer to Weaver personally. Consider 
their criticism of Section 205 of the bill, in which it is stated that the HUD Secretary would 
determine the awarding of grants based on evidence that a local project meets the requirements of 
a previous section. One criterium mentioned is “the establishment and consistent administration 
of zoning codes, subdivision regulations, and similar land-use and density controls.” For the 
authors, this raised significant questions, especially whether only communities who followed the 
view of federal planners on matters that were largely related to housing, such as “zoning codes, 
subdivision regulations, and similar land-use and density controls.” The question, the authors 
asserted, answered itself.512 Those who feared metropolitan governance because of the dominance 
of central cities, feared to be at the expense of suburbs, would “wake up and find their fears were 
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misplaced. Under the Federal-Metro concept, all true power will reside not with the city, but with 
the Secretary of HUD.”513 
While the authors took the clarity of their argument for granted, their suspicions over the 
meaning and general usage of the word “consistent” spoke to a broader distrust towards the bill 
and HUD. While they hinted at their distrust of Weaver specifically, they also assured the reader 
later in the report that “We will not assert our displeasure with Title II with the hackneyed warning 
that these are powers that might be entrusted to Secretary Weaver, but not to his future successors 
in office. On the contrary, we will be bold enough to say that they should not be entrusted to any 
Secretary of HUD, including the incumbent.”514 It was also clear that, even with fears of large 
social expenditures and federal usurpation of local governance, there was more going on than these 
arguments as evidenced by the authors’ preoccupations with suburbs and schools, the sites of 
significant anti-integration sentiments.  
The minority report then quoted Secretary Weaver providing the obvious rebuttal to these 
fears: no one had to accept or even ask for federal funding via the Demonstration Cities program, 
and therefore would not have to meet any of the criteria laid out in the bill. Even here the authors 
accused Weaver of an “old tried and true carrot-and-stick approach,” in which the HUD Secretary 
punished those who did not want to participate in the program by not including. Doing so, the 
authors argued, meant that grants would not be based on local need, but rather upon “fealty” to 
HUD.515 Later, the authors returned to this point, writing that they anticipated the argument that 
“if local communities don’t want to comply, they don’t have to ask for the supplementary Federal 
grants.” As far as the authors were concerned, it simply meant that “rewards for compliance” 
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would become “penalties for noncompliance.” They emphasized by repeating, “Incentives of 
today will become the penalties of tomorrow. Today’s incentives will be tomorrow’s penalties.” 
The authors then ominously concluded that, when local communities are penalized for not 
complying with the Federal-metro standards, “the die will have been cast.”516  
As an alternative, the authors called for a “reasonable solution,” as they, once again, 
stressed that something had to be done about cities and metropolitan planning.  The authors 
recommended S. 561, from the previous year, a bill in which grant-in-aids required areawide or 
regional planning as a prerequisite, but which “would rely on commonsense and good will to 
persuade local governing bodies to accept planning decisions; it would not be mandatory.”517 The 
main difference, it seems, was that local bodies could choose not to accept the resulting regional 
planning in the earlier bill while still accepting the funding. Under Demonstration Cities, if the 
funding was accepted, so were the planning decisions. Moreover, the alternative bill left planning 
at the local and state levels. Title II of the Model Cities bill meant that “such metropolitanwide 
plans would be under the thumb of the Secretary of HUD, leading inevitably to the creation of 
Federal-Metro government throughout our Nation.”518 
The minority view report was the creation of a range of dissenting voices and the arguments 
for not supporting Demonstration Cities varied. While all those who signed the report had to, to 
some degree, support the argument therein, their individual opinions, included as addenda, made 
clear that their emphases were different. One of the final sections, entitled “You Can Fight City 
Hall,” worried about how local communities could fight decisions made through the program. 
Where could one protest a zoning decision or the placement of a highway? “Certainly not to their 
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local town council or to their mayor – or their Representative in Congress,” the report answered.519  
Here, fears over local control lost their partisan-flavor, as this was a trans-partisan complaint over 
urban renewal, whether it was Robert Moses in New York City or the destruction of Detroit’s 
black neighborhoods for the construction of urban highways.520 This is a theme that Florence P. 
Dwyer in particular took up in her statement, and one to which we will return shortly.  
The group report concluded by insisting that “all of this should alarm any community 
wishing to preserve its independence.” Then, somewhat contradictory, the authors argued that the 
program as outlined could not address the problems of cities as they were because “to do the job 
as it should be done, we need planning not so much on the local level as we do on the national 
level.” By national planning, the authors must have meant something that was not HUD, to which 
along with Model Cities they concluded by calling “economic coercion.”521  
 Other minority views were not always in the same vein. William B. Widnall, a 
congressman from New Jersey, did not sign off on the group report, but submitted his own 
supplemental response. In it, he criticized urban renewal as having been used to benefit property 
developers at the expense of middle- and low-income housing. In fact, he connected the abuses of 
urban renewal directly to the urban upheavals of the mid- to late 1960s. Widnall lamented that 
attempts to reform urban renewal had been met with the response that it had to stay “flexible.” 
“Flexibility for what?” Widnall queried. “Do they mean the kind of flexibility that has constructed 
luxury high rise apartments and promoted commercial downtown renewal at the expense of the 
low- and moderate-income citizens left behind in the ghettoes? Do they mean the kind of flexibility 
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that has fostered the explosive situations in city after city that we face this summer?”522 The 
country did not need to take six years, Widnall argued, to demonstrate that thousands of cities 
needed better housing for low- and moderate-income residents. “Let them restrict urban renewal 
grants to those cities who are interested in housing the poor instead of accommodating the rich,” 
Widnall continued. “Had we kept our urban renewal program on the right track all these years, 
possibly millions of our citizens of all races and backgrounds would not be living in fear of their 
very lives and properties this summer.”523 
 Paul A. Fino, who represented working-class white ethnics in the Bronx, had the most 
explicit objections to Demonstration Cities. Likely, he was where the concerns over suburbs and 
schools originated in the group report. He began by defending his urban bona fides, writing that 
“when I oppose this bill, I oppose it as a Representative from a 100 percent urban New York City 
constituency.” He then immediately argued that the bill would give Secretary Weaver “dictatorial 
powers over city living patterns.”524 Under a section entitled “Threat to Neighborhood Schools,” 
Fino wrote that his “people know what Dr. Weaver wants this control for.” The answer was for 
“so-called ‘open occupancy’” and to give the US Education Commissioner Howe “the tools to 
undermine the neighborhood school in the name of ‘racial balance.’” Despite having “heard a lot 
of talk about the need to head off the ‘explosion’ of the ghettoes,” Fino argued that Demonstration 
Cities was “obvious demagoguery.” “All this bill is really designed to do,” Fino informed his 
readers, “is force Federal control on our cities: to make them accept Federal social criteria straight 
from the backroom social planners down at HUD or the Office of Education.” For Fino, Model 
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Cities was not about helping cities at all. Rather, it was a legislative trick through which the federal 
government could enforce social planning, by which Fino meant integration.525 
 Fino then accused President Johnson of wanting “control, pure and simple,” The bill was 
designed to “give him massive powers over our cities.” Obscurely, Fino connected this with “the 
string of Asian ‘brush-fire’ wars the President expects to fight because of Asian ‘poverty’.” If 
nothing else, his response suggested that Fino was not only suspicious of the motivations of 
Secretary Weaver and HUD but of the entire Johnson administration. Fino then quoted James J. 
Kilpatrick, the conservative opinion writer, describing the bill as a “trojan horse.” If people knew 
what was in the bill, they would “hang its sponsors.” Fino conceded that the language was a bit 
extreme, but that did not stop him from placing in the Congressional Record the view that those 
sponsoring a bill that he objected to, because he accused it of facilitating a dictatorial desire for 
racial balance, should be hung.526 
 Fino broke down his objections further. Demostration Cities was an “economic pistol to 
the heads of our cities – all in the name of social coercion.” The coercion was to force “conformity 
and compliance” to criteria that included busing school children in order to achieve school 
integration and housing policies that sought “economic integration.” Pointedly, Fino characterized 
those seeking busing as “ridicul[ing] the suburban way of life.” He quoted the US Commissioner 
of Education as saying “that he intends to take aim on those ‘fortunate white families who flee to 
the suburbs to escape integrated schools.’” Without a hint or recognition of irony, Fino asserted 
that “such racism is a stain on the Federal Government” and that the Commissioner sought to 
violate the 1966 Civil Rights Act.527  
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 In addition to his fears of “racial balance” in neighborhood schools, Fino was concerned 
about “economic integration” in terms of housing. The bill would give “the Secretary power to 
force” housing with rent assistance “in neighborhoods where they don’t want it.” The congressman 
feared that “Dr. Weaver can draw up local ‘civil rights’ laws” under the provisions of the bill, 
which would impact both suburban housing and schools. He concluded that “this program is not 
aimed at meeting the needs of the tense ghettoes – that is only propaganda. Nowhere in the bill is 
there a section giving precedence in ‘demonstration city’ grants to high-tension neighborhoods 
suffering the most extreme socioeconomic pressure [….] The administration wants to play with 
other neighborhoods where it can implement Dr. Howe’s school ideas and Dr. Weaver’s rent 
supplement economic integration ideas.”528 
 Finally, Fino returned to the impending “metrogovernment,” his preferred term for what 
the bill calls a “Federal review board.” If local communities do not agree to “hand away their 
sovereignty,” then Fino considered it likely that requests for federal funding would be rejected. 
Thus, “He [Secretary Weaver] can make airport grants hostages for areawide school districting 
mixing slum children with suburban children in schools paid for by high taxing of the suburbs.” 
Referring to a July 3 Washington Post article to support his suspicions, he asserted that the Johnson 
administration wanted to use the federal government to “provide the lever for Negroes to crack the 
suburbs.” “Suburbs would be asked to build scattered low-income housing and work out areawide 
plans for school integration.”529 Not mentioned by Fino is that this was the plan supported at the 
National Mayors Conference in Dallas a month earlier. He then concluded by once again 
mentioning Secretary Weaver and Commissioner Howe, saying that the US needed a plan that did 
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not put them “in the saddle in every courthouse and at the head of the table at every town meeting 
or board of education meeting the America.”530 
 Bill Brock, the previous business vice-president and later Secretary of Labor, reaffirmed 
the group report in his statement, emphasizing that “it becomes patently clear that the motivation 
of this bill is founded upon a basic lack of faith in local government and represents solely a stronger 
device to control it.” Brock attacked the entire premise of the bill, including the idea that cities 
were in trouble, as being anti-local governance. “Do you honestly believe that all local and State 
officials of these United States are either inefficient, incompetent, or corrupt?” Brock implored his 
Congressional colleagues. “Do you honestly believe that they don’t care, that they are not doing 
the best possible job with the resources available for the people in their area?” If cities were indeed 
in trouble, Brock concluded, it was likely only because of excessive taxation on the part of 
Washington, and therefore further funding, such as Demonstration Cities, would only worsen their 
problems.531  
 The crux of Brock’s argument was that federal aid had become too complicated. The Model 
Cities program streamlined the grant-writing process, so that a local project could apply once to 
the program in order to access all the disparate federal aid programs and agencies available. 
Brock’s conclusion was that cities “cannot effectively utilize many of these programs” and that 
perhaps it was “time to pause and reevaluate our past efforts.” Employing even more rhetorical 
questions, Brock continued:  
When the bill takes four pages just to list those areas in which national controls and 
standards must be substituted for local judgment and initiative, doesn’t this ring a small 
bell? If our local communities are unable or unwilling to establish reasonable criteria, as 
this language implies, then perhaps we had best reexamine the root structure of America. 
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Thus Brock moved from the logistics of the Demonstration City legislation to the entire structure 
of American governance. He wondered whether “we will cease to earn the title of a great, or even 
a free, society.” Given that LBJ’s social programs were titled collectively The Great Society, 
Brock’s choice of words was no accident.532  
 Burt L. Talcott submitted his individual views, which echoe those of Bill Brock, but his ire 
was directed more to Title IV, “Land Development and New Communities,” an amendment to the 
National Housing Act. The amendment addressed small matters of mortgage insurance and sewage 
infrastructure. Somewhat oddly, Congressman Talcott took the opportunity to lambast “federal 
suburbs” and “government towns.”  They were, Talcott wrote, “the most devastating encroachment 
by the Federal central bureaucracy upon the functions of local government, private enterprise, and 
individual freedom yet concocted by the Federal planners.” Far from being “a lesson in 
democracy,” they were rather “benevolent dictatorships.” Strangely, Talcott described the 
proposed communities as “artificial.” He was dismayed that “for the first time we are going to 
have our people told where to live and under what conditions.”533 
 In contrast Paul Fino were the views of Seymour Halpern, a Republican representative 
from Queens who was, as his New York Times obituary phrased it, “distinctly liberal.”534 The 
broadness of the Model Cities program was, Halpern acknowledged, concerning, but “I feel the 
seriousness of the urban ills which plague our cites warrants consideration of the massive programs 
outlined in this critical legislation.” So while he held reservations, Halpern also considered it 
doubtful that the federal government would seek to limit local governments. He asserted that “the 
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local voice, I am certain, will be heard.” Taking up the concept of metropolitan planning directly, 
Halpern argued that it would make the process “more immediate, more effective, and more 
efficient.” Indeed, “the metropolitan planning title will serve to decentralize and speed 
administration of the federally aided urban projects.”535 
 The additional views of Florence Dwyer were of note as she seemed to follow what one 
could term the Jane Jacobs’ view of urban renewal: namely, that local control is vital. The 
reasoning was not the coded racial and class prejudice apparent in Paul Fino’s arguments. As far 
as Jane Jacobs was concerned, one of the clearest signs of a healthy city was racial and economic 
integration. The problem was, instead, that large-scale projects, even by the most well-intentioned 
planners, tended to harm neighborhoods, especially those that could not defend themselves. These 
were the neighborhoods where those without social, economic, or political power lived. Based on 
her individual report on Demonstration Cities, Representative Dwyer shared a similar point-of-
view. 
 Dwyer began her report by saying that the weaknesses of the bill were discussed in the 
minority report, “with which I generally concur.” She repeated its concerns over the vagueness of 
the language and argued that the problems of cities were so important and urgent that it was worth 
doing well. In her estimation, the Demonstration Cities legislation was not good enough. It opened 
a flood of money that would be under the control and discretion of the HUD secretary, meaning 
that city planning and development would be largely under the direction of one individual. She 
was not, she continued, anti-urban-renewal, but specified that it can be done well and it can be 
done poorly. She saw local control as the issue. “All too often,” she argued, “the people of a 
community have been the missing ingredient in urban renewal.” Despite the clear interest that local 
                                                          





residents and citizens have in being part of the planning process, Dwyer noted, too often 
development agencies sought to discourage citizen interest and participation. The consequences 
have been profound, and not necessarily positive:  
To many who have experienced it, urban renewal has not been an unmixed blessing. And 
the lower down the income scale these people have been the more they have been hurt. 
[…] The record is discouragingly full of documented reports of hardship, dislocation, 
disruption, higher rents, vacant land, Negro removal, new slums, the unnecessary 
destruction of viable neighborhoods, and a host of other ills resulting directly from badly 
planned and mishandled projects.536  
 
The contrast with Fino’s response is striking. Whereas Fino feared how urban renewal as pursued 
by Demonstration Cities might unfairly affect anyone who did not live in a slum, Dwyer 
recognized that urban renewal projects often harmed those who do live in economically distressed 
urban areas. Thus she recommended that all urban renewal projects be voted on as a referendum 
in communities of 150,000 or less – an amendment that failed to receive support. Where Dwyer 
and other writers of the group report, including Fino, agreed is that they saw a general lack of trust 
of “the people”.537  
Conclusion 
 The opposition to the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966 did not succeed 
in defeating the bill, although it made it a tight race. The 89th Congress passed the bill, but not 
before trimming it severely. The original concept had aid targeting only six cities: Washington, 
Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Houston, and Los Angeles. Perhaps if aid had flown to only those 
six cities, the bill could have lived up to its intention to demonstrate what a city could accomplish 
via a coordinated array of services and aids from the federal government. When the bill passed, 
the number had grown elevenfold, to 66 cities. As the New York Times diagnosed, after the number 
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of beneficiaries grew well into the double-digits, “Eventually the money was shoveled around only 
a half-inch deep anywhere. The program was destined to fail.”538 As the architect of the Model 
Cities program, Charles Haar, wrote in his memoirs, “No legislation, despite its merits, is assured 
without votes, and to acquire them for Model Cities President Johnson knew he needed to add 
more cities as potential recipients.” Not only were the funds diluted via the growing number of 
cities included, but the sums requested were enormous. Mayor John Lindsay of New York City 
alone asked for $50 billion, noting that the city would likely need more. Detroit asked for $15 
billion, even as Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh argued that $250 billion would be required to adequately 
address the urban crisis in the United States. “Slowly, the original idea was expanded further, 
diluting the effectiveness of federal funds,” Haar observed, “. . . intended by Reuther’s original 
letter to the President.”539 
 While lower than the sums mentioned in the previous paragraph, the surviving bill, which 
had originally asked for $2.3 billion, still allocated $900 million to cities to help develop and 
implement plans for revitalization. The sixty-six cities that benefited were broken down into six 
large cities (over 500,000), ten medium cities (250,000 to 500,000), and fifty small cities (less than 
250,000), and called for full citizen participation. It was, urban historian Roger Biles commented, 
“arguably his [Johnson’s] most arduous struggle with the Eighty-ninth Congress.”540  
One of the core lessons of the Civil Rights Movement in the history of the United States is 
the tension within local and national control. Just as states’ rights had been used since before the 
Civil War to justify the institution of slavery and, following the Civil War, to decry the tyranny of 
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Abraham Lincoln and the federal government, so the argument of states’ rights had been used 
since the Civil War to defend local race codes, segregation, discrimination, and Jim Crow 
practices. It was the argument used in Little Rock, Arkansas, when the Supreme Court’s ruling 
was disregarded. It was to a greater extent used even when federal troops were sent in to enforce 
desegregation. It was used in the Deep South when it came to the disfranchisement of African 
American voters and desegregation of public facilities, especially when Kennedy and then Johnson 
gave their support to the civil rights movement. 
 Thus, in 1966, when these views of those who opposed the Demonstration Cities bill 
deployed the language of local governance versus federal control, it was hard to ignore the 
prevalent contemporary use of that language to defend racial prejudice and discrimination. The 
explicit references to school busing and integrated suburbs only served to reinforce this 
interpretation. While it was possible that the authors of these dissenting views did not consciously 
echo these racialized arguments, it is impossible to imagine that the Johnson administration did 
not interpret them in just that light. If some of the opponents to the Model Cities program were 
rooted in racial and class biases, however, the next chapter will explore the ways that the Model 











CHAPTER 6 THE URBAN IMAGINARY OF THE GREAT SOCIETY, 1967-1968 
 
How strange that Lyndon Johnson, so homespun and regional – the unabashed son of rural Texas 
– could become the nation’s advocate for the old and decaying central cities. 
Charles M. Haar541 
 
 The political fight over Model Cities recounted in the previous chapter was contentious 
and revealed deep fault lines between liberal and conservative understandings of racial and class 
geography in American cities. It was not just the opponents of the legislation, however, who 
worked with flawed racial and class assumptions. The Model City legislation itself, while well-
meaning, misunderstood racial and class divisions in urban spaces, and as a consequence it 
inadequately addressed urban conflict. By examining the ways that key members of the Johnson 
administration understood urban challenges and conceived of solutions, this chapter explores the 
place that the urban crisis occupied in the though of federal policy makers in the Great Society.  
 This chapter represents the far distance from the first chapters of this study, metaphorically 
as well as more literally. The discussion of how federal policy makers thought of the problems of 
black and working-class city residents is the complement to the earlier chapters that focus on how 
some of those problems manifested in metropolitan Detroit. As the chapters have moved up 
geographic scales – from communities to the greater metropolitan region to the federal level – so 
too have urban issues become more abstract and generic. Federal policy makers rooted their 
discussions in data and observations, including observational trips to distressed urban areas. In 
addition to first-hand observation, however, federal policy makers filtered their empirical research 
through their own racial and class biases. When it came to, say, treatments of the civil disorders 
and black anger in the late 1960s, one could imagine that some authors of reports or speeches wrote 
not out of their own biases but in order to accommodate those of their audiences. Yet, still, these 
                                                          




treatments of cities and the response by the Model Cities program reveal how members of the 
Great Society thought about and understood the urban crisis.  
 Four Johnson administration texts form the main focus of this chapter. Beginning with a 
speech by Lyndon Johnson, the chapter will address how the president approached the war on 
poverty and the Great Society. Then, the urban vision and imagination of the architect of the Model 
Cities program, Charles Haar, will be described. In his secret memo to the president, Haar 
described four possible futures for American cities that were used to guide policy decisions 
regarding urban questions. Third, a 1968 Center for Community Planning (housed in the US 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) booklet, A City for Man, sought to explain the 
Model Cities program to its readers. Finally, the chapter will conclude with two speeches delivered 
by the Assistant Secretary for Model Cities, H. Ralph Taylor, who tried to explain what citizen 
participation was and what it was not.  
 Taken together, this different administration perspectives on Model Cities specifically and 
urban affairs broadly help reveal the thinking of those directing the Great Society. All sought to 
improve the quality of life for urban residents as they did for all Americans. However, their 
understandings of the lived experiences within cities could be limited, their treatment of serious 
urban problems could be amiss, and their treatment of city residents could be patronizing. It is this 
distance between what the Great Society aimed for – and the aim was high – and what 
administration members failed to see that helps illuminate what urban thinking in the twilight of 
mid-century liberalism got right, and where it went astray.  
American’s Unfinished Business: Urban and Rural Poverty, 1967 
 That the Johnson presidency understood the Model Cities program to be part and parcel of 




Johnson’s March 14, 1967, address to congress, “Message on America’s Unfinished Business: 
Urban and Rural Poverty.” Johnson began by quoting Jacob Riis, whose 1890 book of 
photojournalism How the Other Half Lives continues to be a classic of anti-poverty literature unto 
today.542 “The slum is as old as civilization,” Riis wrote in 1902, and those who lost the race of 
civilization gave up hope and ambition, until “they are the victims, not the masters of their 
environment; and it is a bad master.” Riis’ words were not only applicable to the United States in 
1902, Johnson continued, but to the US in the 1960s as well. 543  
 “The basic conditions of life for the poor must, and can,” the president argued, “be 
changed.” Social security, public assistance programs, and fair labor standards all contributed to 
Johnson’s “total strategy against poverty,” and he encouraged adding additional measures in 
education, health, jobs and job training, housing, public assistance, transportation, recreation, and 
clean air and water. It was no coincidence that Johnson originally referred to New Deal measures. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a political hero, and LBJ consciously positioned himself as FDR’s 
heir.544 These measures, Johnson stated, were not mere handouts. Those who would benefit from 
the proposed programs against poverty were “capable of helping themselves if given an 
opportunity to do so.” For Johnson, it was the opportunity to improve one’s position that 
counted.545  
 Yet, the more that was done to address poverty in the United States, the more the size of 
the problem became apparent. Gains had been made, the president observed, “but we have also 
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come to see how profound are the problems that confront us, how deeply ingrained are the customs 
and practices that must be changed, how stubbornly the heritage of poverty persists from 
generation to generation.” Warning his hearers not to give into pessimism, Johnson instead 
encouraged his listeners to embrace “a sober determination to carry through.” At the same time, 
Johnson recognized and acknowledged the controversy caused by his Great Society programs. He 
considered it inevitable, as he was proposing a “fundamental change” to how the federal 
government responded to poverty. Waiting, however, was not an option for the president. Change 
was required immediately, not in some vague future. “America had to pull the drowning man out 
of the water,” as far as Johnson was concerned, “and talk about it later.”546 
 In addition to being a powerful rhetorical moment, Johnson’s analogy summed him his 
approach to his administration overall. On one hand, the Johnson administration would keep 
avoiding program details, and occasionally leave in ambiguous or even contradictory language, in 
order to help the passage of bills through Congress. “The attitude of the president,” LBJ 
administration insider Charles Haar recalled, “was simply to pass a bill through first and worry 
about the details of implementation later.” On the other hand, Johnson encouraged taskforces to 
develop experimental solutions and programs. This strategy allowed for flexibility and creativity, 
but it also meant that mistakes and errors would be made. Johnson recognized this, and accepted 
it as the cost of trying to push the federal government in a new direction.547 
Describing the Indescribable  
 The future of American cities in the late 60s, while unknown, was not unforeseen. For the 
Great Society, one vision came from Harvard Law professor and architect of the Model Cities 
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program, Charles M. Haar. He was a significant advisor to Lyndon Johnson and his administration. 
In August of 1967, he wrote a confidential memo to Johnson in which he described the likely 
futures of American cities. The memo was intended to sketch the results of different policy 
decisions, with the aim of guiding Great Society decision on urban affairs. “President Johnson,” 
Haar recalled in his memoir, “considered each of these possibility during intense discussion with 
his advisers.” Thus, it provides a window into the thinking of key Johnson advisor on urban affairs; 
that it was taken seriously by LBJ and other advisors only underscores that these scenarios found 
resonance among policy makers in the Great Society.548 
 Born in Antwerp, Belgium, in 1920, Haar and his family immigrated to the United States 
when he was six months old. After serving the Pacific theater during the Second World War, he 
received his law degree from Harvard in 1948. He joined the faculty in 1952 and remained until 
1991. At Harvard in the 1950s, Haar was at the head of the newly-emerging field of land-use law. 
In 1958 he wrote Land-Use Planning: A Casebook on the Use, Misuse and Re-Use of Urban Land, 
an influential text. He advised John F. Kennedy on urban planning and policy during his campaign, 
and he helped LBJ craft Great Society programs. Haar also served a chair of LBJ’s National Task 
Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty in 1964, a position that led  him organizing the first 
White House conference on the environment.  
President Johnson afterwards appointed Haar as chair on a commission on the creation and 
organization of a housing department, which became the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). Johnson then assigned him to a task force through which he became the 
primary architect of the Model Cities program, including drafting the legislation. He later served 
as the first assistant secretary for metropolitan development in HUD. Later in life Haar led the 
                                                          




cleanup of Boston Harbor in 1983, following a pollution lawsuit in which he was a court-appointed 
master. The case demonstrated for Haar the necessity of the judiciary in intervening in the tragedy 
of the commons. In addition, he wrote numerous articles and books from the 1950s through the 
2000s. As the New York Times wrote in his obituary, “Mr. Haar advocated robust government 
regulation of, and intervention in, urban development.”549  
 In his confidential memo, “Describing the Indescribable in Metropolitan Development: A 
Scenario in Four Parts,” Haar provided four “illustrations,” “painted in broad brush strokes.” The 
first scenario described the future Haar considered the most likely based on contemporary urban 
trends, with the title “The Armed Fortress.” In this vision, urban disorders would become routine. 
White Americans would abandon the civil rights movement, treating “the Negro revolution as a 
civil war that must be stamped out or contained.” White Americans would therefore isolate 
themselves in suburbia. Northern and Southern cities would become centers of “black power,” and 
“the white humane impulse [would be] lost amid the rising demands of middle-class whites that 
streets be made safe and the order of the Republic secured.” Coupled with continuing violence in 
the cities and white backlash in the suburbs, as Haar imagined them, federal budgets would become 
constrained, perhaps through an expansion of the war in Vietnam, or tax cuts, or the use of 
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surpluses in the pursuit of space exploration. Regardless, the War on Poverty and the Model Cities 
program would be dismantled by a Congress concerned with inflation or deficits, or both.550  
 With less resources, he continued, “resentment in the ghetto flares higher.” Mayors would 
have to focus on containing riots rather than addressing their causes. In this scenario, police forces 
would grow larger, and “they [would] take on the characteristics of occupying armies in the 
ghettos.” Whites who still lived in the central city, fearing violence, would flee to suburbs, as do 
downtown institutions and businesses. The remaining non-white city residents would become “an 
alien population carrying on guerilla warfare with police and national guardsmen.” One result of 
the “white exodus,” Haar argued, would be that housing would become available as they move 
out, allowing for more class stratification among black city residents: middle-class and working-
class African Americans, also “anxious to flee the violence of the ghetto,” would move away from 
the impoverished.551  
 In Haar’s first scenario, cities would become centers of black political power, as they 
become homes to black majorities, but this is a Pyrrhic victory: “[D]rained of the institutions and 
businesses that once provided job opportunities, the central city exists as an angry and unstable 
mixture of middle class Negroes who have scant hope of escaping to suburbia, plus a vast host of 
lower-class Negroes who can only stew in their own resentment in an environment which has little 
to offer them in social services and economic opportunity.” The white power structure, which had 
“sacrificed its capital investment in Downtown institutions,” would have no interest in helping to 
improve the quality of life in central cities. Only federal aid, “which can hop over the white 
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suburbs,” could help cities, but, given this scenario, the forces in Congress would likely decline 
such a path.552  
 Finally, Haar concluded, with cities impoverished and the federal government unwilling to 
act, state governments would intervene. They would take over critical functions like policing and 
hospitals. Nationally, “Reagan Republicans” would become politically dominate. Their appeal 
would lie with “white families with a newly vested interest in maintaining the suburban status quo. 
Their platform stresses larger police forces, an end to fair housing laws, cuts in the welfare budget, 
and state supervision over central city finances.” Such was the envisioned urban future in the 
United States in 1967 by one of its foremost urban thinkers. Fifty years later, a number of details 
in this speculative sketch ring accurate.553 
 Haar’s second scenario, “the Pacified Ghetto,” was preferable only insofar as it was less 
violent. Convinced that urban disorders of the late 1960s were caused largely by black power 
politics, Haar asked the reader to “imagine” that Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, “and 
others along the ‘black power’ spectrum [would] come to the conclusion that the Model Cities and 
related programs [could] provide the mechanism whereby Negroes stand to gain political and 
economic leverage in the central cities.” Equating black power with violence, the author imagined 
a future in which “the Civil Rights movement realigns itself around the theme of using Federal 
dollars to build unified, politically responsible black communities.” The policies of the Johnson 
administration were within the realm of political responsibility; those who dissented were outside 
of responsible politics.554 
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Compared to Haar’s first scenario, in which the Vietnam War or other factors led to a 
restricted federal budget, the second scenario was one in which big-city mayors and “a now-united 
Negro movement” form a force behind “a greatly enlarged Model Cities campaign,” which would 
be financially feasible with the end of the war. With “massive expenditures in the ghetto” the 
quality of life would rise, schools would improve, and residences would be rehabilitated. 
Unemployment would decline via social services and job training. Unlike the Armed Fortress 
scenario, with its rigid segregation, the Pacified Ghetto “remains a place to which whites from the 
suburbs travel for commerce and culture.”555 
 Politically, central cities would become the locus for black political power. With an 
“increased capacity to operate the levers of the political system,” a black congressional bloc would 
form to advocate and gain benefits for their constituents. This development, explicitly tied to 
following the Johnson administration and comprised of middle-class African Americans, Haar 
characterized as “the positive results of ‘black power’ ideology.” However, as the white business 
community would desire to maintain their influence over the cities, they would support the creation 
of metropolitan governments, or else support state intervention in city functions. Haar presented 
this as a positive development, as it would lead to better planning and negotiation over the form 
of metropolitan areas while maintaining support for Model Cities programs in central cities.556  
  While suburban whites still would travel to the city, the demographic flow would not be a 
two-way street. This scenario ended with “a pacified Negro community reaping the benefits of 
massive Federal aid through the Model Cities program,” and the development of a separate-but-
equal metropolitan space. “The price paid by the Negroes,” the white paper predicted, “for political 
domination of the central city and improved housing and service conditions [would be] exclusion 
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from the suburbs and from realization of the ideal of a single family home on a plot of grass.” On 
the other side, the price paid by the white suburbs for keeping the black community contained in 
the central city would be paying taxes to support central city programs like Model Cities. It would 
be a tithe to “preserve their freedom to keep their communities exclusionary.”557 
 While this short-term status quo might have some limited benefits over the urban crises of 
the late 1960s, it would not be able to last long. City residents would continue to be cut off from 
employment opportunities in the suburbs, creating a pool of unemployed residents which would, 
in turn, suppress the wages offered by the remaining employers in the city. Segregated school 
would lead to decreasing quality of education in the city. A growing black middle-class, described 
as “articulate,” would begin to advocate for “access to suburban housing.”558 
 The first two cases were Haar’s worst-case scenarios, but they were the ones that he 
considered the most likely, given contemporary policies and attitudes. The latter two scenarios 
provided a view of a more hopeful, even idealistic, future, but the report cautioned the reader that 
serious, even drastic, changes had to be made in politics and policy to achieve them. The third 
scenario was the Mini-Ghetto. It was predicated on the passage of a robust open housing law. As 
a result, in the United States, it would be “a Federal offense to discriminate against Negroes in any 
kind of housing, old or new, single or multi-family.” In another telling description of the black 
freedom movement, the author encouraged the reader to “assume also that the Civil Rights 
movement [would be] somehow pieced together again,” and that its leaders would agree on a 
“grand strategy” which is really just “a reinforcement of natural tendencies.” This imagined grand 
strategy, based on purported natural tendencies was to “urg[e] Negroes to abandon the central 
cities and start anew in the suburbs.” In this imagining, Haar revealed his own valuation of suburbia 
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as more in tune with the natural inclinations of human beings. The city, on the other hand, is 
implied to be a greater distance from human nature.559 
 In turning to the suburbs, Haar assume that the black community would follow the pattern 
of other ethnic groups, such as Jewish, Italian, and Irish communities. They would form enclaves 
and pockets throughout metropolitan areas: essentially, black suburban communities would be 
formed. This development would result in the geographic separation of classes within the black 
community, with the middle class choosing middle-class neighborhoods, the working class 
moving to working-class neighborhoods, and so on. The author assumed a class-based racism in 
the suburbs, in which lower-class white suburbs would respond with “hostility of the worst kind 
[…] followed by a massive white out-migration.” Within middle-class suburbs, however, “once it 
had been established that only middle-class Negroes were moving in,” the suburbanites would 
have “a hesitant willingness to remain.” Haar assumed that a cautious class solidarity would trump 
racial antagonism.  As chapter one showed in the case of Grosse Pointe, there was no basis 
historically for assuming this class difference in regards to attitudes towards suburban racial 
integration.  
 Moreover, the central city would remain “the largest of the ghettos.” Unlike those who 
moved to the suburbs, residents of the inner city would continue to face “alienation, 
unemployment, and poor education,” which was “the lot of the lower-class Negro in the central 
city.” Even lower-class black suburbs, lacking political clout, downtown business districts to 
provide a tax base, and diminished access to state and federal aid would find themselves threatened 
with becoming “pocket[s] of poverty,” “a series of dispersed small ghettos … throughout the 
metropolitan areas.”  With the population of the central city moving to the suburbs, city land would 
                                                          




become vacant and available for redevelopment. “For once,” Haar commented, “redevelopment 
could proceed without stirring problems of relocation.” Indeed, with “the exodus of the Negro 
ghetto,” institutions and businesses would feel “more confident” in operating in the central city. 
Other would feel more confident, too. With “race no longer an issue in the life of the central city, 
more suburbanites, especially the young married, might be lured back downtown.” Thus urban 
renewal would “come into its full glory” as the central city, “reclaimed ghetto land,” is rebuilt “to 
suit the tastes of the middle-class.”560  
 Haar predicted that this future would be aided by a Democratic Party run by “pragmatic 
leaders” who accepted segregation by choice. For instance, there could be “many exclusively white 
or exclusively Negro neighborhoods for those who prefer that way of life.” This compromise, as 
Haar termed it, could be expanded throughout the metropolitan area. The decision of Brown v. 
Board, which ordered school desegregation, would be “extended to require equality of facilities 
and expenditures within local corporate unites as between their ghetto and non-ghetto portion; and 
on the State level as between all-Negro communities and all-white localities.” Without any sense 
of irony the author proposed to put to the Brown v. Board decision in service of the separate-but-
equal doctrine it had intended to overturn. This era of compromise would create a political climate 
in which “a rule of reason prevails” and consensus could be reached. In arguing for such a course 
of “reason,” in which segregated neighborhoods for those who desired them represented making 
the best of a less-than-ideal reality, contained echoes of the stated reasoning behind the Grosse 
Pointe point system. Given how segregated neighborhoods for white Americans and black 
Americans have historically led to vastly disparate economic possibilities and futures, the burden 
of this imagined consensus would fall unevenly across the racial divide.561  
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 Haar’s fourth scenario was the most hopeful. It was called the Vanishing Ghetto. Taking 
the strict open-housing law of the third scenario, this last scenario coupled it with “major 
affirmative housing programs,” backed by full Congressional funding. Congress also would 
provide full funding for the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
including rent subsidies and guaranteed annual incomes. Full geographic mobility would be 
recognized as a right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, with the result that “Negroes are 
endowed with unprecedented freedom of movement.” This movement would not be only down to 
individual choices; it would be the result of public policy as well. All municipalities would be 
residentially opened up equally, guided by a deliberate effort to “fairly evenly absorb the 
newcomer.” Thus, new ghettoes would not be created to replace the old ones.562  
 Imagining that Johnson would win reelection in 1968, “a brilliant New Cities Program” 
was envisioned in which “institutional investors and large corporations such as General Motors & 
General Electric” supported the creation of integrated communities, where “greater economies of 
scale overcome lingering racial prejudice.” “As suburban whites became convinced that the Negro 
exodus would be guided so that no single community would receive more than a small share of 
the total,” the report continued, “they [would] lose fear of inundation and resist the early inclination 
toward panic selling.” Deliberately planned to permanently be a minority population in whatever 
community in which they lived, black Americans would have no political power but would benefit 
from the services and housing available to white Americans. De facto segregation would be thus 
eliminated, with the result that “the Negro population [would] become[…] increasingly 
assimilated into American middle-class life.”563 
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 The author argued that these last two scenarios were not “beyond reach if we use public 
policy to deflect current mobility patterns,” but it would require changes in both residential 
movement and public policies. Quoting President Johnson’s “Message on Problems & Future of 
the Central City and Its Suburbs,” the report concluded by arguing that all people had to have 
access to the full range of choices available, whether in the realm of housing, education, recreation, 
or culture, and not just “the fortunate.”564 In a follow-up memo clarifying the last two scenarios, 
Haar emphasized that the fourth scenario was “unrealistic as a short run goal but minor steps can 
be taken in this direction, and as an ideal, it needs stating.”565 
 While this document contained insightful projections for the future of American urban life 
and policy, it also contains important evidence of the perception of cities in the late 1960s. Given 
that the main architect of the Model Cities program wrote the report, it provides a perspective into 
the worldview that gave birth to that program. One of the first thing that strikes the reader is the 
author’s distrust of black power politics. The phrase was always put in quotation marks, as if to 
reinforce that it was not the author’s term. Haar associated it with violence, political extortion, and 
irresponsibility. The author’s racial politics are ambivalent at best. On one hand, he supported 
access to housing, to education, to employment, and the freedom of movement. Equality in terms 
of integration is desired. On the other hand, the author balked at the idea of a majority black 
population and of black political control. Equal access to resources and services are one thing, he 
seemed to say, but equal access to power itself is seemingly a step too far. 
 Tension existed, then, between the goal of complete integration and the reality of black 
political power. As the report reflects in the fourth scenario, the elimination of de facto segregation 
would go hand-in-hand with the African-American population remaining a minority in all 
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communities, and therefore without access to political control.  Assuming complete integration to 
be the more worthwhile goal, it followed that a majority-black city, or inner city, was anathema to 
the pursuit of civil rights. Not only were black urban spaces to be eliminated, Haar believed, they 
were a barrier to progress in and of themselves. American cities, in order to have a healthy future 
free from crisis, required the dispersal of the black population into suburbs, leaving the “reclaimed 
ghetto land” free for redevelopment. The problem with American cities, the report argued, was not 
discrimination, segregation, runaway jobs, or the resulting geographically bounded and racialized 
poverty; it was the impoverished population, largely but not exclusively black. That poverty itself 
was not the issue was indicated in the acceptance of lower-class suburbs, described as potential 
pockets of poverty or smaller ghettos. Here class intersected with race, as middle-class African 
Americans were predicted to move to integrated middle-class neighborhoods, where, despite 
hesitations, there would be no hostility or white flight. Indeed, the future of black American laid 
in its assimilation into American middle-class life. The historical experiences of African American 
families that moved into white suburbs, however, seemed to counter this imagined middle-class 
integration. 
 The future of the city was to be middle-class city, rebuilt to “suit the tastes of the middle-
class.” The black working class and lower class were to be banished to the suburbs, as, presumably, 
working-class and lower-class members of other racial and ethnic groups also were banished in 
pursuit of a city oriented around middle-class tastes, desires, and needs. Once again, saving the 
city did not mean saving those who lived in them; rather, it meant getting rid of existing city 
residents, solving poverty by moving the poor, and overcoming racial strife by relocating black 
communities elsewhere.566  
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 Needless to say, the roots of urban ills – of poverty and of racial strife – were not examined. 
They did not need to be, as those were not the problems that needed to be solved. The wording and 
phrasing of the four different scenarios strongly suggests this indifference. In praising political 
compromise in the third scenario, the author explicitly defended segregated communities “for 
those who prefer that way of life.” He then referenced Brown v. Board in a defense of separate-
but-equal public policies. One of the key arguments of the Brown v. Board decision was that 
separate-but-equal was unconstitutional because separate meant unequal. Taking the argument 
about housing segregation presented in the first chapter at face value, that the core problem was 
property values, separate-but-equal would mean the end of the motivation behind housing 
segregation. If all people, regardless of ancestry or other traits, had access to equal housing, then 
fears of lowering values would not enter the equation. It is only in an arrangement in which black 
housing equated to slum housing that a black neighbor would have equated to deteriorating 
property values. Segregation was premised on unequal access to resources, whether it be housing, 
education, or political power.  
 It is striking that “Describing the Indescribable” never questioned white racism or 
segregationist tendencies. At best, it took them for granted; at worst, it suggested they were 
reasonable. This bias came to the forefront in the third scenario, in which political compromise is 
described as meaning a modus vivendi comprised of exclusively white and exclusively black 
neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan area, with a resulting “checkerboard pattern.” In the 
fourth scenario, in which full integration was to be achieved through deliberate public policy, the 
white suburbs, would be “convinced that the Negro exodus [would] be guided so that no single 
community receive[d] more than a small share of the total.” They would, consequently, “lose 
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[their] fear of inundation and resist the early inclination toward panic selling.”567 There was no 
attempt to explain white panic as anything other than “fear of inundation” that could be assuaged 
by guaranteeing that the black population would always be no more than “a small share.”568 
 A component of this conception of race and space was that Haar saw suburban space as 
ideal and to be preferred over the urban.569  Black suburbanization, for the middle class at least, 
would give them “the fulfillment of the American dream: the single family house on a grassy plot, 
barbecue pits, a good education system, a high level of public services, easy access to suburban 
jobs.”570 There was nothing wrong with such a dream in and of itself, though it begged the question 
of why were there good education systems and high levels of public services in suburbs, but not 
the inner cities. Why were decent jobs to be found, not in cities, but in their metropolitan fringes? 
Could one not happily barbecue, in good relations with one’s neighbors and surroundings, in the 
city? 
 The eagerness with which Haar conceived of the city as being remade in the image of 
middle-class culture, with “opera houses, art museums, new town houses, and even a sprinkling 
of contemporary single-family houses” suggested that it was not the city, inherently, which posed 
the problem. The problem was that the city was inhabited increasingly by the impoverished, and 
the impoverished were overwhelmingly black. By the late 1960s, Haar believed, city residents 
were violent, as demonstrated by riots and by black power politics, which went hand-in-hand in 
his mind. It bears repeating that, for Haar, the middle class was not necessarily white. It also 
included the black middle class, those who were “articulate” and “politically responsible,” and 
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who were “assimilated” into middle class society and culture. Yet, when speaking of the middle 
class, he relapsed into language that indicated that he meant a white middle class. In the third 
scenario, suburbanites, and particularly the “young married,” could be “lured” back downtown 
with “race no longer an issue” in the city.571  
By the late 1960s, some of those city residents’ frustrations at social, political, and 
economic inequalities manifested in black power politics or in rioting, beginning with civil 
disorders in Harlem in 1964 and Watts in 1965. As recounted in Chapter 4, Detroit was the site of 
what was considered the worst civil disorder in July of 1967, and what was described by veteran 
Detroit police as “in the worst urban guerilla warfare witnessed in the United States in the twentieth 
century.”572 Over the course of a week, unrest spread through the city, with looting, arson, and 
sniping covering a hundred square miles. Two thousand five hundred and nine buildings were 
damaged, accompanied by a loss of $36 million in insured property. Over seventeen thousand 
members of law enforcement were present in the city, which included the five thousand federal 
troops deployed by President Johnson at the request of the state governor. Seven thousand two 
hundred and thirty one people were arrested, and forty-three died.573 These events, less than a 
month in the past, constituted the backdrop of Charles Haar writing his confidential memo to the 
president in August of 1967.  
A City for Man 
 
 Half a year later, in a February 1968 booklet,  A City for Man, the Center for Community 
Planning within the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) outlined the vision 
behind Model Cities. It thus provides an perspective on how the urban crisis and the Great 
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Society’s proposed course of action was viewed by involved members of the Johnson 
administration outside of HUD. For the author of the Center for Community Planning booklet, the 
urban crisis was a “a puzzling paradox.” In an era of affluence and technological progress, twenty 
percent of Americans lived “in abject poverty and despair.” Millions within that twenty percent 
were “crowded into the slum areas of America’s cities,” where some “riot on the streets.” The 
urban poor served as “an ever-present bad conscience for the affluent majority.” While never stated 
explicitly, the “violent, alienated men with nothing to lose” within the slums were more than just 
a bad conscience. The consequence of poverty shifted unto those who were impoverished, so that 
the poor became the manifestation of poverty itself. The slums, and those who lived in them, served 
as a repository of fear for the affluent majority, a site of projection. It led to conclusions such as 
“it is increasingly clear that Americans will either have to abolish the slums, or the slums will 
destroy the very fabric of our society.”574 
The booklet identified unemployment and underemployment as culprits behind poverty, 
but only as abstract forces which, like hunger and illiteracy, were all “part of a horrifying but 
familiar picture which often seems all but impervious to human hand and will.” Any attempt at a 
causal explanation for these elements of urban poverty was quickly dismissed out-of-hand. 
Automation, “racial change,” and migration from rural to urban areas were further identified as 
underlying factors behind “slum conditions.” 575 Nonetheless, the fundamental problems of slum 
areas had to be studied; existing social programs, even if inadequate, had to be utilized. Urban 
planners, along with “private citizens from both suburb and slum,” and different levels of 
government, business, labor unions, and private associations and organizations, had to join 
together in order to address the urban crisis. Community involvement was “vital,” as city residents 
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have an “understanding of local conditions and habits [that] can help the specialists develop 
effective programs for aiding the residents.” Explicit in the philosophy of the Model Cities 
program, then, was that the program could not be top-down. In fact, speaking of city residents, the 
booklet argued that “their cooperation and interest may well determine success or failure of any 
new or renovated programs.”576 
 A few pages later, the booklet returned to this theme, noting that planners would have to 
“depend heavily upon residents,” as “too often projects are ‘successful’ on paper without ever 
working in reality.” It was necessary that local residents be involved in planning and subsequent 
steps of programs, in order to “suggest ways to of making  them more pertinent.” Already the 
reader could see that local resident involvement, while praised, was conceived as advisory: Local 
residents were to make suggestions, but not decisions. But, then, after “long months of 
consultation, research, and deep thought,” the arrived-at programs would be ready for “bringing 
modern living standards and opportunities to the slums.” At stake for the booklet’s authors was 
modernity itself, which did not include slums, and appropriate living standards. The lack of 
opportunities, which included employment, were an acknowledgement that there were social 
conditions beyond city residents’ control. The booklet did not address why there were no 
opportunities present in slums areas, or how one could bring back jobs that had moved 
elsewhere.577 
 The economic deprivation of the slums were to be addressed through what the booklet 
called “financial health.” Poverty was, the booklet observed, the “single massive problem” behind 
slum conditions. The report betrayed a confusion over what, exactly, caused poverty. On one hand, 
there were “men and women who spend every waking hour looking for work, working at menial 
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but exhausting jobs, or minding large families,” with the result that they “have little time for 
education or job training.” Indeed, “many of the poor are still eager to take advantage of any job 
training or career programs they can get their hands on.” In other words, the impoverished sought 
to improve their lot in life if possible, though all too often it was not. Those in the best position to 
understand that living in poverty and slums was less-than ideal were those who lived in poverty 
and slums. At the same time, the unstated premise of the booklet was that well-paying employment 
required advanced education and training; what working-class employment there was was 
exhausting and menial and paid poverty wages.578 
 Yet, in the same passage, the booklet forwarded a culture-of-poverty argument that 
somewhat contradicted the above.579 The impoverished “have been beaten down by hopelessness,” 
and “have been convinced too many times that they are worthless.” The result was that “they lack 
confidence in themselves and in the future.” There was no foreseeable benefit to improving their 
conditions. Instead of the “risky route of advanced training and education,” the poor chose “early 
marriage, child bearing, and sticking to a menial, futureless, but familiar job.” This worldview, the 
booklet stated, was passed down to children in poor families, “continuing the hopeless cycle of 
poverty for yet another generation.” At the same time, automation was taking away exactly those 
menial jobs (“ditchdigging, dishwashing, and many other rote jobs”) while rural-to-urban 
migration continued, putting more pressure on the existing “rote” jobs. That the authors of the 
booklet understood automation as affecting jobs like dishwashing and ditchdigging indicated their 
lack of familiarity with automation or its impact on working-class employment.580 
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 The proposed answer to poverty, whether it be created by lack of employment and 
education opportunities, or the reluctance of the poor to take risks and improve themselves, was 
threefold: “job training and career development, financial assurance, and consumer protection.”581 
Job training formed a cornerstone to the Model Cities’ approach to under- and unemployment, and 
especially industrial employment. While industrial employment was commonly associated with 
semi- and unskilled labor, or as an entry-point to learn a skilled trade, it was clear that to the Model 
Cities program, those living in impoverished slums were unaware of this career path. The authors 
proposed that businesses and associations sponsor urban renewal and housing projects; that labor 
unions, along with industry and government, create apprenticeship programs; and that local 
industries “make their machines and equipment available during non-working hours to give 
residents practical experience in the jobs they are learning.”582 That industrial employment might 
not be an option to impoverished city residents in 1968 due to the combination of segregation, job 
discrimination, and industrial decentralization was not part of this solution. 
 Fundamental to this solution was the premise that jobs existed and workers in demand. The 
booklet was not calling on private businesses to engage in charity; rather, “thirty million poor 
represent an immense loss of markets and resources.” There was a “manpower gap,” in which 
“able-bodied men and women” went unemployed while help-wanted columns were growing. 
“Inadequate numbers of key workers,” the booklet asserted, “curtail business and industrial 
expansion, still millions are unemployed or underemployed.” The jobs that needed to be filled, 
however, were above the abilities of the poor. As the “middle-range” jobs were “too demanding 
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for the undereducated,” intensive job training would be required to fill those positions and allow 
businesses and industries to expand.583  
 Along with job training, Model Cities was to aid with career development. Here a curious 
solution was proposed. As an expansion of social services was part of the three-fold solution to 
poverty, it followed that there would be an increased need for people staffing social service 
agencies. Essentially, it was proposed that the poor be hired to help the poor. “Renovated social 
services,” the booklet continued, “will contain innumerable opportunities for permanent, satisfying 
jobs at all levels of skill and responsibility.” Education and healthcare were included as areas of 
employment, in addition to social services. If these positions were to be publicly funded was not 
addressed, although it would be a reasonable conclusion to draw. And while the plan had the merit 
of connecting the end of poverty with viable job opportunities, including expanding public 
employment, it was also premised on the continued existence of poverty, not its elimination. If 
poverty was adequately addressed and eliminated, these positions would no longer be necessary 
or required. 584 
 At this moment, the booklet took a brief yet revealing detour, assuring the reader that “job 
training is not a panacea.” Training was a precondition to employment, but employment still 
required open positions. Thus, in a direct reference to industrial decentralization and the lack of 
employment opportunities in urban areas, the booklet stated that “hundreds of firms must be 
attracted into the cities.” Labor unions and professional organizations “had to open their ranks,” 
which was perhaps a reference to the history of racial discrimination in employment. These 
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changes would take years to achieve, meaning that something had to fill the gap between the 
present moment and when avenues of employment became available to city residents.585  
 Yet, instead of addressing social services or welfare provisions, the booklet immediately 
returned to the culture-of-poverty argument: “more important than the inevitable time lag of years 
is the attitude of many of the slum residents.” All too many had “passed the point of caring” and 
thus had no hope for the future. While lamenting the lack of risk-taking on the part of the poor and 
their reluctance to try a new path in life, the booklet noted that many had sought job training “only 
to discover that they cannot get into unions or into professions,” or that competition was too 
intense, job requirements too demanding, or their new skill was already obsolete. The tension 
between arguing that the poor do not care to improve themselves while acknowledging that many 
try and failed due to conditions outside their control was never resolved.586  
 Instead, the booklet continued by arguing that “still others lack interest in working.” For 
these people, “the very concept of full-time work is foreign if not fearful.” To complete the 
impression that the booklet was contradicting itself, it once again changed tack and argued that 
others worked for “endless years” in underpaid jobs. As their incomes are inadequate, “they 
‘moonlight[ed]’ to support their families. And they never have the time or the opportunity to break 
the cycle.” So while the booklet acknowledged that some impoverished city residents work year 
after year in underpaying jobs and moonlighted to make ends meet, while others tried to obtain 
better employment only to be knocked back down again, it still asserted that the important factor 
was the attitude of the poor and their fear of full-time employment.587 
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 If there were those who could work, and needed employment, the planners also recognized 
that there were many people who could not work for one reason or another: “the aged, the infirm, 
the mothers with five or six children, very young or ill children, or even older children themselves 
who should be getting further education and training.” In these cases, the booklet argued for the 
need for financial assurance, which would allow a family to “feel secure enough about the future 
to be interested in planning for it.” Many who could benefit from existing social provisions did not 
realize that they were eligible. Furthermore, programs were  split between local, state, and federal 
initiatives, with “severely limited” resources, restrictive criteria, and intrusive eligibility 
requirements. Regardless, they had “moved an increasing number of Americans towards 
independence and a new sense of dignity and self-respect.”588 
 “Still,” the booklet noted, “public welfare payments are now a source of heated national 
debate.” While some sought to expand the programs, others desired to abolish them altogether. 
Confusion existed around the different forms welfare programs could take, such as public 
assistance, in-kind programs, a negative income tax, allowances for age groups, and social 
security. The challenge, the booklet continued, was that all suffered from the fault of either keeping 
incomes too low, or else “destroying the incentive to work.” At root, the authors of the booklet 
assumed that the challenge was the incentive to work, or the inability to find existing work, and 
not the lack of jobs in which one could work. Also, one might note, proposals for a guaranteed 
income surfaced and were rejected.589 
Citizen Participation 
 That HUD and Model Cities were struggling to understand how to approach city residents 
in the wake of the long hot summer of 1968 comes across in a number of speeches and reports. A 
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continuation of the effort of members of the Johnson administration to understand the urban crisis, 
the reports and speeches that focused on citizen participation how federal policy makers conceived 
of city residents. The HUD Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations, H. 
Ralph Taylor, delivered a talk on “Model Cities: Progress and Problems in the First Ten Months” 
to the Model Cities Midwest Regional Conference in Dayton, on September 6, 1968. Taylor was 
the HUD official in charge of the Model Cities program. In the course of his long address, Taylor 
sought to support the fundamental principle that “citizens have the right to participate in and 
influence the development of plans that will affect their lives.” This, he argued, was no longer 
debatable. The Model Cities program was, in an echo of its original name, a demonstration. For 
Taylor, however, the goals of the program were “nothing less than a demonstration that this 
country, its government and its people, have the capacity, faith and willingness to commit 
resources needed to build an urban society that honors rather than mocks the rhetorical of 
democracy and equal opportunity for all.”590 
 While the title of Taylor’s speech referenced “the first ten month,” it had been two years 
since Model Cities had passed Congress, and only a year after it had received only 45% of its 
requested funding. The first ten months Taylor meant was the first ten months since seventy-five 
cities had been chosen to participate in the Model Cities program. Taylor welcomed the occasion 
to review the program for “our most important and critical audience,” by which he meant “the 
people of the neighborhoods” and local public officials. The support of these two groups was 
integral to the support of the program passed by Congress. The Model Cities program was a new 
form of planning, Taylor told his audience, “totally unprecedented in this country.” He was 
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glowing in his description of its achievements to date. There had been not only an agreement on 
the relationship and program between HUD and city governments, there also had been (according 
to Taylor) a move towards “a joint analysis of the basic problems of their neighborhood and its 
place in the total picture” by “the city and the people.”591 
 Of course, Taylor noted, “there are debates and disputes as to details.” Voicing his 
confidence that such debates and disputes could be resolved as long as citizens and cities 
remembered that they were partners, Taylor quoted Senator Edmund Muskie, whom he 
characterized as having done more than any single legislator to mold “the shape, form, philosophy 
and existence” of Model Cities. The program mean, Muskie argued in an acceptance speech only 
weeks prior to Taylor’s remarks, “giving all citizens an equal opportunity to participate in 
American life and in the policy-making processes of our society. And in all frankness, our society 
has not worked in this way up to now.” Taylor, via Muskie, began by affirming the need for citizen 
involvement in policy-making, even as he acknowledged that the history of governance in the 
United States had not always lived up to this ideal.592  
 Part of the challenge was that the Model Cities program was attempting to do something 
new. There had been “virtually no experience in American cities with broad-scale planning that 
related planning and social and economic planning,” which made the program daunting enough as 
it was. Moreover, Model Cities proposed to create a new planning process, through which “the 
total urban problem as an inter-related whole” was to be the focus. That process was to include the 
involvement of the government as well as citizens, “in close association.” Just as there was no 
experience with broad-based planning that covered physical, social, and economic needs at once, 
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so there had been no experience with “this kind of planning as a collaborative enterprise” between 
city governments and neighborhood residents.593 
 The first ten months of Model Cities had a been a period of conceiving and developing 
plans. The first thirty or so plans were to be received by January of 1969 and all plans by that June. 
After they had submitted their plans, cities were expected to begin their first action year out of a 
five-year plan. The first steps were expected to be uneven, “but in every city people and institutions 
that have never worked together before will be working together in a common endeavor.” This 
collaboration could only improve over time. As such, the planning process itself was an 
accomplishment of the Model Cities program. Longer-term objectives would likely be, Taylor 
reminded his audience, far more difficult to achieve. “No city in the country today,” he stated, “has 
any real measure of the money needed to eliminate entirely slums and poverty, to educate all of its 
children to function effectively in a technological society where there are jobs for all, and how to 
create those jobs.”594 
 Model Cities did not just aim to research how much it would cost to expand the program 
to an entire city based on empirical data from selected neighborhoods. It also sought to 
“demonstrate that funds will be used more effectively than in the past.” Thus, the program was 
both research- and action-oriented. The necessary funding was neither solely in the purview nor 
the responsibility of the federal government. Even as Taylor championed the objectives of the 
Model Cities program, he cautioned that he was “concerned about this because I see very little 
evidence of enlarged State capacity or of State commitment to focus resources on the problems of 
the inner cities.” Model Cities created the arena in which the Federal government and other levels 
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of government could experiment with “new patterns of partnership” that created a grant system 
with local flexibility.595 
 Taylor described two other long-term objectives that were fundamental to the Model Cities 
program. The first was “to increase the competence and the responsiveness of local government,” 
following the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
popularly known as the Kerner Commission. In contrast to conservative fears that Model Cities 
was a way of diminishing local power and control, Taylor argued that the program instead “rests 
on the premise that the problems of the city cannot be solved without the participation and the 
leadership of local government.” Further municipal fragmentation threatened local leadership and 
competence. The focus on citizen participation would help, Taylor continued, with the 
responsiveness of local governance. Model Cities was “an experiment in the sharing of power 
between government and citizen in developing institutions that will help the individual overcome 
the feeling that he has no role to play in an impersonal society, no relationship to the decisions that 
determine his life.”596 
 In particular, this ability to participate in decision-making was important to “the  black and 
the Spanish-speaking citizens.” Their right to participate had been long denied. Still, Model Cities 
gave such citizens the means to “learn how to master the system, how to change it and adapt it to 
[their] needs.” The opportunity to do so was integral to American democracy, and “everyone else 
in our society has done this.” The opportunity had to be granted to “the people on the bottom rungs 
of society’s ladder – the black, the Mexican-American and the Puerto-Rican migrant to our cities, 
the Indian and the Appalachian and other white citizens at the poverty level.” There was an 
racialized imbalance of power, which was something that Taylor sought to address in ways that 
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Haar and other did not. The imbalance was also economic and included impoverished white 
Americans as well. Thus, Model Cities programs and the findings of the Kerner Commission 
would both be successful through an expansion of the democratic process. Opening up decisions 
about the allocation and use of resources to those at the bottom-rung of American society – the 
poor, whether they be black, Latino/a, indigenous, or white – would mean more effective and equal 
governance. For Taylor, the benefits of Model Cities went well beyond the quality of life in 
American cities. In extended to the well-being of American democracy itself, as well as the vitality 
of democratic processes in the lives of all citizens.597  
 The second long-term objective was to improve the relationship between the federal 
government and local governments. If the goal was to have local leadership responsive to changing 
conditions and willing to experiment, then local governments had to trust the support of the federal 
government, including its support through robust funding. “Mayors have insisted,” Taylor 
reminded his audience, “very rightly, that if they are to plan with their citizens, they must have 
more certainty and more timely funding than presently provided.” Otherwise, mayors could not be 
expected to make institutional changes, many of which were experimental and therefore politically 
risky. Part of the problem was that federal and state funding flowed through a number of channels, 
some of which were outside the control, and even the knowledge, of local governments. “As a 
result,” Taylor rued, “there are very few Mayors in this country who know the full extent and 
nature of the flow of Federal funds into their cities.” Taylor proposed, as “the only effective 
solution to this problem,” that approval of all federal grants require recipients in Model City-
designated areas to participate in the Model City program and planning process.598 
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 In contemplating the future course of the Model Cities program, three significant problems 
suggested themselves to Taylor. The first was the role of states in addressing the urban crisis. The 
second was the adequacy of program resources, and the third was the challenges of citizen 
participation. Taylor began with the role of states as “key decisions as to who gets aid, its use, and 
the level of services to be provided” were made by state governments, not the federal or local 
governments. Unfortunately, state governments were often “unsympathetic to, or even unaware 
of, what is happening in the central city.” Nonetheless, state governments were essential partners 
for addressing urban problems. They were local enough for experimental and flexible responses 
to local concerns, but they were at a level to overcome the fragmenting of metropolitan municipal 
governments, “the splintering of metropolitan areas into political jurisdictions that do not relate to 
the nature of the problem.” It was necessary that state governments were open to “new ideas, new 
ways of doing things, new approaches” in the areas of health, welfare, education, and civil rights.599 
 Taylor was not unaware of the ways that states-rights politics had been used in American 
history, and he was cognizant that these politics and the goals of the Johnson administration were 
not compatible. In calling for the importance of state governments in the Model Cities program, 
he was careful to distinguish it from this strain of conservative politics. As Taylor told his audience 
in Dayton, “a state where the rhetoric of States rights is used as a substitute for hard analysis of 
reality and a commitment for action serves only to continue the historic suspicion and hostility 
between State and local governments.” Rather than hostility between a state and the federal 
government, Taylor underscored that states-rights politics ill-served local governments and 
especially urban ones. Taylor invited state governments to participate in the Model Cities program. 
                                                          




He saw it as a key partnership, but “the ticket of admission is State commitment to assist in the 
solution of problems of the inner city.”600 
 The inadequacy of resources to successfully reach “the desired quality of urban society” 
was of fundamental importance to the success of the Model Cities program. In an election year, 
Taylor was skeptical of those who proposed unrealistic cuts to the domestic budget, “who talk 
glibly of black capitalism and private enterprise and never mention the question of the need for 
public funds, Federal and State to make it happen.” It was mere dishonesty in Taylor’s mind to 
talk about rebuilding urban America without providing for adequate funding to make it happen. 
That funding had to be public. As he argued, “the private sector cannot be expected to, nor will it 
act at the volume required, without guaranties, subsidies, training dollars or aid in a form that will 
either create a market or overcome the cost handicap of the action desired.” Black 
entrepreneurship, just as home ownership and good health and education, were certainly the social 
objectives to be met, but they required investment in order to reach them.601  
Feeling the need to make public investment palatable, Taylor reassured his audience that 
“Federal dollars do not necessarily mean Federal operation, or control, or that the money has to be 
spent through public channels alone.” Rather, Taylor proposed that public funds be used by private 
enterprises. At the end of the day, it was a matter of priorities rather than means. “We have the 
resources to build America,” Taylor said, “the issue is whether we have the will.” In perhaps an 
oblique reference to the war in Vietnam, Taylor conceded that it was a “period of resource 
shortage,” but that “priorities must be set.” Here Taylor joined a number of other members of the 
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Johnson administration who publicly spoke of the need to set resource priorities as a way to 
indicate that they considered American involvement in Vietnam to be an ill-judged venture.602 
Finally, Taylor addressed the challenges presented by the principle of citizen participation 
in the Model Cities program. In particular, Taylor spoke on the rhetoric of black control and black 
separatism. He clarified that he “read this as rhetoric, not reality.” Exclusive control by one group 
of citizens was not an option, but instead power had to be shared. Standing in the way of this 
sharing of power were two related obstacles: the “suspicion and hostility” of citizens towards “the 
city” (by which Taylor meant the city government), and the “suspicion and skepticism” of public 
officials towards citizens.  Taylor was not unsympathetic to the suspicions and hostility on the part 
of citizens towards city government, as it was “based upon a long history of neglect and second 
class treatment.” It was not to be overcome quickly, and certainly not by mere words. As he 
remarked, “even positive actions are slow to penetrate the thick layers of hostility build up by 
history.” Taylor counseled his audience of Model City officials that they had to cultivate patience 
and understanding, but that they also had to contribute to an understanding that a joint effort would 
lead to desired results that could not be attained “solely with resources within the neighborhood 
itself.” It required that neighborhoods “participate effectively in the decisions determining the use 
of these resources.” Taylor saw no other way to move past the suspicion and alienation of the city 
residents that Model Cities was designed to aid.603 
To reach that goal required that public officials respect and listen to participating citizens. 
There were those “who resent the restraints on their power” that came with citizen input. The 
resentment of public officials could take many forms. An official could prize action over 
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discussion and debate, thereby ignoring input by community members, or an official could express 
dismay over “the difficulty of getting citizens to agree on a plan for action.” One could rue the 
“fragmentation” of neighborhood opinion, “conflict between groups,” and the inability to appoint 
a single “accepted spokesman” as reasons to retain full control over the planning process. These 
ruses only covered the true reason behind the resentment, that “they have the arrogance of 
professionals who believe that citizens, particularly poor and black citizens, lack the necessary 
credentials.” This attitude only justified the suspicion and hostility on the part of the same citizens 
towards the resentful public officials.604 
The pathway to partnership between these two forces was wrought with perils, but it was 
not impossible or unreasonable. It would entail rights and obligations on both sides. Both city 
government and city residents had to work towards the representation of all groups in the planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of the program; they had to recognize that no one, “not even the 
President of the United States,” has absolute power or control; and that processes had to be 
established clearly and early and then only changed through joint agreement. But while citizens 
should have “access to and influence on” the decision-making process, the final decisions should 
be in the hands of city governments, as “elected officials accountable to the citizenry,” as well as 
“administrative authority.” As will be made clear below, Taylor’s conception of the role of citizens 
in the decision-making process was a proscribed one.  
Even at the ten-month mark, Taylor was able to pinpoint some of the characteristics of the 
cities with successful Model Cities programs to date. They were ones in which public officials and 
citizens had jointly “discussed, debated, and negotiated” the process through which participation 
would take place. They had ensured the “democratic selection of a group representative of the 
                                                          




major groups,” in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, economic status, and political views, who lived 
in the relevant neighborhood. They had determined in joint acceptable ways the roles citizens 
would play in “identifying problems, formulating plans and reacting to plans.”605  
Yet, again Taylor underscored that “city government is clearly the dominant partner in the 
Model Cities program and that is as it should be.” A danger resided in this power dynamic, as city 
government had final decision-making power and could use that power to undermine citizen 
participation. Avoiding this danger would required different responses from city to city, but Taylor 
advised that “strengthening the citizen partners” would be one way to address it. Specifically, 
Taylor promoted what he called Independent Technical Assistance. An idea being developed in at 
least twenty cities, it provided “resources to provide technical assistance and expertise they trust” 
to citizens and which were under their control. This assistance was not intended to duplicate the 
staff that already existed in public agencies, but rather to “develop and maintain a neighborhood 
structure that is representative of and accountable to the neighborhood, with access to experts to 
assist neighborhood residents with the technical aspects of the planning process.” Community 
expertise could thus be tapped and community members “strengthened” as partners. The plan as 
described by Taylor did not address the degree to which such community partners would then be 
involved in the decision-making process.606 
At stake was not just the conditions of inner cities. At the immediate level it was about 
addressing the hostility of city residents towards city government and “city hall’s fear that 
participation and planning are mutually inconsistent.” At another level, it was about creating 
successful cities. Ultimately it was “a great experiment in participatory government and 
administration,” As such, Taylor combined the largest federal program focused on urban affairs 
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and with the ethos of new left urbanism. He echoed the call for participatory democracy that had 
characterized the Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society. But, as Taylor 
himself argued, there is a difference between rhetoric and reality.607  
On another occasion, H. Ralph Taylor gave remarks on the idea of citizen participation 
before the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials on September 27, 1968, 
in Minneapolis. Taylor’s argument was that “the fundamental principle that citizens have a right 
to participate in and influence the development of plans that will affect their lives is not longer 
debatable.” The world had changed, and “the social revolution under way throughout much of the 
world has made this so.” The problem for planners and other professionals was that citizens 
participation could easily become “an effective barrier to action.” In a telling use of the plural first 
person, Taylor described how “we are frustrated by having to deal with (what some consider) the 
chaotic, undisciplined, unstructured, quarrelsome reality that is the world of the poor, particularly 
the black and the Spanish-speaking poor.” Perhaps Taylor was playing up the sense of frustration 
for his audience, but this would still suggest that this perception was widely shared. It also suggests 
that Taylor himself shared it.608 
 Despite the chaos and quarrels, Taylor assured his audience that citizen participation was 
a healthy and necessary process, albeit one that can be difficult. “We must recognize and 
understand this,” he continued, “for the black, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communities 
because these are problem areas.” Citizen participation in these “problem areas” was only useful 
insofar as it led to understanding. Taylor then addressed three aspects of citizen participation. The 
first was the issue of control, “a word that permeates the rhetoric of the minority community and 
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is, rarely, if ever, heard in the white community.” This was the case, Taylor suggested, because if 
one has control, one does not have any need to talk about it.609 
 The talk about control was not going to go away, Taylor observed, “in the model cities 
program and elsewhere,” because it “is an important part of the rhetoric of self-affirmation and 
must be understood as such.” There was a difference, implicit in Taylor’s comments, between the 
rhetoric of control and having control. “There can be no exclusive control by citizens,” Taylor 
cautioned his listeners, and the responsibility for the Model Cities program rested with the political 
leadership, whether the federal or the local government. The distrust of citizen participation was 
not necessarily aimed at minority populations. Local control could easily lead to further racial 
segregation, and “apartheid, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not a legitimate objective of the 
Model Cities program. Perhaps it would be in a Wallace administration – but not under Secretary 
Weaver or this Assistant Secretary.”610  
 Full citizen control contained the possibility of continuing old urban ills or creating new 
ones, and Taylor concluded that citizen participation worked best when “citizens and city 
government negotiate a sharing of power” over the use of resources in a certain neighborhood. 
Citizens and city government, however, were not equal players, and “the city is clearly the 
dominant partner and that is as it should be in the Model Cities program.” Taylor qualified this by 
emphasizing that partnership was not paternalism, the latter of which would make citizens 
“subservient” to the government. This concept of citizen-government partnership was “nothing 
new, startling, or frightening,” but rather was “consistent with the historical pattern by which other 
minorities have moved into the main stream.”611 
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 A new challenge in the late 1960s was the hostility among some members of minority 
groups to the mainstream. There were some, Taylor noted, who saw all social programs a form of 
pacification, or else saw “the destruction of the present social structure as an essential prerequisite 
to progress.” Such people, for Taylor, presented negative opposition to all proposals, unless they 
themselves could “dominate” them. They were not, however, representative of the majority of 
minority communities. Taylor cited a CBS national survey in support of his argument that the 
majority of minorities still maintained faith in “the system.” Even as Taylor dismissed the 
politically radical fragment of minority communities, he still believed that channels of 
participation should be kept open for “those who are bitter, suspicious, cynical, and even 
hostile.”612 
 Despite the crucial place control and power played in Taylor’s remarks, he never defined 
what he meant by them. He argued that “city governments must be sincere in their willingness to 
share power.” Without a sincere effort, any resulting program would lack legitimacy in the targeted 
community, and “chaos is the inevitable result.” In working with a neighborhood it was essential 
to have “a full understanding of power relationships in the neighborhood.” This meant, on one 
hand, recognizing those who are loudest with “demand and threat” are not necessarily the leaders 
of the neighbor or representative of majority opinion, and on the other that those who are 
representative leaders must be given the assistance they need “to bargain and negotiate 
effectively.” With this assistance, neighborhoods could “analyze, criticize, and suggest alternatives 
to be explored and developed, and judge whether the exploration of those alternatives has been 
honest and thorough.”613  
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Citizen participation was to be advisory in nature. At no point was any means through 
which citizens could participate in decision-making ever addressed: The proscribed routes of 
involvement were to analyze, criticize, suggest, and judge. Whether a planner or government 
official had to listen to citizens’ suggestions or follow through with their judgements was left 
unsaid. Moreover, spokesmen [sic] for the community who were “divided and contentious” were 
deemed by Taylor to be “blocking progress.”614 By definition, those who disagreed with the plans 
of the specialists and professionals were unqualified to represent their communities.  
To stand in the way of progress, as represented by the power and knowledge of planners 
and specialists, would be to “focus on the equivalent of cottage industries on the threshold of the 
computer age.” Once again, the residents of inner-cities were characterized as outside modernity. 
Taylor provides a novel coda to this argument. He added that such anti-modernity “would give the 
enemies of integration the rationale and philosophy for their own special brand of apartheid.” Even 
so, Taylor cautioned his listeners that one could not expect a member of an urban minority 
community to take “the larger view” unless they “had reason to believe that there is hope in that 
larger view.”615  
On one extreme end of the spectrum of citizen participation, then, was the apartheid of an 
imagined Wallace administration. The other end came from the parochial and anti-modern 
community politics that Taylor equated with black separatism. Integration was the national goal 
of the Johnson administration, but to “inveigh against black separatism” while denying funds for 
federal programs like the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was an act of hypocrisy and mockery. Taylor’s 
remarks affirmed the program of the Johnson administration, advocated for fully funding approved 
legislation and moving “forward more effectively to resolve the most difficult problems we all 
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face today – that of involving the citizen in a constructive process that will lead to positive 
accomplishment, and significant improvement in the quality of urban life for us all.”616 
Conclusion 
The Great Society envisioned a revitalized American society and democracy, and healthy 
urban areas was central to that vision. Members of the Johnson administration were sincere in their 
commitment to civil rights, the war on poverty, and an increasingly better life for all Americans. 
Johnson himself was sensitive the realities of poverty, working, and racism, even as he carried 
with him lingering prejudices from growing up in rural Texas. He was known to deploy racial 
epithets, but he also kept a picture of the impoverished rural Mexican-American schoolchildren he 
taught as an early adult in his desk. Once, when asked who had written one of his speeches as 
president, he pulled this photograph from his desk and replied, “they did.”617  
Yet, the Great Society was more than just President Johnson, and other members brought 
their own experiences and prejudices with them. As the memo, booklet, and speeches analyzed in 
this chapter have shown, not all members of the Great Society were sensitive to the lived realities 
of racial discrimination or economic deprivation. These attitudes combined to create imagined 
cities, based on observed realities but colored by preconceptions, for which federal policy makers 
developed remedies. Additionally, there were generational differences that shaped how policy 
makers confronted the urban crisis. A main one was the difference between those, like LBJ, who 
saw themselves as heirs to FDR’s New Deal, and those who considered themselves as part of John 
F. Kennedy’s New Frontier.  
The two halves of this divide approached economics in fundamentally different ways. For 
those who considered themselves New Dealers, and who had experienced the Great Depression, 
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there existed a wariness towards capitalism itself. It was necessary, therefore, to regulate the 
excesses of capitalism, as proscribed by economist John Maynard Keynes. Carefully calibrated 
government spending, so the idea went, would ensure economic growth. The postwar success of 
the United States’ economy seemed to demonstrate the veracity of Keynesian economic thinking. 
This very success, by the 1950s, led liberal thinkers to consider capitalism as stable and capable 
of sustained expansion. The Kennedy administration argued over what poverty truly meant: it 
could be a lack of resources, but in “the affluent society,” perhaps it was a lack of opportunity. 
Counseled by JFK’s economic advisers away from his New Deal inclinations, Johnson’s first State 
of the Union address thus averred that “very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of 
poverty, but the symptom.” The cause was a lack of a fair chance, of access to opportunity to share 
in the ever-growing American prosperity.618 
 It was not until the 1970s that this worldview would change, with the combined forces of 
stagflation and the oil crisis. Historian Carl Abbott locates this exact shift in 1972, when a group 
of economists and scientists, the Club of Rome, released their report The Limits to Growth. The 
group, via computer modeling, arrived at the conclusion that population growth was leading to 
unsustainable pressure on natural resources. This Malthusian prediction, however, then combined 
with the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, raising fears of peak petroleum. Stagflation and 
deindustrialization rounded out the picture, which strongly suggested that ever-expanding 
economic prosperity was not, after all, assured.619 As the second chapter of this study explained, 
however, indications of this were already present by the early 1950s. Or, rather, that the growing 
economy following the Second World War developed unevenly in different regions and in 
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different industries. The result was that entire cities were left behind. Regional urban disparities, 
such as that between the rust belt and the sun belt, were not address by the Model Cities program. 
 The funding for Model Cities was spread too thin, from six cities to sixty-six, and did not 
accomplish what it was originally intended to do. Even if it had remained focused on the original 
six cities proposed by Walter Reuther, the Johnson administration and the Great Society was 
devoured by the continuing war in Vietnam. Increasing consumed by the quagmire in southeast 
Asia, Johnson did not seek reelection in 1968, and Richard Nixon won the presidency. Nixon and 
subsequent presidents have continued key Great Society programs, from Head Start programs to 
public media, and these continue to be popular with the general public. The role of cities in the 
health and vitality of American society and democracy, however, never reached the same height 
















CHAPTER 7 EPILOGUE  
This project began under the presidency of Barack Obama, when the United States was 
supposed to have moved beyond race, into what has been termed a post-racial society. Doing 
graduate studies in urban and labor history in the majority-black city of Detroit, surrounded by 
largely majority-white suburbs, it was difficult to quite buy this argument.620 It was clear that 
poverty and blackness correlated into living in the city proper, while wealth and whiteness 
correlated with living in the suburbs. Income, ancestry, and geographic location all seemed 
interrelated. Thus, even if we grant that, in interpersonal dimensions, we were post-racial, it 
seemed indicated that serious structural inequalities persisted.  
The murders of Trayvon Martin, Freddie Grey, Michael Brown, Eric Gardner, and too 
many others occurred in rapid succession. Ferguson and Baltimore became sites of public 
frustration and anger met with militarized policing – the same policing that had led to the shooting, 
choking, or otherwise deadly treatment in police custody, of so many unarmed black men and 
women. Subsequent police testimony demonstrated to what a degree blackness, even in children, 
was connected to criminality and violence, therefore perceived as a physical threat.621 Our society 
and, especially, our cities, were anything close to post-racial, and it was clear to most that there 
was a logic at work in which slums and ghettoes, the inner-cities, were black and impoverished.622 
Then, with the subsequent presidential election, the gates of hell seemed to burst forth. Neo 
Nazis and the KKK openly marched, harming and killing anti-fascist protesters, and leading to a 
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political climate that saw a rise in the harassment and assault of minorities of all sorts: racial, 
ethnic, religious, sexual. In the year this dissertation was finished, a new phenomenon emerged, 
chilling given the recent history of extra-legal police killing of black Americans: calling the police 
on black people for simply being present in public spaces. Within two weeks in the spring of 2018, 
white Americans called the police on black Americans for waiting in a coffeeshop, for taking a 
nap in a dormitory common room, for shopping at an upscale clothing chain, for eating breakfast 
at a popular chain restaurant, for renting a room in a white neighborhood, for having a BBQ in a 
public park. Similar cases continued over the summer, including the police being called on a black 
politician canvassing door-to-door, and a black landlord checking on a property he had just 
purchased. Divorced from any illegal activity, this persistence calling of the police is the cruel 
harassment of black Americans for simply being in spaces in which they are not welcomed by 
some white Americans. This chapter in the long book of anti-black racism in the United States 
earned its wearily dry rejoinder online via #existingwhileblack, through which people documented 
their experiences with racism in everyday situations and tasks. 
 The criminalization of blackness, in and of itself, and its subsequent policing, has been 
long interrogated by scholars of black experiences. As urban areas in the US become increasingly 
non-white, they correspondingly become criminalized and therefore requiring more intense 
policing, for not other reason than that they have become non-white. Just as white communities 
feared the “invasion” of integration fifty years ago, so black presence in what is coded as white 
space is perceived as an invasion of criminality, and requiring the intervention of an increasingly 
militarized and violent police force, even if all that is occurring is a BBQ, a vacation, a nap, or a 




history or merely academic, the major concerns of this study continue to have present relevance 
and resonance.  
 Detroit itself entered into a moment of cultural cachet as this study was being written. A 
spate of books and articles emerged attempting to explain Detroit to the uninitiated. Those focusing 
on the abandoned structures of the industrial past were roundly criticized by Detroiters as ruin porn 
(titillating to its safely-ensconced observers, exploitative of its objectified subjects). The New York 
Times released a series of articles on the city that sublimely missed the point altogether, when not 
simply patronizing, including that authored by critically-acclaimed Norwegian author Karl Ove 
Knausgaard.623 The obscurity of Detroit, the unknowability of it, is nothing but the inability to 
accept what Detroit represents in reality: the potent combination of structural racism and the ability 
of industrial, and now post-industrial, capitalism to abandon an entire city. Detroit, and its 
residents, were and are disposable. It is easy to dismiss this statement when it is an abstract 
utterance. It is another matter altogether when one is, in one’s human-sized physicality, confronted 
by miles upon miles of abandoned industrial spaces and devastated residential areas throughout 
the metropolitan area. But here’s yet another moment of inscrutability. The largeness of that 
confrontation, in turn, leads to the obfuscation of what does remain in Detroit: resilient and strong 
communities, vibrant and rich creativity in and appreciation of music and art, a thriving food 
culture, wide-spread devoutness that crosses faith traditions, a continuing working-class ethos, a 
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warmness and generosity of spirit on the part of those who live there which is nearly always 
overlooked and ignored in favor of stories of criminality and violence. 
 Similar in conceit to ruin porn strand of photography is the comparison of Detroit to post-
Soviet urban decay or a bombed-out city, often Berlin after WWII or Sarajevo following the 
brutalities in the former Yugoslavia. For instance, Detroit native Mark Lilla compared the city to 
post-Communist Bucharest, where one can take a “Beautiful Decay Tour” to visit “buildings full 
of rubble and broken glass, abandoned factories invaded by local grasses.” Detroit, Lilla tells his 
readers, is “American’s Bucharest.” Part of the appeal, which can be traced back to Romanticism, 
is that “for those who have never experienced defeat, destruction, or exile there is an undeniable 
charm to loss.”624 A common story told in Detroit is that of visitors from Bosnia or Germany or 
some such place that has experienced grievous destruction during a war, and asking Detroiters who 
had bombed them.625  
 Detroit does not fare better in fiction, as related by urbanist and science fiction fan Carl 
Abbott. In Imagining Urban Futures, Detroit appears as an iteration of “crabgrass chaos,” where 
even the suburbs are “ghettos and slums, free-fire zones of danger and depopulation where it’s 
everybody for him or herself and wilding gangs take the hindmost.” Abbott points to Tobias 
Buckell’s “Stochasti-City” and Elizabeth Bear’s “The Red in the Sky is Our Blood,” both based 
in metropolitan Detroit. “Bucknell’s and Bear’s Detroit,” Abbott tells his readers, “is no long 
stretch from the real thing.”626 In another case, Nalo Hopkinson, author of 1998’s Brown Girl in 
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the Ring, featuring a Caribbean Canadian young woman in a future inner Toronto abandoned by 
government and businesses alike, has said her vision of Toronto was modeled on Detroit.627 
 Between the extremes of only seeing the many hardships faced by Detroiters and focusing 
only on the positives, and consequently over-romanticizing, one can acknowledge the difficulties 
experienced by the city and its residents while seeing that humans, through time and space, make 
the best of the circumstances in which we find ourselves: we find love, joy, and creative expression 
where we can.628  
This study has aimed to explore the roots of present day Detroit, by examining case studies 
of racial segregation, deindustrialization, and contemporary responses at different scales (by 
residents, by local elites, and by the federal government). The intent is not to chide historical actors 
for not making better decisions, but rather to endeavor to understand what solutions had been 
proposed in the past, what their advantages and drawbacks might have been, and which were 
followed and which were not. This history is more variegated than it is often presented in popular 
narratives, and this study seeks to bely the notion that the present conditions of Detroit, and many 
other cities and small towns that share its experiences, were inevitable. They were not. As 
sociologist Daniel Bell wrote in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, “these trends become 
subject to choice and the decision is a policy intervention which may create a turning point in the 
history of a country or an institution.”629 Alternatives and proposals were offered by many, the 
acknowledgement of which is not to argue that their implementation would have been plausible, 
possible, likely, or desired.  
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Even as we acknowledge that the present is the culmination of the decisions and choices 
we, as a society, have made in the past, it is difficult to argue that, for instance, a racialized society 
should have simply chosen to forego racism, structurally as well as interpersonally. Ideally, yes, 
but structures of power did not appear over night and, putting severe ruptures of catastrophe, 
revolution, and war to the side, they do not change over night. Understanding what those structures 
are, and how they operate, and how they came to be, however, is the first step to moving towards 
moving beyond them.  Likewise, this study does not mean to argue that deindustrialization of a 
region is inherently bad, which is a form of romanticizing industrial production for its own sake. 
Rather, the point is, historically, deindustrialization led to a certain set of problems for workers 
and for cities. On one plane is these problems and how they could have been avoided, and on 
another is how they could have been quickly and efficiently addressed after coming into being.  
As we live in a world that is largely urban and only becoming more so, the conditions of 
life in our cities matter greatly. All too often, solutions to urban ills center around moving the 
problems out of sight and out of mind – instead of addressing the roots of poverty, for instance, it 
is easier to relocate impoverished city residents to the outskirts of the city or into scattered suburbs. 
It is impossible to grapple with inequalities within metropolitan areas without grappling with the 
history and legacy of racial inequalities or large-scale changes in economic structures, yet 
frequently we do just that. It is unsurprising, then, that these questions have risen to the forefront, 
yet again, of American politics and social relations. They are fundamental to our social well-being, 
and we must engage with them if we are to move forwards as a democratic and urban society that 
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 Following Second World War, cities in the United States appeared to be in trouble. The 
urban crisis revolved around poverty, unemployment, segregation and discrimination, 
suburbanization, and deindustrialization. Using metropolitan Detroit as a case-study, this 
dissertation examines responses by local residents, urban planners, and federal policy-makers to 
these changes. Local community and union members centered around the Ford River Rouge 
complex in Dearborn rallied against industrial decentralization in the early 1950s. Community 
members in Grosse Pointe practiced systematic housing segregation, while other members of the 
community organized a Human Relations Council to support integration and interracial 
understanding. Constantinos Doxiadis led a research project in the 1960s, which published a three-
volume study on the city in the year 2000. In the Lyndon B. Johnson presidential administration, 
the Model Cities program was developed to address struggling urban areas across the nation, even 
as the program originated in Detroit, via Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers. 
Through all these episodes, different people expressed how they understood the current challenges 




state of race relations, economic inequality, and who was and was not considered to have a right 
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